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‘It is a capital mistake to theorise before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgment’  
 
Sherlock Holmes (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 1905) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This thesis examined influences on the decision making process of police officers attending the 
scenes of sudden and unexpected death in England and Wales. It was initiated following concerns 
raised by Home Office Registered Forensic Pathologists (HORFPs) in some parts of England and 
Wales that their services were not being appropriately utilised to assist in the decision as to 
whether a death was ‘suspicious’ and possibly involving a third party, or a non-suspicious 
community death. Failure to properly assess the scene of the death can deny the investigation of 
processes to forensically determine a cause of death, and to lose forensic trace evidence from the 
body. There were three parts to the research; i) an examination of homicide statistics and forensic 
post mortem data which showed inconsistency in decision making between some police forces; ii) 
a case study of 32 real deaths where HORFPs had taken over the conduct of a post mortem 
procedure where the police had made a decision that the case was not suspicious but where the 
non-forensic pathologists felt that the case was a suspicious one; and iii) focus groups interviews 
with key individuals involved in the operational decision making process at the scene of sudden 
and unexpected death which revealed a lack of training and standardisation in dealing with 
sudden and unexpected deaths. Overall it was found that homicide cases may be missed due to 
poor decision making and that this phenomenon is not a new one. The mind-set of police officers 
dealing with these cases may influence the decision to treat cases as non-suspicious, and thus the 
services of a HORFP is not utilised to give an expert medical opinion. A major factor appeared to 
be the vulnerability of the deceased, as well as budgetary pressures. Recommendations are made 
to address the quality of death investigations, including a national policy, training of front line 
officers and supervisors and a standard operating procedure.   
The wrong decision – a ‘fatal call’ – can lead to a failed investigation and someone ‘getting away 
with murder’.  
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Introduction: Setting the Scene 
In 1997, the body of a paraplegic man was found at his home address in a small market town in 
the south of England. The local Detective Inspector was informed and attended the scene. Also in 
attendance were uniformed officers, a Detective Constable and a Scenes of Crime officer. The 
man in his sixties was found in a downstairs room in his council house, sat in his motorised 
wheelchair slumped forward and in a semi-decomposed state. The house was in disarray with 
rubbish strewn throughout. Examination of letters on the doormat revealed that the body had 
probably been there for at least six weeks, and the unfortunate man was known as a hermit with 
no family or friends. The Detective Inspector concluded from all the available information that the 
man had probably died because of natural causes and the case was referred to the coroner. 
The coroner telephoned the Detective Inspector questioning the decision that the death was not 
suspicious as there appeared to be no adverse medical history. The officer assured the coroner 
that the case was a straightforward non-suspicious death in the community and that no forensic 
post mortem was necessary. The coroner accepted those assurances. A non-forensic coroner’s 
post mortem took place. The pathologist commenced the autopsy but ceased his examination on 
dissection of the neck of the deceased. He formed the view that the man had been strangled as 
evidenced by a fractured hyoid bone.  
A forensic pathologist was called and the Detective Inspector ordered that the scene be guarded 
pending a full scene examination, even though the house had been released back to the local 
council. A full forensic post mortem then took place on the deceased body.  Although the death of 
this poor vulnerable individual transpired not to be a murder, the Detective Inspector had learnt a 
lesson on making hasty decisions at the scene of sudden and unexpected deaths and vowed never 
to make the same mistake again. 
The Detective Inspector was the author of this thesis. 
This thesis examined influences on decision making by the police in the early stages of a sudden 
and unexpected death investigation in England and Wales. The focus was on the decisions of 
death investigators in the early stages of an inquiry into a death and whether to call for a forensic 
post mortem examination. Current forensic pathologists on the Home Office Register of Forensic 
Pathologists (HORFP) have made anecdotal claims that police and coroners may not be using their 
services in a way that will maximise the decision making process as to whether to treat a death as 
'suspicious' or as 'natural causes'. Failure to properly forensically process the body of a deceased 
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person has the potential to lead to homicides not being identified as such, or in cases later 
confirmed as homicide, forensic trace evidence from the body being missed.  
The system of death investigation in England and Wales essentially fits into one of three 
pathways. The first and most common is a death which is anticipated due to ill health and where a 
medical doctor can issue a Medical Certificate of the Cause of Death (MCCD). If a doctor is unable 
to issue a certificate because they had not recently been treating the deceased or the death was 
unexpected, the case is referred to a coroner for investigation. This will usually involve the police 
attending the scene of the death and completing an investigation on behalf of the coroner. If the 
outcome of that initial police investigation is that the death is not suspicious, and there is no 
third-party involvement, the coroner will continue with the investigation which may involve the 
appointment of a non-forensic hospital ‘histopathologist’ conducting a post mortem (PM) to assist 
with the medical cause of death. If, however the outcome of the police investigation is that the 
case is suspicious, the police take on primacy in the investigation. In consultation with the police, 
the coroner will appoint a HORFP to conduct the PM. The two disciplines of normal non–forensic 
PM’s and forensic PM’s are very different. Therefore, if the outcome of that initial police 
investigation is flawed and the decision by the police is that the case is not suspicious, there will 
be no forensic examination of the body and a potential homicide could be missed.   
The research question was; 
Are decision makers at the scene of unexplained deaths utilising the services of Home Office 
registered forensic pathologists appropriately, thereby reducing the possibility of missed 
homicides? 
There are three principle sub-questions: 
How are decisions about whether to undertake a forensic post-mortem made, and what are the 
key influences upon these? 
Why aren’t forensic post-mortems commissioned when they should be? 
What are the implications for policy and practice that can be distilled from the findings? 
 
Scope of the research 
Since 2003 there has been a downward trend in the homicide rate, coupled with a reducing 
number of requests for the services of HORFPs and so this thesis examined the relationship 
between identified homicides and the number of cases where HORFPs are called to perform a 
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forensic post mortem examination. It is clearly important that the investigation of sudden and 
unexplained death is of a high quality to identify cases where there may have been third party 
involvement. Reductions of homicide may be due to several factors, but could poor death 
investigations contribute to the falling homicide rate? The goal of this research was to identify 
good practice and areas which may need to be reviewed and be improved upon.  
Chapter 1 examines how death is investigated in England and Wales, both in terms of criminal 
homicide investigations and the parallel coronial inquiry. The processes of a homicide 
investigation are examined and highlights that good quality investigations are necessary to avoid 
miscarriages of justice.  
Chapter 2 examines the academic literature in terms of failed murder investigations and 
psychological issues concerning decision making and in particular investigative decision making, 
together with issues of bias and heuristics and measures that can be employed to reduce biased 
thinking. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology used within this mixed method study. The rationale is 
explained for the selected design and the way in which the data were collected, stored and 
analysed. The chapter also discusses the ethical issues and in particular considerations involved 
with being a ‘practitioner researcher’. 
Chapter 4 identifies the social reasons death investigation is important and the roles of those who 
are charged with identifying the medical cause of death. It examines the differing roles of doctors 
involved in death work and how forensic pathology differs from routine coronial autopsy practice. 
Key cases of missed homicide are examined which highlight the importance of high quality and 
robust investigations by the police and coroners.  
Chapter 5 sets out the findings of the study in terms of the overall statistical state of death 
investigation in England and Wales and an analysis of the relationship between forensic PM 
investigations with the homicide rate.   
Chapter 6 sets out the analysis of thirty-two real death cases where initial decisions may have 
been flawed and sets out the factors identified as potentially influencing decision making by 
investigators. 
Chapter 7 describes the outcomes of focus groups interviews with key decision makers in the 
investigation of sudden and unexpected death and identifies the various issues perceived to 
impact on decision making.  
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Chapter 8 discusses the findings of all three parts of the study and sets out the implications for 
the coronial investigation of death as well as homicide investigation. Several conclusions and 
recommendations are made which have been taken forward with the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council and the College of Policing, including a draft national policy in dealing with death cases as 
well as training for front line officers and a proposed standard operating procedure. 
Chapter 1 
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Chapter 1: Dealing with Death 
1.1   Death Investigation in England and Wales: How Many? 
As can be seen in table 1, there are about half a million deaths in England and Wales annually 
(MoJ, 2016). Most of these deaths are from natural causes, whether that be through natural 
illness, unfortunate circumstances or simply 'old age'. Approximately 55% of deaths can be 
accounted for when a medical practitioner issues a document certifying the death as being due to 
known medical conditions (MoJ, 2016).  
Table 1: Registered deaths and deaths reported to coroners in England and Wales  
Year Registered deaths Deaths reported to coroners 
 Number Number % of registered 
deaths 
2000 537,877 218,092 40.5% 
2001 532,498 224,286 42.1% 
2002 535,356 224,999 42.0% 
2003 539,151 227,790 42.2% 
2004 514,250 225,511 43.9% 
2005 512,993 232,401 45.3% 
2006 502,599 230,007 45.8% 
2007 504,052 234,458 46.5% 
2008 509,090 234,784 46.1% 
2009 491,348 229,883 46.8% 
2010 493,242 230,595 46.8% 
2011 484,367 222,371 45.9% 
2012 499,331 227,721 45.6% 
2013 506,790 227,984 45.0% 
2014 500,122 223,841 45.0% 
 
Of this half a million deaths, about 45% will not be clear cut (MOJ, 2014). These will be cases 
where a doctor is unable to immediately identify the cause of death and so referral is made to the 
coroner for investigation and usually attended by the police who conduct an initial investigation 
at the scene on behalf of the coroner. This study examines those factors affecting police decision 
making at the scene of sudden and unexpected death and discusses the potential for homicides to 
be left undetected due to decisions made in the early stages of the investigation when the police 
are involved.  
The vast majority of the deaths referred to coroners will be deemed as ‘non-suspicious’ where 
there is no suspected third party involvement. The coroner may or may not request that a post 
mortem (PM) examination of the body takes place by a pathologist to assist in the identification 
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of the cause of death. Approximately two thousand deaths annually will be treated as ‘suspicious’ 
from the outset (Home Office, 2016). Table 2 shows the numbers of cases where the coroner 
refers deaths for PM examination as well as the number of inquests1.  
Table 2: Number of coroner authorised PMs and inquests opened in England and Wales  
Year Number of 
Post-Mortems 
Number of 
Inquests 
 
2000 124,536 24,117 
2001 121,112 24,617 
2002 117,684 25,363 
2003 119,610 25,754 
2004 115,773 26,618 
2005 114,620 27,537 
2006 110,224 27,305 
2007 110,360 28,510 
2008 108,360 28,518 
2009 105,354 28,213 
2010 101,943 27,401 
2011 93,954 27,162 
2012 94,814 28,279 
2013 94,455 29,942 
2014 89,875 25,889 
 
 Usually, the pathologist asked to conduct such an autopsy2 is a ‘hospital pathologist’ known as a 
'histopathologist' who is trained in autopsy practice. A histopathologist is a medical doctor who 
specialises in the examination of human tissue under a microscope and assists in the diagnosis of 
disease in both the living and the dead. In a death case, the report from the pathologist will go 
with other evidence gleaned by the coroner who will decide on a cause of death and issue a death 
certificate accordingly. Autopsy practice is normally ancillary to the main role of disease diagnosis 
that histopathologists perform. 
Of the two thousand cases annually dealt with as deaths where there is the possible involvement 
of a third person, the coroner in consultation with the police will order what is known as a 
'forensic post mortem' examination, and a 'Home Office Registered Forensic Pathologist' (HORFP) 
will be called upon to conduct this examination. Of these forensic cases, approximately one third 
have historically transpired to have been homicide (Hutton, 2015). If a homicide is suspected, the 
                                                             
1 An inquest is held when; i) a violent or unnatural death; ii) a sudden death of which the cause is unknown, or iii) death 
in custody.  
2 Autopsy and Post Mortem are synonymous.  
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coroner will suspend their investigation until the police investigation is complete. The numbers of 
forensic PM examinations compared with homicides is examined in Chapter 5. 
The decisions made by the police and the coroner in the early stages of an unexplained death are 
therefore very important contributors to the outcome. Failure to identify a suspicious death may 
lead to the homicide being undetected because an untrained histopathologist may not pick up on 
indicators pointing to foul play. A homicide can be missed or at best, vital forensic evidence could 
be lost. The initial investigation can be a difficult call. If the wrong decision is made it could be 
fatal to the investigation - a ‘fatal call’. 
 
1.2   The Coronial System 
The system of death investigation in England and Wales is complex and its origins based in history 
and commonly referred to as the ‘coronial’ system (Knight, 2008). The coronial system was 
established in England during the reign of Richard 1st (Knight, 2008). The word ‘Coroner’ was 
derived from the original title of ‘Crowner’ and their purpose was primarily the collection of 
revenue to support King Richard’s conquests in the Holy Land. This was done by establishing an 
inquisition into the death of a person and recovering any assets due but also enquiring as to the 
cause of death with a view of identifying cases of murder and in particular suicides. Suicide was an 
offence against god and therefore all assets of the deceased were taken by the state and became 
the property of the King (Knight, 2008, p. 3). A short history of the coronial system in England and 
Wales is included at Appendix 1. 
The primary role of a coroner in modern times is to inquire into the death of a human being 
within their jurisdiction. Their role was directed by several statutes and rules but has now been 
consolidated into current legislation under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 1 of the Act 
defines the primary role of the coroner to investigate a death where the body lies within their 
jurisdiction if:  
a) The deceased died a violent or unnatural death; 
b) The cause of death is unknown; or  
c) The deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. 
 
In practical terms, this is any death where a medical practitioner cannot issue a Medical 
Certificate of Cause of Death (MCCD). 
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The purpose of the coronial investigation is to establish who the deceased was, how, when and 
where the deceased came by his or her death and the particulars required to register the death 
(Fairbairn, 2014). The detailed guidance as to the role of the coroner is set out in the ‘Guide to 
Coroners Services’ (MoJ, 2014a). Coroners are independent judicial appointees and are paid and 
funded by local authorities. Their governmental oversight lies with the Ministry of Justice and 
since July 2013, all newly appointed coroners must be legally qualified. This new requirement is 
controversial in some quarters as it is argued it may lead to unnecessary autopsies being ordered 
by legally qualified coroners, nervous about calling the cause of death because they are not 
knowledgeable about medical issues (Carpenter and Tait, 2010, p. 207). Carpenter and Tait (2010) 
claim there is an over reliance on the medical reports from the pathologist rather than the scene 
report outlining the circumstances of the death, resulting in more focus on the ‘science’ rather 
than the investigation. This is due to the perceived superiority of the ‘scientific’ medical evidence 
verses what is seen as less scientific circumstantial and physical evidence from the police 
investigation at the scene (Carpenter and Tait, 2007, p. 209-10).  
This over reliance on autopsy demonstrates a risk averse approach which is driven partly by a fear 
of missing homicides. If the coroner makes the call without the PM, and it is wrong, it is the 
coroners fault. If a PM is conducted and the outcome is wrong, it is the pathologists fault 
(Carpenter and Tail, 2010, p. 214). The existence of this risk averse attitude of coroners is 
supported by Luce, (2003, p. 70) and Smith (2004, p. 284). Over reliance on the medical cause of 
deaths can lead to less consideration as to why the death occurred which the medical evidence 
cannot reveal (Carpenter and Tait, 2010, p. 216).  
The 2009 Coroners and Justice Act created the post of ‘Chief Coroner’ whose main responsibility is 
to provide support, leadership and guidance for coroners in England and Wales. The 2009 Act also 
introduced the concept of ‘Medical Examiners’. This was due to recommendations of Dame Janet 
Smith in the 2003 public enquiry which took place following the conviction of Dr Harrold Shipman 
for murdering what is estimated to be at least 215 of his patients dating back to the 1970’s 
(Smith, 2003). The necessity for medical examiners was reinforced by the Francis Inquiry into Mid 
Staffordshire Foundation Trust (Francis, 2010) and the Kirkup Inquiry into the Morecambe Bay 
disaster (Kirkup, 2015). It was recognised that the quality of the MCCD reports completed by 
doctors was flawed (Fernando, Oxley and Nottingham, 2012; James and Bull, 1996; Roulson, 
Benbow and Hasleton, 2005; Slater, 1993; Swift and West, 2002). The medical examiners system, 
unlike the system of the same name in other jurisdictions3, will not replace coroners, but acts as 
                                                             
3 Medical examiners in the USA take on a dual role of pathologist and decision maker replacing the coroner. 
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an oversight second opinion for all deaths except those which are referred to coroners from the 
outset. It is still unclear how medical examiners when appointed will interact with coroners but 
speculation was made by the interim National Medical Examiner, Professor Peter Furness for 
which the title of his lecture to the Medico-legal Society in 2012 sums up the possibilities; 
‘Mutualism, Commensalism or Parasitism?’ (Furness, 2012). The system of medical examiners has 
been piloted in various parts of the country and a review of these pilot studies found that the 
quality of death certification by doctors improved; there was more consistency of reporting to 
coroners where a doctor could not issue a certificate and a better liaison with next of kin. In one 
pilot area the medical examiner altered the MCCD in 83% of cases and in another site 33% 
required ‘major changes’ (Furness, Fletcher, Shepherd, Bell, Shale and Griffin, 2015, p. 11). Figure 
1 appears complex but in fact the medical examiners system will, in theory, improve the quality of 
death investigation and assist to reduce the potential for missed homicide in those cases where a 
doctor has issued a death certificate (MCCD). 
Figure 1. Medical Examiners System 
 
1.3   Types of Death Investigation 
All deaths in England and Wales must be registered with the Registrar of Births, Marriages and 
Deaths. This registration is required under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 and 
registration must take place before the body can be released for burial or cremation and the 
financial and legal affairs can be settled. Before the registrar can make an entry of the death in 
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the register of births marriages and deaths and thereby issue a death certificate to the next of kin, 
they must be in receipt of a MCCD issued by a medical practitioner if the legal conditions are met. 
These conditions are described at table 3 and termed as a ‘non-suspicious community death’. If 
these conditions are not met, the next of kin will require a certificate issued by a coroner. The 
undertaker will require a copy of the death certificate from the registrar prior to disposal of the 
body. If the body is to be cremated, a second medical practitioner must verify the cause of death 
before the body is released by the undertaker. This is clearly because once destroyed by fire, no 
further examination can take place, whereas, if the body is buried, it can be exhumed and 
examined at a later date if further information comes to light which casts doubt on the original 
cause of death (Department of Health, 2016). 
Therefore, a death will fall into one of three categories which will determine the way in which it is 
investigated. Table 3 briefly explains these. We therefore see three broad categories of non-
suspicious; unknown (or ‘grey’) and suspicious. These same categories are referred to further in 
Chapter 3. 
Table 3: Investigation of death 
Investigation  Decision 
Maker 
 Outcome Process 
Non-
suspicious 
community 
death 
Doctor  Certificate 
Issued 
A death certificate (MCCD) may be issued by a 
doctor (under Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1953) who has provided care during the last 
illness and who has seen the deceased within 14 
days of death or has seen the body after death 
and where there are no circumstances leading to 
suspicion of third party involvement (ONS, 2010). 
These are normally deaths which occur in the 
community or in hospital settings and are 
expected due to terminal illness and are not 
routinely referred to the police or the coroner for 
investigation.  
Non-
suspicious 
death where 
conditions for 
Doctor to 
issue a 
certificate are 
not satisfied 
Coroner  Coronial 
Investigation. 
Certificate 
issued after 
decision or 
inquest 
In circumstances of unexpected death where the 
deceased was not being treated for an illness 
and/or has not been seen within 14 days of death, 
the case must be referred to a coroner (Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1953). The police will 
normally inquire into the death on behalf of the 
coroner who may, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, order there to be a 
post mortem examination of the body and may 
also order an inquest (Coroners and Justice Act, 
2009).  
Suspicious 
Death 
Coroner 
Police 
 Police 
Investigation 
followed by 
Coronial 
Investigation 
Where death is unexpected and unexplained and 
there are circumstances which arise as to the 
possibility that there may have been a third-party 
involvement, the coroner will be informed, but 
the police will conduct an initial investigation. If 
the results of that investigation allay fears of third 
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party involvement in the death, the case will be 
referred back to the coroner to complete 
investigations and consider whether an inquest is 
required. If, however the outcome of the initial 
investigation points towards third party 
involvement, the police will commence a 
homicide investigation. In such cases, the 
coroner’s investigation will be suspended until the 
outcome of the homicide case or the case has 
been heard by a Crown Court. 
Hospital 
Death 
Doctor 
and 
NOK4 
 Post Mortem 
for learning 
purposes 
If a person dies in hospital whist being treated, 
the next of kin can ‘consent’ to a post mortem to 
discover the cause of death. This is done in the 
interests of learning and future death prevention. 
However, such post mortems are rare in recent 
years, which have caused some concern amongst 
the pathology profession as this source of data is 
being eroded (Burton and Underwood, 2003). 
 
 
1.4   The Initial Police Investigation 
The police will be involved in the initial investigation of the death only in circumstances where a 
doctor cannot certify from known facts regarding the patients’ medical condition. Upon the 
report of a sudden and unexpected death, a police officer will be deployed to the place where the 
body has been discovered or currently lays, which could be the hospital if admission had taken 
place or death had occurred on route to the hospital. It will be the responsibility of that police 
officer to make an initial assessment of the death as to whether there may be third party 
involvement or not; in other words, to treat the death as ‘suspicious’, or to satisfy themselves that 
no suspicious circumstances exist (ACPO, 2006). It is this initial investigation by the police which is 
the subject of the research in this thesis. There is no clear guidance, even within the ‘grey 
literature’5 which sets out a process for this part of the investigation. If it is thought that the death 
may be suspicious, medical assistance will be required to provide an initial opinion as to the 
medical cause of death. A ‘police doctor’ sometimes referred to as a ‘Force Medical Officer’ (FME) 
may be called to the scene but unlike forensic pathologists, they are not trained to provide a 
medico-legal cause of death (ACPO, 2006). Other than pronouncing that ‘life is extinct’, the FME 
may not be able to offer any expert opinion as to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the 
death apart from in the most obvious of cases. There is a lack of nationally accepted advice 
regarding the process of having a doctor contracted by the police attending unexplained deaths, 
                                                             
4 Next of Kin 
5 Grey literature is defined as ‘material produced and published by organisations without recourse to the commercial or    
  scholarly publishing industry’ (Lawrence, Houghton, Thomas, Weldon, 2014, p.2). 
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and there is no law or national policy in relation to the need for a medical professional to declare 
that life is extinct. The reason for this is not clear but is discussed at chapter 8. At this stage, if the 
first attending officer considers that the death may be suspicious, the investigation will be 
referred to detective officers and crime scene examiners. If the view remains that expert medical 
opinion on the cause of death is required, the services of a HORFP will be called to conduct a 
forensic PM examination and to advise at the scene if appropriate (ACPO, 2006). However, the 
HORFP will not be called if the view of the attending police officers is that there are no suspicious 
circumstances, and it is considered that the case is a straightforward non-suspicious coroner’s 
case. If no suspicious circumstances are identified, the police officer will arrange for the body to 
be recovered by an undertaker and a report will be completed for the information of the coroner. 
Based upon the police report and any other facts gleaned from the deceased’s medical records 
and witness evidence, the coroner will decide on the conduct of the coronial investigation and 
whether a non-forensic PM examination is required. It is these such cases which is the focus of 
this research. 
Prior to a homicide investigation commencing, the most likely scenario is that there will be a 
reported incident of some kind. This may be a fight, an accident or a discovery of a body. In any 
event there is typically limited information and so a uniformed police officer is deployed (Feist 
and Newiss, 2000, p. 5). The Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) (ACPO, 2006, p. 35) describes 
the priorities of the first attending officers and is known as the ‘Five Building Block Principles’ at 
figure 2 (source ACPO, 2006). 
 
Figure 2. Five Building Blocks Principle  
 
 
 
These five principles are self-explanatory with the preservation of life clearly being the overriding 
one. The MIM (ACPO, 2006) describes processes and acknowledges that identifying whether a 
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death is a potential homicide can be very difficult, and states that all cases should be treated as a 
homicide until the evidence proves otherwise (ACPO, 2006, p35). However, it offers little 
guidance to officers on decision making. One of the main weaknesses is that the document was 
written for the SIO and not the officers who are most likely to attend, few of which would have 
ever heard of the manual (Fox, 2013).  
Some scenes are easier to identify than others (Innes, 2002, p. 671), such as those described as 
‘self-solvers’ (as opposed to ‘whodunits’) – cases where the person responsible is obvious (Innes 
2003, p. 197). The importance of the police initial response to crime more generally is also 
important to the outcome (Steer, 1980, p. 74; Eck, 1983). The first stage of the investigation is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Golden Hour’, which is the period most critical to the investigation 
in terms of losing evidence and identifying witnesses (Cook and Tattersall, 2010). 
 
 
1.5   The Coronial Investigation 
The reason that the coroner is an important figure in the potential for homicides to be missed is 
because of their gate keeping and decision making role in death investigations referred to them. 
Because only the coroner can authorise a PM examination under Section 14.1 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act (2009), any erroneous decision leading to a missed homicide may be shared between 
the police and the coroner. However, the coroner does rely on the police report and opinion in 
making directions as part of their investigation (see Chapter 8). If the police investigation at the 
scene is inadequate, the decision making thereafter may be flawed (Carpenter and Tait, 2010, p. 
206). There are political influences which can shape the decisions of professional death 
investigators, especially when suicide is suspected where there is great pressure to reclassify for 
the sake of grieving relatives (Timmermans, 2006, p. 75). Another area of external influence 
relates to terminally ill people where the euthanasia debate is often encountered (Materstvedt, 
2003). It can therefore be seen that there are outside influences to decision making other than 
the actual evidence from the scene and at autopsy. There are also social issues which can affect 
an investigation into a death such as a reluctance of some police officers to examine a dead body 
or do not know what to look for (Timmermans, 2006 p. 41). There may be objections to the 
invasive PM process on ethical or religious grounds (Hutton, 2015). 
There have been several academic studies in relation to shortcomings in the current coronial 
system, none of which have been ‘fixed’ by the 2009 Coroners and Justice Act, which introduced 
largely cosmetic changes and has been viewed by many within the system as a missed 
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opportunity (Cooper, Leigh, Lucas, and Martin, 2007). The deaths caused by Dr Harold Shipman, 
the Marchioness disaster and the Alder Hay tissue scandal all highlight that the system is not 
water tight (Berry and Heaton-Armstrong, 2005). Although there have been several reviews 
dating back to 1920, there has been no significant change in a system which is embedded in 
history (Palmer, 2012, p. 64).  
Whatever the shortfalls of the coronial system, the main reason for the coronial investigation is to 
identify suspicious deaths where third party involvement is suspected, in other words ‘homicide’. 
If the coroner’s inquest cannot identify a cause of death, the jury will normally return what is 
termed an ‘open verdict’ – this means that the cause of death cannot be established and doubt 
remains as to how the deceased came to their death. There were over 1700 open verdicts in 
England and Wales in 2015 (MoJ, 2016, p. 23) and although the majority tend to be possible but 
unproven suicides, this is the arena where unidentified homicides are most likely to be found 
(MoJ, 2016.
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Chapter 2: Academic Literature Review 
Bell (1993; p. 25) describes that the literature review should show that ‘the writer has studied 
existing work in the field with insight’. The purpose of a literature review is to provide the reader 
with a picture of the state of knowledge and of major questions in the subject matter being 
investigated (Bell, 1993).  
2.1 Miscarriages of Justice 
Several significant cases dating back to the seventies have shaped the way that the police deal 
with homicide investigations. To fail to identify a homicide thereby allowing someone to ‘get 
away with murder’ is a miscarriage of justice in its own right.  
In 1972, the way in which the police interviewed juveniles in the Maxwell Confait case led to 
murder convictions being overturned, resulting in an inquiry into the case by Sir Henry Fisher, 
which in turn led to the Royal Commission of Criminal Procedure in 1979 (Poyser and Milne, 
2015). The case of the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ in which thirteen women were murdered by Peter 
Sutcliffe highlighted many failures of the police to tie together murder investigations across police 
force boundaries thus resulted in the 1982 ‘Byford Report’ (1981), which introduced many 
changes in the police handling of homicide investigations. These included the introduction of a 
standardised method of managing investigations (ACPO, 2005a) and the development of the 
Home Office Large and Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) as the first national IT solution for major 
inquiries. There are many more cases such as the Soham murders (Rogerson, 2004), Damilola 
Taylor (Metropolitan Police, 2002), Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2005) and the Canning’s case (Dyer, 
2004) which show that the failings are also a contemporary problem. Failures emanating from the 
IRA mainland bombings in the 1980’s led to a Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in 1981 
(Reiner, 2000, p. 67). The death of Stephen Lawrence in 1993 was a watershed in the way that 
murder was dealt with by the police. This lead to the Macpherson Enquiry (1999) which made far 
reaching recommendations into police practice. Miscarriages of Justice are not simply ‘wrongful 
convictions’ but are ‘questionable convictions’ as the former suggests there has been a ‘denial of 
the truth’ which may not in fact be the case (Savage and Milne, 2007). Questionable convictions 
are not only the consequence of poor investigations, but also ‘inaction’ or ‘no action’, and so the 
miscarriage may be a result of a failure to act on the part of investigators. The reasons for 
miscarriages of justice are varied, and include police malpractice; failed investigation; disclosure 
issues, through to poor legal representation and questionable ‘expert evidence’, but 
fundamentally a violation of an individual’s rights (Walker and Starmer, 1999). Miscarriages of 
Justice can occur where there is no action which can include police incompetence (Milne, Poyser, 
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Williamson and Savage, 2010). As well as the causes of failed investigations characterised by 
unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness, stereotyping and other forms of bigotry (Grieve, 
Crego and Griffiths, 2007). Grieve et al introduced the concept of ‘institutional incompetence’ 
which may not be mutually exclusive from the concept identified by the findings of the 
Macpherson inquiry of ‘Institutional Racism’ (Macpherson, 1999).  
These failings have in turn resulted in legislative changes imposed on the police as it appeared to 
politicians that there was an inability for the police service to effectively manage major crime 
without intervention (Stelfox, 2006, p. 102). This resulted in the introduction of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984; Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 and Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. These measures caused the intended tightening of outside 
scrutiny of the police and how they operate, particularly when dealing with serious and major 
crime. This increase in oversight was even to the extent of taking charging decisions away from 
the police via the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service. Further measures were introduced 
such as the introduction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and 
establishment of the Criminal Case Review Commission (CCRC), the latter to review the numerous 
claims of wrongful conviction for murder (Stelfox, 2015, p. 102-105).  
The police themselves have recognised the need for professionalising and have introduced many 
measures to safeguard against the failings of the past; such as the introduction of reviews for 
homicide cases (Jones, Grieve and Milne, 2008), and the writing of the Murder Investigation 
Manual (MIM) the first version of which was published in 1998 (ACPO, 1998). The MIM was 
reviewed in 2000 (ACPO, 2000), and the latest version was published in 2006 (ACPO, 2006). The 
MIM has a ‘sister’ document called the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative 
Procedures (MIRSAP) which sets out the procedures and processes within a murder incident room 
based upon the Byford recommendations (ACPO, 2005a). The MIM and the MIRSAP documents 
set out the collective learning from murder investigations and reviews of the past and provide 
practice advice in the light of new technical and forensic advances. However, much has changed 
since the last iteration of the MIM which is long due for revision. The MIM outlines the core 
doctrine for the management of murder inquiries, and is annexed to the Core Investigative 
Doctrine publication (ACPO, 2005b).  
The MIM sets out the process of a murder investigation (see Appendix 2), but only at the point a 
death is deemed to be suspicious. It does not create policy in respect of the process prior to that, 
namely the initial stage of the police attending a sudden and unexplained death. If the first 
attending officer is unsure as to the cause of death, they should alert supervisors and the case is 
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referred to the Criminal Investigation Department. Forensic pathologists can be consulted and 
attend the scene to assist in the medical cause of death, as well as making a scene assessment 
and advising on evidence recovery from the body. However, if the first officer who attends the 
scene of the death does not consider it ‘suspicious’, then the process directed within the MIM will 
not take place. The management of the scene of death prior to the declaration that there is some 
reason for suspicion of third party involvement appears to be outside of the traditional 
management, supervision and oversight of criminal investigation (Neyroud and Disley, 2007, p. 
549). It is important to have a designed and established protocol for officers first attending the 
scene of a potential homicide (Geberth, 1996). Such a protocol on a national basis in England and 
Wales does not exist currently (Doyle, 2011). 
The arrest and conviction of homicide offenders is usually in the mid 90 percent range (Office for 
National Statistics, 2014) and so success is high. This success is clearly in ignorance as to the 
number of homicides which are never identified as such. Stelfox (2006) examined a number of 
homicide investigations conducted in a single year in a large force with a view to identifying the 
features of a police homicide investigation which lead to a successful detection of the crime. He 
concluded that ‘the investigation process does not consist of a series of designed activities which 
occur in all cases but a loose framework within which officers deploy a range of investigative 
techniques, knowledge and decision making skills depending on the needs of the individual case’ 
(Stelfox, 2006, p. iii). 
Surprisingly, there is little academic literature about homicide investigation (Stelfox 2006, p. 2) 
although some notable exceptions exist such as Innes, (1999; 2002; 2003); Brookman, (2005); 
Brookman and Innes (2013) and Stelfox (2006). To conduct a successful homicide investigation, 
there are three key information needs as identified by Innes (2002, p. 681) and Maguire and 
Norris (1992, p. 7) as:  
 Determining that a crime has taken place;  
 Identifying a suspect and;  
 Gathering evidence to support a prosecution.  
 
Traditionally a successful murder investigation has only been heralded as such when there is a 
successful conviction at court, however as well as ‘outcome success’ the investigation can also be 
judged on ‘procedural success’, ‘community impact success’ and ‘preventative success’. 
(Brookman and Innes 2013, p. 296-305). For a homicide to be categorised as such, the event must 
be identified and classified in relation to the standards of evidence and definitions in law, which is 
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a ‘complex constructive process’ (Innes, 2002, p. 671). The interpretation of ‘facts’ is through a 
‘social process of objectification’ (Innes, 2002, p. 671), which of course can be different realities to 
different people because meaning is not intrinsic to an object or phenomena but is ‘an artful 
construction’ expressing a ‘situated perspective’ (Innes, 2003, p. 68). This thesis is concerned with 
the first of Innes’ three stages - identifying whether a homicide has taken place, because if this is 
not done properly, there may be no homicide investigation. The investigation at the scene by the 
first attending officer is therefore the most critical part of the investigation because if this is 
flawed, the other two stages will not come into play. 
Doyle (2011) conducted a survey of all police forces in England and Wales to ascertain whether 
they had policies in place for first responders on how to deal with a sudden unexpected death. 
She found that 66% of forces had policies in place but the quality and content varied across the 
country, and it was clear that those who were expected to attend these incidents were the most 
junior and inexperienced of officers. There was little in the way of guidance as to what constitutes 
‘suspicious’ or indicators of aggravating factors which may lead to suspicion. Some forces had 
policies in place where ambulance staff attended and the police were only involved if the 
ambulance staff considered the case to be suspicious (Doyle, 2011, p. 50). Policies were in place 
for half of the forces for child death cases, but again, she found the content and quality variable. 
Thus, there appears to be considerable disparity across the country which remains unchanged 
(Doyle, 2011), although there is now a national protocol for dealing with child death cases 
(Marshall, 2012). 
 
2.2 Issues Affecting Decisions Made in the Early Stages of a Sudden Death Case 
Central to this research are the decisions made in the early stages of a sudden and unexpected 
death investigation. It is important therefore to look at factors which may affect the choices that 
first attenders make. Decision making within the investigative context is no different from the 
broader issues in respect of any context (O’Neill and Milne, 2014, p. 124), and so this section will 
examine the literature on generic but then focus in on investigative decision making. Systematic 
errors can be caused by bias thinking and many of the issues which affect our perceptions of 
reality, impressions, intuitions and decisions go on subconsciously in human minds (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 4). Cognitive bias is a result of ‘computational trade-offs’ carried out in the brain (Dror, 
2013, p. 2). Most of the time humans are rational and their thinking is sound, but this can be 
affected by emotions which can cause a departure from rationality (Dror, 2013, p. 8). Kahneman, 
(2011) describes two systems in the mind, System 1 and System 2. System 1 operates 
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automatically, intuitively involuntarily and effortlessly. This might include such tasks as riding a 
bicycle or other ‘motor’ tasks which we do not consciously think about in any depth. System 2 
requires active thought; slowing down; deliberating; problem solving; reasoning; concentrating 
and not jumping to quick conclusions (Johnson, 2014, p. 1). The problem with system 1 thinking is 
that many people are over confident in their intuitions and they find cognitive effort ‘unpleasant’ 
and so rely on their intuition which may be flawed. They are also likely to listen to arguments 
which support their view and ignore those that do not. With system 1 thinking, the conclusion 
comes first and the justification follows (Kahneman, 2011, p. 45). Although system 2 should 
overcome the weaknesses inherent in system 1, on most occasions ‘the lazy system 2 will adopt 
the suggestions of system 1 and march on’. In other words, the decisions reached in system 2, 
although slow and more thoughtful, will be influenced by initial thoughts already made 
(Kahneman, 2011, p. 64). 
There is a bias of ‘first impression’ which is supported by a sub-conscious search for evidence to 
reinforce that first impression, rather than gathering all the evidence and then using system 2 to 
analyse and consider what might be the reasoned outcome (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). This 
phenomenon was realised even as far back as Francis Bacon in the 17th century (Bacon, 1620). 
Kahneman (2011) introduces the mnemonic WYSIATI – ‘What You See Is All There Is’. In other 
words, one does not look beyond what one observes, or thinks that they have observed. 
Kahneman (2011) describes the heuristic approach to problem solving, learning, or discovery that 
employs a practical method not guaranteed to be optimal or perfect, but sufficient for the 
immediate goals. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic 
methods are used to speed up the process of decision making. Heuristics are mental shortcuts 
that ease the cognitive load of making a decision. Examples of this method include using a rule of 
thumb, an educated guess, an intuitive judgment, stereotyping, profiling, or common sense. 
‘System 1 is sometimes the cause of what we do wrong, but it is also the origin of most of we do 
right – which is most of what we do’ (Kahneman, 2011, p. 416). Whereas one might expect the 
individual to deduce the particular from the general, in fact there is a tendency to deduce the 
general from the particular. In other words, to generalise a principle from one particular case 
(Kahneman, p. 174)6.  
Generally, the literature describes the effect of bias on decision making as affecting all human 
interaction. Dhami (2003) studied decisions on bail applications in court cases and found that 
decision makers were more likely to use heuristics than an objective consideration of the case. 
                                                             
6 A range of heuristics are summarised at Appendix 4, together with other academic references. 
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The same heuristic interference is identified within the medical profession (Hamm, 2004). 
Goldacre (2008) explained the appeal of alternative medicine on the effect of bias, including 
confirmation bias which induced people to use substances for which there remains no medical 
evidence that it works. Pennington and Hastie (1986 and 1992) examined the influence of 
heuristics on jurors which influenced their decision making rather than the evidence presented in 
criminal trials; Carpenter and Tait (2010) found similar biases in the decisions of coroners. There 
have also been studies into the decisions made by legally qualified professionals including judges 
where bias influenced decisions rather than the evidence presented (Simon 2004). The decisions 
of judges and legal professionals are equally susceptible to the effect of heuristics which poses a 
concern for the reliability of criminal and civil proceedings (Greene and Ellis 2007; Heilbrun and 
Erikson, 2007).  
Eyre and Alison (2007) examined the organisational and political culture in which professionals 
work when dealing with ‘critical incidents’, particularly with heavy media coverage and within the 
context of the blame culture (Eyre and Alison, p. 212). Context is a very important influence over 
decision making which is a factor not previously considered by traditional decision making theory 
(TDM), pointing to the fact that most research in this area has been laboratory based 
experimental research, where the researcher has control over the context which may not have 
much applicability in the ‘real world’ (Eyre and Alison, 2007). This type of research is contrasted 
with ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’ (NDM) which examines what decision makers do in real 
situations. In other words, the study commences with what was done rather than what should 
have been done (Eyre and Alison, 2007, p. 214). Researching the real world brings into play 
factors which may not be present in laboratory based experimentation, such as time constraints, 
stress, ambiguity, emotion, fear of criticism and organisational culture which can lead an 
operational decision maker to miss or ignore vital information causing ‘premature closure’ of an 
incident (Eyre and Alison, 2007, p. 220). Premature closure could of course include the 
investigation of a sudden and unexpected death. Eyre and Alison (2007) examined the literature 
in respect of failure to make decisions which are described as ‘decision avoidance’. This accounts 
for many of the tragedies over recent years which have led to public inquiries such as failure of 
the authorities to act in many child deaths where social services were criticised for failing to act to 
implement child protection measures (Laming, 2003).  
Decision avoidance is defined as ‘a tendency to avoid making a choice by postponing it or by 
seeking an easy way out that involves no action or no change’ (Anderson, 2003, p. 139), which 
leads to the bias effects of; i) maintaining the status quo; ii) omission to act and iii) deferring the 
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decision (Anderson, 2003). A sudden and unexpected death where the simplest option is that the 
death was from natural causes seems therefore to be attractive in that it is the easiest line of 
resistance. The effect of organisational culture and identity may also play a part in operational 
decision making (Eyre and Alison, 2007). 
Klein (1993) introduced ‘Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPM)’, which examined the 
decision making of experienced fire-fighting commanding officers and found that they were able 
to assess a situation and rather than considering alternative options, they simply decided on the 
required action based upon the first option they generated. Using their experience, the fire 
officers could access the ‘typicality’ of the situation and act appropriately (Klein, 1993; Klein, 
2008; Eyre and Alison, 2007, p. 215). Klein found that those fire commanders with experience 
made more correct decisions than those with less experience. The main element of the 
Recognition Primed Decision Making model can be seen at figure 3 (Klein, 1993, p. 147).  
 
Figure 3: Elements of Recognition Primed Decision Making 
 Prescriptive decision strategies are not designed for ill-defined tasks or for time-
pressured situations.  
 A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model describes how decision makers use their 
experience to avoid painstaking deliberations. 
 Experience enables a person to understand a situation in terms of plausible goals, 
relevant cues, expectancies and typical actions. 
 Experienced decision makers usually try to find a satisfactory course of action, not the 
best one. 
 Experienced decision makers can usually identify an acceptable course of action as the 
first one they consider, and rarely need generate another course of action. 
 Decision makers can evaluate a single course of action through mental simulation. They 
don't have to compare several options. 
 Recognitional decision strategies are more appropriate under time pressure and 
ambiguity; analytical strategies are more appropriate with abstract data and pressure 
to justify decisions. 
 In a variety of operational settings, recognitional decision strategies are used more 
frequently than analytical strategies, even for difficult cases. 
 
 
 
The RPM model is analogous to a learner driver of a car who must slowly consider each next 
action, whereas an experienced driver does so without even thinking (Klein, 1993; Eyre and 
Alison, 2007). In the context of critical incident management, ‘less experienced managers do not 
possess a complex memory structure which contains a broad repertoire of typical situations from 
which to generate first and best options and are more likely to be prone to error’ (Eyre and Alison, 
2007, p. 215). Saunders (2001, p226) also found that police officers did not rely on a formal 
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decision making process, instead responded in ways that they had done in previous similar 
situations. The shortfall of this experiential learning model is that when dealing with a relatively 
rare event such as a homicide, the repertoire of responses is likely to be more limited (Adhami, 
Browne and Laycock, 1996, p. 15). There are currently less than ninety-nine thousand7 ‘front line’ 
police constables in England and Wales and so considering the numbers of cases they might 
attend per year on average it would be no more than one or two and thus they cannot build an 
experience base on which to rely. Police officers decisions are also influenced by the ‘occupational 
values of the police and a set of rules used to achieve outcomes consistent with those values’ 
(Reiner, 2000, p. 87). 
Another form of effect which is an example of cognitive bias is the effect of ‘framing’, whereby 
people react to a particular choice in different ways depending on the way information is 
presented; e.g. as a loss or as a gain (Plous, 1993). Alternative ways of presenting the same 
information can cause the recipient to think about it in a different way. Kahneman (2011, p. 88) 
gives the example of a surgeon explaining that ‘the odds of survival one month after surgery are 
90%’ is more reassuring than the equivalent statement that ‘mortality within one month of 
surgery is 10%.’ Although both statements may be true, the latter can be perceived in a far more 
negative way (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Thus, the way a decision is presented has a large 
impact upon the choices that result, and is a form of framing. Although the experiments carried 
out by Tversky and Kahneman were in the main concerned with the framing of questions as to 
financial loss or gain in medical settings, the principles of how a question is framed can be equally 
relevant to decision making in the death investigation context. (This is further discussed at 
chapter 8).                                                                                                                                                                                            
Another biasing effect described by Kahnamen (2011) is that of ‘priming’. Priming is a 
nonconscious form of human memory concerned with identification of words and objects. It 
refers to activating associations in memory which can influence that memory (Tulving, 1991). 
Research on priming was pioneered by Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) who found that memory 
and recall is affected by having a word fed to them which will affect a response due to association 
with that word. For example, a person who sees the word ‘yellow’ will be slightly faster to 
recognise the word ‘banana’. This happens because yellow and banana are closely associated in 
memory. This is a kind of ‘word association’ (Kahneman, 2011, p. 52) and the effect is to anchor 
one’s thoughts to an idea rather than using free thought. Priming can affect thoughts and 
behaviour influenced by stimuli to which the individual has no conscious awareness. ‘Our 
                                                             
7 Gov UK website at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2015-
data-tables 
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thoughts and our behaviour are influenced, much more than we know or want, by the 
environment of the moment’ (Kahneman, 2011, p. 128). There is an obvious link to decision 
making of first attenders at the scenes of sudden and unexpected deaths in terms of the 
information officers receive prior to or at attendance. A practical example of this was described 
by Kertsholt and Eikelbloom, (2007), who looked at mitigating bias in criminal investigations. 
Thirty-eight crime analysts were asked to advise on causal scenarios for how the investigation 
team should continue their investigation. Half of the analysts were given the existing hypothesis 
held by the investigation team while the other half were given no prior hypothesis about the case. 
The results of this study showed that when given a prior hypothesis, the analysts were more likely 
to go with that hypothesis, i.e. a better, more objective analysis of the facts was achieved without 
prior information and knowledge of the hypothesis provided. It was thus recommended that in 
cases where the crime analyst is asked to give an objective assessment, he or she should not be 
informed about the hypothesis of the investigation team until after the analysis has been 
conducted. This was also supported by Saunders (2001, p. 226). An analogy can be drawn here 
with the biasing effect of inappropriate information being given to a police officer attending a 
sudden and unexplained death by a control room operative such as; “please attend a routine 
sudden death at…”.  
One of the most significant issues for police officers in managing critical incidents is the concern 
over how their actions would be perceived by the press and the public (Crego and Alison, 2004). 
This is a sub-set of decision making referred to as ‘investigative decision making’. 
 
2.3 Investigative Decision Making 
Most literature concerning investigative decision making tends to centre on the role of the SIO 
and strategic decisions (Mullins, Alison and Crego, 2008) once the crime is declared as such, but 
little appears to consider the role of the officer attending the initial stages of a crime and in 
particular, decision making in homicide cases (O’Keefe, 2002). Dror (2013, p. 3) discussed the 
effect of ‘base rate’ on the cognitive mechanism whereby the human brain gets used to base rate 
regularities which adjusts cognitive attention and processing. He gives as an example the people 
who view x-ray scanners at airports and never find anything. This can be problematic when a 
second person must check the work of the first, such as a fingerprint expert checking a colleague’s 
findings, or in the context of this study, a supervisor effectively scrutinising a junior officer’s 
decision making. Dror (2015) succinctly described the biased construction of a case to support an 
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argument at the Bond Solon Expert Witness Conference8 as ‘…it’s like firing an arrow into a tree 
and then drawing a target around it’.  
Much of Dror’s research has been in the realm of laboratory based forensic experts, and his work 
has in part informed the Forensic Science Regulator to issue guidance in October 2015 entitled 
‘Cognitive Bias Effects Relevant to Forensic Science Examinations’, regarding bias in laboratory 
work. There is a risk of misleading an investigation by investigators focussing too early and 
incorrectly on false information where other evidence can be overlooked (Forensic Science 
Regulator, 2015). A summary of the various biasing effects of forensic work can be seen at 
Appendix 4. Similarly, there has long been a debate whether police decision making is intuitive or 
learnt by experience and professional judgement. Skills, knowledge and experience influence the 
decision making of homicide detectives (Wright, 2013). Wright (2004, p. 183) differentiates 
between ‘procedural decisions’ which are standard actions laid down in policy and procedures, to 
‘intuitive decisions’ which are defined as ‘the ability to automatically go beyond the information 
available to develop hypotheses and make inferences’ and is a form of rapid cognition based upon 
experience. It therefore follows that those with the greatest experience and knowledge base are 
better equipped to make those intuitive decisions. Wright used multi-dimensional scalogram 
analysis (MSA) and identified a cycle of cognition which involved a four-stage process of; i) 
contextual clues; ii) hypothesis generation; iii) inferences and vi) decision and action. The subjects 
of the research were detective officers who used contextual features of crime scenes and their 
knowledge and experience to derive inferences and make hypotheses about what happened by 
viewing scene photographs. The study found that overall 67% of detective’s inferences were 
correct and 23% incorrect, but there were variations according to the type of crime scene and 
there were no clear differences between officers of various ranks although the higher ranked 
officers made more inferences (Wright, 2013, p. 194). Officers partaking in the study emphasised 
the importance of ‘keeping an open-mind’, however the psychology of human inference would 
indicate that keeping an open-mind is not possible (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Wright found 
that detectives, from very limited information built a picture of how they perceived events to be 
but this is necessary to make sense of what they see at crime scenes (Pinizzotto, Davis and Miller, 
2004). 
Barrett (2009) explored psychological mechanisms underlying the acquisition, interpretation and 
exploitation of information in complex criminal inquiries and found that interpretations varied 
across participants in the study who were given vignettes of crimes to consider, albeit that the 
                                                             
8 6th November 2015 at the Church House, London. 
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scenarios within the vignettes were the same. Factors of complexity, incomplete information, 
ambiguity and risk can affect investigative decision making especially in the early stages when 
deciding whether a criminal offence has been committed (Ormerod, Barrett and Taylor, 2008, p. 
81). Kerstholt and Eikelboom (2007) describe the main threat to objective information processing 
in crime investigation as the tendency to focus on only one interpretation. One of the main issues 
in respect of confirmation bias is the tendency for people to pay the most attention to that 
information which is confirmatory of one’s existing hypothesis to the exclusion of information 
that challenges that hypothesis (Brandl, 2009, p. 11). A contributing factor in failing to identify a 
homicide as such could be the role that confirmation bias plays in the officer’s initial hypothesis 
that the death is natural or a non-suspicious death (Jones, 2014).  
The Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b) seeks to plot a set of principles in relation to 
policing; in particular crime investigation, and refers to the use of hypotheses within the context 
of the investigation of crime. Hypotheses are defined as ‘a suggested explanation for a group of 
facts either accepted as a basis for further verification or accepted as likely to be true’ (ACPO, 
2005b, p. 70). One of the early writers about hypothecation was William of Ockham (1288 to 
1348). Ockham’s razor was his principle that theory construction should always err towards the 
simple as this was more likely to be the truth. Ockham also warned about making hypotheses too 
elaborate and ‘hypothesising about a hypothesis’ (O’Connor and Robertson, 2005). However, the 
use of Ockham’s principle could itself be the source of bias. Heuer (1999) argues that a set of 
hypotheses should be identified and the inquiry should seek to disprove each one; the one which 
remains is probably the truth9. There is a school of thought that the use of hypotheses within a 
crime investigation should be avoided as the investigator could fall foul to the principles of ‘case 
construction’ (Sanders and Young, 2003; Henneberg and Loveday, 2015). ‘Case construction’ is 
where the investigator adopts a hypothesis as to what has happened and identifies evidence to 
support that hypothesis to the exclusion of evidence which does not support or even contradicts 
that hypothesis (Sanders and Young 2003). This phenomenon is particularly evident in the 
interviewing of witnesses, where there is now a considerable body of evidence to show that using 
traditional interviewing methods it was relatively simple for the investigator to obtain a statement 
as to what the interviewer wants the witness to say as opposed to what the witness wanted to 
say (Milne and Bull, 1999). One can see the dangers of forming a hypothesis too early in a death 
investigation at the scene before all the facts are known. The ACPO Core Investigative Doctrine 
(ACPO, 2005b) describes the dangers inherent in many historical cases of ‘verification bias’ which 
                                                             
9 This concept was first expounded by Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle in his Sherlock Holmes series of fiction and was the first of 
his seven principles of investigation (Tallon and Baggett, 2012). The name ‘Holmes’ and the link with the computer 
system adopted for the use of major crime inquiries will not escape notice. 
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is where an investigator forms an early view as to a hypothesis and then concentrates the focus of 
the inquiry into supporting that hypothesis to the subjective exclusion of other lines of inquiry. 
The opposite of case construction is ‘case denial’ where the investigator forms an early view that 
no crime has been committed, which can limit the investigation to proving that no offence took 
place (Sanders and Young, 2003). Indeed, this is what happened in the case in of Ricky Reel who 
went missing in 1997 but whose family still campaign for justice10. When this youth was reported 
missing the police took the view that there was no crime even after his body was found in the 
River Thames (BBC, 2000). Such preconceived views on the part of investigators can lead to 
‘premature closure’ of investigations prior to all reasonable lines of inquiry being followed in 
accordance with Section 23a of the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996. Again, both 
case denial and premature closure are relevant to decision making at the scenes of death.  
The Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b) describes reasons for flawed decision making on 
the part of senior investigators and accepts that it may be impossible to rid one’s mind of 
‘ingrained flaws’. However, as Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa (1998, p. 47-58) argue, if one is 
aware of the flaws which effect decision making, the individual may be able to compensate for 
them. Hammond et al (1998) describe the most common of the decision making traps as being i) 
over-confidence; ii) over-cautiousness; iii) memory interference or ‘recalability’ and iv) what he 
describes as ‘anchoring’ which is an over reliance on the first accounts available to the 
investigator to the exclusion of further and perhaps more accurate information. Hammond et al 
(1998) describe the tactics to overcome these flaws as; i) view a problem from different 
perspectives; ii) thinking a problem through alone prior to consultation with others thus avoiding 
being anchored by their ideas and iii) to be open-minded and seek views from a variety of others 
to widen the frame of reference. 
The Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b) lists five elements of what it describes as the 
‘investigative mind-set’ necessary for an investigating police officer to acquire over time and with 
experience; 
 Understanding the source of material; 
 Planning and preparation; 
 Examination; 
 Recording and collation: and 
 Evaluation. 
                                                             
10 Report on the case of Ricky Reel downloaded 28th February 2016 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
london-28447168. 
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More recently, the College of Policing has adopted a National Decision Making Model at figure 4 
(College of Policing, 2014). 
Figure 4: National Police Decision Making Model 
 
 
The College of Policing model has five sequential processes, but with the overarching principle 
being the Code of Ethics to ensure that decisions are ethical, lawful and proportionate in 
accordance with the principles of human rights. The elements are: 
Code of Ethics – Principles and standards of professional behaviour 
Information – Gather information and intelligence 
Assessment – Assess threat and risk and develop a working strategy 
Powers and policy – Consider powers and policy 
Options – Identify options and contingencies 
Action and review – Take action and review what happened. 
 
This model is similar to the ‘Intelligence Cycle’ (Maguire and John, 2006) and has similarities to 
the ‘Experiential Learning Cycle’ (Kolb, 2014). Although the model assists police officers and 
decision makers with a framework, James, (2016) argues that it does not take into consideration 
other factors such as the experiential, psychological and emotional dimensions of decision 
making. It thereby assumes that decision makers are rational and consistent and so although the 
model may satisfy the police hierarchy that staff will act lawfully and ethically, it ignores the 
realities of the real world (James, 2016). 
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2.4 What Measures can be introduced to Reduce Bias Thinking at the Scene of a Death? 
There are a taxonomy of ‘biasing’ factors in five levels called ‘Linear Sequential Unmasking’ (LSU) 
at table 4 (Dror, Thompson, Meissner, Kornfield, Krane, Saks and Risinger, 2015, p. 1111-1112). 
Dror et al (2015) argues that the further through the levels, the more likelihood of a bias affecting 
the outcome of forensic analysis. This principle is also relevant to the officer in first attendance at 
a death scene. 
 
Table 4: Taxonomy of Linear Sequential Unmasking  
Level Factors Causing Bias 
5 Organisational and Cultural Factors 
4 ‘Base Rate’ Expectations 
3 Case Information 
2 Reference Material 
1 Trace Evidence 
  
 
According to Dror et al (2015) forensic examination (such as attendance at a death scene) should 
attempt to restrict access to information to as low a level as possible within the taxonomy to 
reduce the bias affect. This mainly relates to laboratory analysis and therefore its application to 
the first officer attending the scene is limited.  
A rather crude method of reducing the effects of bias is taught on Senior Investigation Officer 
training to the police in England and Wales, called the ‘ABC rule’ (Cook and Tattersall, 2010): 
A – Assume Nothing; 
B – Believe Nothing; and 
C – Challenge and Check everything. 
 
Rossmo (2006) describes several strategies to reduce the influence of bias affecting decision 
making which includes the importance of study based training. This is supported by Fahsing and 
Ask (2013) who identified that experience and training were the single most important safeguards 
against biasing influences. This was also found to be the case in a study of decision making 
between British and Norwegian detectives, where Norwegian officers receive degree level 
academic education which was found to be inferior to the British system where detectives have a 
nationally standardised professional experienced based training (Fahsing and Ask, 2016). It is 
interesting to note that little or no training is given to police officers attending the scenes of 
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sudden death. The curriculum offered by the College of Policing website11 to police supervisors 
and managers of those responsible for dealing with these cases tends to concentrate on 
leadership and management competencies and the system of delivery may be flawed (White, 
2006; Peace, 2006). In police training, emphasis on cultural change and ethical standards leads 
the political agenda since the Neyroud report in 2011 triggered the government to setting up the 
College of Policing (Neyroud, 2011).  
One of the strategies which could be effective in combating poor decision making due to bias is 
the adoption of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). There is evidence that SOPs can overcome 
the bias effect (Dror, 2013, p. 2; Nakhaeizadeh, Dror and Morgan 2015). Other measures which 
can overcome base rate bias can be ‘blind verification’, whereby the person who is supervising 
and checking work does so without knowing the outcome of that work (Dror, 2013, p. 3). 
Kahneman, (2011, p. 417) argues that the way to avoid the pitfalls of heuristics invited by system 
1 is to slow down the thought process, and actively use system 2 and this can be aided using 
algorithms or mechanical systems which are more reliable at coming to a judgement than experts 
because a slight variation as a judgment by a human can vary with differing circumstances. 
Therefore, checklists and simple rules are more efficient than judgement which can be influenced 
by the ‘halo effect’, defined as the tendency to use global evaluations to make judgments about 
specific traits (Long-Crowell, 2015). Meehl (1954) describes the argument between the merits of 
experience and knowledge verses ‘system’ or a ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ as ‘Clinical verses 
Statistical Prediction’. Meehl argues that a system based upon statistical probability is a more 
reliable tool than the intuition and experience of professionals. In other words, a rule or a 
standard way of decision making is more reliable than a clinician’s opinion. Reviews of 20 studies 
in later work found this was shown in respect of prediction in a variety of environments including 
criminal justice (Meehl, 1986). A substantial number of studies have shown that the use of 
algorithms is more reliable than expert opinion and it is also more cost effective (Kahneman, 
2011, p. 223). Meehl argues that there are only a few circumstances when a human judgement 
should be substituted for a formula, but one of them is when unusual facts are known which 
make the formula redundant. Kahneman (2011) states that the reason that algorithms are more 
reliable is that they are not susceptible to the frailties of system 1 thinking. Dawes (1979) argues 
that even roughly conceived algorithms are more reliable than professional judgement. The 
adoption of standard operating procedures in medicine has saved many lives in the past rather 
than reliance on clinical judgement (Gawande, 2010). These principles are now common place in 
                                                             
11http://www.college.police.uk/What-we-do/Learning/Curriculum/Leadership/Pages/leadership-and-strategic-
command.aspx  
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selection interviews where rather than relying on the interviewer’s judgement regarding a 
candidate, a scoring matrix is used (Kahneman, 2011, p. 232). 
Gawande (2010) takes the principles of Meehl and writes of the applications of a simple checklist 
to aid decision making in all walks of life including medicine, manufacturing and construction. 
Medicine has become so specialised there is no such thing in modern hospitals as a general 
surgeon and so each procedure accompanies a checklist to avoid missing anything and making up 
for human error (Gawande, 2010, p. 30). Gawande makes the point that most professions 
including services like emergency responders deal with such complexity that they cannot rely 
upon experience and memory alone (Gawande, 2010, p. 34). Checklists instil a ‘discipline of higher 
performance’ (Gawande, 2010, p. 36) and reduces the likelihood of missing stages in a process 
that appear not to be necessary. Medical procedures have seen some remarkable increases in 
reliability and patient safety as a result (Berenholtz, 2004; Pronovost, Needham, Berenholtz, 
Sinopoli, Chu, Cosgrove and Bander, 2006; Haynes, Weiser, Berry, Lipsitz, Breizat, Dellinger and 
Merr, 2009). Checklists assist memory recall and set out the minimum necessary steps in a 
process. This leads to a higher level of baseline performance (Gawande, 2010, p.39). Heilbrum 
and Erickson (2007) argue that checklist principles could also be applied to judicial decision 
making (Heilbrun and Erickson, 2007, p. 202). 
Although the concept of using checklists appears to detract from personal responsibility for 
decision making, Gawande (2010) is clear that although apparently contradictory, a decision 
maker must use the checklist to avoid simple mistakes but responsibility remains with the 
decision maker who is left with the ‘power to manage the nuances and unpredictability’s the best 
they know’ (Gawande, 2010, p. 79). 
Checklists should be structured and be clear and precise. They do not attempt to manage all 
eventualities but must spell out the important and critical steps, those points that even the most 
professional and highly skilled operators could miss (Gawande, 2010, p. 120). Gawande (2010) 
also points out that checklists cannot be lengthy and contain no more items than the human brain 
can recall which is stated as nine. The checklist must contain the critical factors and wording 
should be simple and exact but also reflect the familiar language of the profession (Gawande, 
2010, p. 123).  
2.5 Standard Operating Procedures in the Police Service: Are they Effective? 
The use of checklists in the police service is not a new concept. There are many suggested lists 
and models which are used and the use of the mnemonic dates back many years (Cook and 
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Tattersall, 2010). Jones, Grieve and Milne (2010) experimented with a checklist-type tool for the 
use in the review of homicide inquiries. Two groups of detective investigators were used as a 
control and experimental group. Both groups contained equal numbers of pre-defined 
experienced and non-experienced officers. All participants were given the same homicide case to 
review. The control group were asked to produce a report outlining the strengths and weaknesses 
of the homicide inquiry to date with recommendations for the future progress of the 
investigation. The experimental group were asked to produce a report in the same way, but using 
a review tool template (a detailed checklist). The experimental group outperformed the control 
group in terms of the quality, detail and length of the review report. It was clear that the 
experience of the reviewer was a significant factor in quality and quantity of the review report in 
both the control and experimental groups. The inference was that an officer detailed to perform a 
review should be very experienced within the field of murder investigations, but also that that the 
use of a structured standard operating procedure is likely to garner far more quality information 
than leaving the process to individual thought, knowledge and experience (Jones et al, 2010, p. 
14). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the way in which answering the research question was approached. The 
British Society of Criminology’s general principle is that ‘researchers should ensure that research is 
undertaken to the highest possible methodological standard and the highest quality in order that 
maximum possible knowledge and benefits accrue to society’, (British Society of Criminology, 
2006).  
To answer the research question it was necessary to carefully consider the appropriate 
methodology. As with any research, it is vital that data is collected appropriately and outcomes 
are consistent with that data and that any inaccuracies or bias are kept to a minimum. With this 
study, as the outcomes and recommendations were likely to be acknowledged by the police and 
coroners, and possibly implemented, the methodology was likely to receive further scrutiny 
beyond academia, particularly by those who may feel threatened by the outcomes. 
A scientific approach was therefore required to produce the necessary data. Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) define science as ‘...an approach for the generation of knowledge that places 
high regard for empirical data and follows certain norms and practices that develop over time ... 
(Johnson et al p. 24). There has been much debate about what is and what is not scientific 
(Chalmers, 1999). Robson (2011, p. 14) talks in terms of a ‘scientific attitude’ which he describes 
as being ethically sound and systematic but also viewing your ideas sceptically by subjecting your 
ideas to possible disconfirmation. It can be quite problematic to be systematic as the researcher is 
human and subject to the frailties well documented in other types of investigation (Kahneman, 
2011) including the investigation of criminal offences (Eyre and Alison, 2007 p211-232; Rossmo, 
2006). Postmodernists may claim that the scientific approach does not in reality exist (Wilson 
1999 p. 44), however this appears to be a minority view (Robson, 2011). Having established that a 
scientific approach is required for this research, the particular methodology and methods needed 
to be identified. 
The existing literature concerning the investigation of death and homicide in the main examines 
actual homicide investigations rather than decision making at the original scene. Therefore, there 
is little in the way of precedent in terms of methodology. Other research which has examined the 
way in which death is investigated include Innes (1999) who looked at the process of a murder 
investigation and used participant investigations and case studies – real murder investigations 
Chapter 3 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 33 
which he was able to observe. Saunders (2001) used a simulated crime to research how 
investigators make decisions. A similar methodology was used by Adhami, Browne and Laycock 
(1996) in respect of a simulated child homicide. The role and function of a SIO was examined by 
Smith and Flanagan (2000) where semi-structured interviews were used. The favoured 
methodology in crime investigation research appears to be examination of official case files 
(Stelfox, 2006; Banton, 1985), or participant observation (McCabe and Sutcliffe, 1978). A 
combination of both methodologies was used by Steer, (1980). Doyle (2011) conducted a 
document analysis of death investigation policies from all police forces in England and Wales. 
Jones, Milne and Grieve (2008) used a case study experiment in relation to murder review. 
Henneberg and Loveday (2015) examined three murder investigations from different jurisdictions 
to identify shortcomings in police investigatory practice, in particular the phenomenon of ‘case 
construction’ where cases go ‘off track’. Another possible method considered for this research 
was that of trawling cases of known ‘missed homicide’ from media and academic accounts. 
However, it was considered difficult to make approaches to those involved in such cases as many 
are historic in nature and it was likely that they would be unwilling to assist for the purpose of 
research. Some may have received discipline outcomes and others may still be going through the 
discipline process. Known cases have however been highlighted as part of this research within 
chapter 4. 
There were three main strands to this mixed method study. The first was to identify the numbers 
of death investigations in England and Wales and compare this with the number of identified 
suspicious deaths to see if there was a correlation with the reducing number of forensic PM’s 
performed with the reducing homicide rate. The second and central method was an examination 
of over thirty real cases where there was potential for a homicide to be missed due to the 
decisions made by police and coroners in the early stages of the sudden and unexplained death 
investigation. These were cases identified because they were initially thought to be non-
suspicious but later facts emerged tending to make them less straight forward. Each was treated 
as a separate case study whereby information was gathered as to the circumstances of each case. 
The third method was a series of focus group interviews involving police decision makers in 
unexplained death investigations.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Positioning 
According to Mackenzie and Knipe (2006), social scientists have come away from categorising 
between quantitative and qualitative data, instead concentrating on the most appropriate 
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methodology to address the research subject. It is important however to set out the philosophical 
position in terms of the epistemological and ontological standpoints of the researcher. The reason 
this is important is that those who read and consider the research should be aware of the 
paradigm in which the researcher is positioned and thereby ensuring that the principles and 
assumptions that underpin the research are clear, allowing the reader to make their own 
evaluation (Crotty, 1998). The choice of this paradigm sets down the intent, motivation and 
expectations for the research (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). The construction of the research 
therefore relies on the subjective assumptions of the researcher which is based upon his or her 
learning and experience (Scotland, 2012). Although the literature refers to at least four research 
paradigms12, the two dominant epistemological and ontological ideologies are positivism and 
constructivism (also referred to as interpretivism). Positivism is sometimes referred to as a 
‘scientific method’ in that it is ‘value free’ (Robson, 2011, p. 21) and relies in its approach 
primarily on quantitative data. Scientific findings are based on ‘facts’ and hypothesis are tested 
against those facts. Positivism therefore rejects the human dimension that facts are relevant to 
individual perspective and sees the world as having a reality independent of the observer (Carson, 
Gilmore, Perry and Gronhaugh, 2001). Constructivists on the other hand would argue that 
meaning does not exist independent of humans’ interpretation and attempts to understand the 
world of ‘human experience’ which is socially constructed (Cohen and Manion, 1994, p. 36). 
Constructivist research therefore tends to rely on participants view of the subject and therefore 
rather than starting with a hypothesis, a pattern of meaning emerges from the data (Creswell, 
2003).  
As this study does not claim the outcomes to represent an external reality, the researcher’s 
position is very much of the constructivist paradigm. Although the multi method approach seeks 
to identify and explain the issues, this is from the perspective of the researcher’s interpretation of 
the data and it is accepted that others may have differing perspectives. 
 
3.3 Ethical Considerations and Access to Data - General 
There were a number of ethical considerations in relation to the access to data and the fact that 
the researcher was working within the Home Office organisation when conducting the research. 
Although some publicly available information identifies individuals, where feasible they have not 
been referred to by name where general description of the point will suffice. However, where 
                                                             
12 The four research paradigms referred to in the literature are a) Interpretivist/constructivist; b) Transformative; c) 
Positivist (and post-positivist), and d) Pragmatic. 
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high profile cases are referred to, individuals are named as this information is in the public 
domain. All cases which were used in this research have been anonymised; both names and 
references to identity and location have been removed. No participant had any relationship with 
the researcher except in the case of pathologists with whom there was clearly a professional 
relationship due to the role of the author. The researcher may have been known to other 
participants but not personally. The nature of the researcher’s occupation was such that many 
within the arena of death investigation will have heard of or have some knowledge of the role 
which he performed. 
No information or access to individuals was obtained which was not available to any other 
researchers, however it is acknowledged that familiarity with the system and how it operates was 
an advantage. Such a privileged position is somewhat inevitable with an ‘insider researcher’ 
(Rooney, 2005). All material collected and retained in connection with this study was kept 
securely either as password protected electronic data or if in hard copy form, under secure 
conditions and in a locked cabinet within an office environment at the researcher’s home address. 
 
3.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Death Investigation in England and Wales 
All statistical data referred to and quoted within this research is publicly available, if not on line, 
through a Freedom of Information request and downloadable from various public websites which 
are attributed where necessary. Although this information is publicly available, this is the first 
time that forensic PM data has been used alongside mortality figures when analysing the range of 
disposal of death investigations. The data was entered onto an excel spreadsheet and 
manipulated to reflect the data discussed at chapter 5. It was decided to anonymise the data in 
order that individual police forces could not be immediately identified. The reason for this is that 
in some cases the narrative which identified shortfalls in practice can identify individual police 
forces and therefore individual persons. It is acknowledged that with some investigations, since 
the raw data is in the public domain, it is possible to identify those forces but this would take 
some effort on the part of the reader. 
 
3.3.2 Case Study 
The participants in the case study were police officers; police staff; pathologists and coroners. The 
research accessed data held by the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR) (Jones, 2015). This material 
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was published and was collected in a routine audit of forensic pathologist’s reports. This annual 
data is published on the FSR website. The material was supplied on written authority from the 
FSR. Collection of some of the data was received routinely from returns submitted to the Home 
Office by Pathology Group Practices. Although publicly available, it is acknowledged that the 
researcher was clearly in a position of privilege in respect of interpreting and understanding this 
information due to his unique experience and knowledge. Participants were made aware that 
requests to contribute to this research was on the part of the University and not as a Home Office 
official. 
All data received was anonymised at the point of receipt, and so no data protection issues were 
apparent. However, individuals could have been identified from the narrative of case summaries 
and so case summaries have been retained by the researcher and have not been published as an 
appendix within the thesis.  
The outcomes of the research could identify practice which might be capable of future 
improvement and policies/practices which may require review. It was also recognised that it may 
also identify good practice for future development and practice advice. However, this research did 
not identify any individual or organisation which lead to any concern in relation to miscarriages of 
justice in accordance with undertakings at the commencement of the study and in line with the 
favourable ethical approval. It did however reveal practice which did require immediate remedial 
action which is discussed in chapter 8. It will be obvious to the reader that practice which might 
be capable of future improvement may be attributed generally to police; coroners or pathologists. 
This will be in the general interests of future development and there is no intention to attribute 
blame to any individual or organisation. It was therefore in the public interest to pursue this 
research. There were no known significant risks to the researcher or individuals.  
 
3.3.3 Focus Groups and Interviews 
All participants in the focus groups were crime scene managers/investigators, pathologists and 
senior investigators. All participants were asked permission to take part in the research and for 
the focus groups to be recorded using the documentation and processes detailed in an ethics 
application which was approved by the Portsmouth University Ethics Committee on date 3rd 
December 2014 (see Appendix 5).  
There will always be a danger that if any individual participant is identified and they state 
something which may be controversial or subject to challenge, this could place both them and the 
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organisation which they represent in a difficult position. For this reason, the thesis was written 
not only omitting personal details, but also redacting any information from which the identity of 
the individual could be inferred, or through the triangulation of other data the individual could be 
attributed. It was made clear that anonymity could not be offered in respect of anything said 
which amounted to a criminal offence or circumstances where any person could be placed at 
harm or a miscarriage of justice go unheeded. For this reason, the final data was presented as 
general themes and not as a narrative indicating a particular case or individual. All consents will 
be retained for a period in accordance with University Regulations. 
 
3.4 Practitioner Researcher 
The researcher is a civil servant working within the Home Office for 8 years in a role which 
oversees the provision of forensic pathology services to the police and coroners in England and 
Wales. Prior to this role, he served 30 years in the police, retiring as a Temporary Chief 
Superintendent. He was in charge of Hampshire police Major Crime Team; Director of Intelligence 
and spent several years in a National Role developing national training courses for SIO’s and 
detective officers of all ranks.  
This experience and knowledge of the death investigation system in England and Wales inevitably 
gave him an advantage over other researchers without such experience. Consideration was given 
to how this position was likely to affect the data, especially responses from focus group and 
interviews. Although the position within the Home Office undoubtedly gave the researcher an 
advantage, he was not in a position of authority or management over any single participant in the 
research. Full consent was obtained in respect of all focus groups and interview subjects. 
Consideration was given to the possibility of identifying practice which was so errant in nature, or 
revealed a possible miscarriage of justice, that some intervention or some other action might be 
necessary. It was agreed at the onset that if this position did arise, that the researcher’s 
supervisor would be informed together with Home Office management and that appropriate 
action would be taken and documented. In the event, no such situation arose. However, when 
case summaries were collated, as described in chapter 8, there was some initial concern regarding 
the apparent practice of one police force and correspondence with that force lead to a review of 
practice and a new policy being adopted.  
As the Home Office funded the tuition fees, it could be said that they could either directly or 
indirectly influence the outcome of the research. However, the researcher undertook to keep a 
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private diary of any instances where this may be a factor and report such within the thesis if 
appropriate. In the event, there was no such interference, either direct or indirect. Researching 
within one’s own professional context has attracted both positive and negative comment from 
within the literature concerning research methods (Rooney, 2005). Robson (2011, p. 7) describes 
that some consider that the inside researcher lacks credibility and objectivity. He points out that it 
is important for the employer to ‘buy in’ to the project and the best way to do this is if there is 
likely to be practical benefits to the organisation (Robson 2011, p. 296). This was a consideration 
in the current study, where it was easy to point out the clear benefits to the Home Office in 
identifying a potential cause for concern and making proposals for ameliorating the issues which 
were identified. This can act as a ‘double edged sword’ (Mercer, 2007) in that those in authority 
might expect positive outcomes and attempt to influence the research if outcomes do not concur 
with their expectations. Robson (2011, p. 403) identifies the advantages of researching within 
one’s own work place, including: cost and time savings in travel; an intimate knowledge of the 
context of the study; the historical context of why the study is important; an understanding of the 
politics of the institution, and the hierarchy but also how it ‘really works’ (Robson, 2011).  
The negative aspects of insider research are potential conflicts with colleagues; conflicts of 
interest; the possibility that outcomes may bring about conflict and challenge when the individual 
must continue working in that environment. The main issue is one of retaining objectivity. This is 
especially so if the study starts with a hypothesis and the intention from the outset is to set out to 
prove it. There may also be issues with the organisation if the intention is to publish the research 
which could paint it in a bad light (Bell, 1993, p. 55). The idea of ‘academic knowledge’ and 
‘professional competence’ (Schon, 2006) are separate concepts and so conducting an academic 
study within one’s professional environment can cause some conflicts between academic and 
workplace knowledge (Scott, Brown, Lunt and Thorne,2004, p. 152). 
The insider researcher must be reflexive which means more than just reflecting. Reflexivity is used 
in the context of qualitative research and refers to the element of self-awareness in any such 
research, and to alert the researcher to the need to question that body of knowledge the 
researcher already has. That knowledge might be misplaced (Richards, 2011 p49; p57). 
The issue for the practitioner researcher is that of validity of the process and outcomes. Validity 
usually refers to the degree to which the research was attempting to measure (Feldman, 2003). It 
also refers to the research instruments and the appropriateness of the chosen methodology. 
Positivists assume that science should produce objective knowledge or the ‘truth’ (Hammersley, 
2000). Postmodernists reject the more traditional notions of validity as a concept, arguing that 
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‘truth’ and ‘reality’ do not exist but merely a perspective depending on the individual (Ellis and 
Bochner, 2000). It is not realistically possible to completely remove bias from social research and 
so although absolute truth is to be aspired to, postmodernists would argue that validity includes 
‘credibility’; believability’ and ‘reliability’. If these elements are missing, the study might be 
considered worthless (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). A way of testing validity is to build 
validity checks into the research design such as ‘triangulation’, which is the term widely used for 
research designs where different sorts of data or methods of handling data are brought to bear 
on the research question. This is particularly important where mixed method approaches are 
used, bringing quantitative data into play with qualitative, rigorous analysis of the qualitative data 
can result (Richards, 2011 p. 148). The definition of validity itself is open to interpretation 
depending on one’s epistemological perspective. Therefore, Cohen et al’s (2000) ‘bility’ tests are 
what is aimed for. Tierney (1994) argues however that insider research can increase validity due 
to the quality of the information acquired.  
One of the most important strategies for the practitioner researcher therefore is to be aware of 
the pitfalls discussed and be aware of one owns limitations and potentials. Sjoberg, Williams, 
Vaughan and Sjoberg, (1991) state that: 
 ‘the researcher is a variable in the research design and consequently, the only way 
some form of objectivity can be sustained is through critical reflection, through 
recognition that one’s research results may well be shaped by one’s position in the 
power structure and by the ideological context within which one carries out social 
activities’ (Sjoberg et al, 1991, p. 36).  
 
3.5 Preliminary Work: Forensic Science Regulator 
The eventual outcome of an unexpected death investigation can be down to the opinion of a 
treating hospital or community doctor, a judicial decision on the part of the coroner, or ultimately 
a court in the cases where criminal homicide is alleged. There are clearly sensitivities involved in 
all three of these areas, such as patient confidentiality; judicial independence and of course the 
process of the jury itself which in law, cannot be challenged by a researcher13. It was therefore 
necessary to gain access to data concerning real cases and have an opportunity to collect data 
without breaching these three areas. To look at cases where police officers and doctors had 
attended the scenes of sudden and unexpected deaths would only show paperwork which was 
                                                             
13 Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981. 
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likely to be confirmatory of the eventual outcome. Police officers opinions about the likelihood of 
missing homicides was not likely to reveal any useful data as they would not be aware of the 
problem on the basis ‘you never know what you never know’ or as Donald Rumsfeld famously 
said:  
“Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, 
because as we know, there are ‘known knowns’; there are things we know we know. 
We also know there are ‘known unknowns’; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also ‘unknown unknowns’ - the ones we don't 
know we don't know”. (Rumsfeld, 2011, p. xii -xvi).  
To investigate the quality of those decisions, it was necessary to identify cases where there was a 
confirmed issue which could be explored. An opportunity arose during the 2012 annual audit of 
forensic pathology reports, where suitable cases were identified to progress research into the 
research question by way of a number of case studies. The audit is conducted annually on behalf 
of the Forensic Science Regulator by the Forensic Pathology Sub Group (FPSG) which is set up to 
recommend standards in forensic autopsy practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The 
primary purpose of the audit is to monitor the standard of the pathological examination. The 
pathologist’s case report contains information which have the potential to offer some indication 
of the efficiency of this service provision. For instance, issues such as timeliness of the report and 
whether it contains the prescribed statutory declarations as well as whether the report is fit for 
purpose and whether the cause of death is consistent with the narrative within the report. 
Audit is conducted in respect of all HORFP’s in England and Wales, and each year a theme for the 
audit is identified and pathologists are required to submit a relevant recent report – usually within 
the last 12 months. The theme for the 2012 audit was ‘a case in which the forensic pathologist 
had to take over a case already started by a non-forensic pathologist’. Anecdotally such cases are 
often considered to give rise to difficulties in ascertaining the course of events leading to the 
death as a common scenario is that a non-forensic pathologist carrying out a ‘routine’ PM 
examination discovers something which appears unusual or suspicious; the examination will then 
be stopped and a forensic practitioner asked to take over the case. Again, as described in chapter 
1, evidence suggests that in such circumstances homicide may be missed due to the varying 
quality of non-forensic PM’s, with the consequent potential for miscarriage of justice (Furness, 
2006). 
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There is a strict protocol of the audit which requires all submitted reports to be anonymised by an 
independent person and then sending the reports to an ‘audit team’ consisting of four forensic 
pathologists, responsible for scrutinising the material for its technical quality; a coroner and two 
police SIO’s providing a lay perspective on the material, each from their own specific viewpoint. In 
total 33 cases were submitted for audit by pathologists fitting the audit theme. The task of the 
auditors was to map the reports against the Code of Practice and Performance Standards for 
Forensic Pathology (Forensic Science Regulator, 2012). The outcome of the audit is not relevant to 
this study, however suffice to say that all the auditors considered that all the 33 cases should in 
fact have been forensic cases from the outset. However, the auditors only had the benefit of the 
pathologists report and not the surrounding circumstances of each case. It was therefore decided 
that these 33 cases would be a focus of the study in the first instance as there appeared to have 
been prima facie evidence that decisions by the police and or coroner in each of these cases may 
have been questionable. As this information was available, it seemed to be the ideal vehicle to 
progress the study.  
 
3.6 Quantitative Data regarding Death; Coroners and Homicide 
The first stage of the research was to set out the statistical position regarding deaths in England 
and Wales and also the number of cases considered ‘suspicious’ as well as confirmed homicide. 
Official secondary sources of death data were therefore required to set the contextual 
background and to set out the size of the death investigation process in England and Wales.  
Data was examined to look at the correlation between homicide numbers in England and Wales 
and the number of forensic PMs conducted by HORFP's. The Home Office routinely records 
homicide data and has done so since 1946. Homicide data is collected in two ways. Firstly, as part 
of the aggregate crime return, which is published by the Office of National Statistics (Office for 
National Statistics, 2014) on a quarterly basis in the ‘Crime in England and Wales Statistical 
Releases’. Secondly, a record-level notification is returned to the Home Office statistical unit when 
a homicide is recorded by the police. The record-level information is held on the ‘Home Office 
Homicide Index’ and police forces update this initial notification at key stages during the 
investigation and court process. In this way, it is inevitable that the statistics change as case 
investigations develop. Sometimes, what was initially thought to be a homicide transpires not to 
be after pathological investigations and other developments during police enquiries, and so the 
statistics do fluctuate with time. Consequently, the Homicide Index produced by the Home Office 
will inevitably vary from the raw data recorded in the ONS statistics. The ONS figures were more 
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relevant to this study than the Homicide Index, as the latter can be influenced by many 
subsequent factors which are not relevant to this study. The Homicide Index could de-classify a 
homicide depending on the circumstances, such as if a person was acquitted at court, but that 
does not mean to say that the case should not have been treated as suspicious from the outset. 
That case would however remain as a homicide on the ONS data. 
It was important to establish that the data was accurate, especially in the light of recent questions 
being raised concerning the efficacy of police recorded crime statistics (HMIC, 2014). The UK 
PEACE Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2013) describes homicide as the most reliable of 
all crime statistics, due to the fact that most occurrences are reported to the authorities. Without 
a doubt, some ‘missing persons’ cases are probably homicides but are not recorded as such. For 
instance, there are currently more than 60 unidentified bodies and body parts that have been 
washed up on the south coast around Hampshire, Sussex and the Isle of Wight (Jones, 2014, p. 
64). Although many of these remains may potentially have originated from sea burial sites, each 
must be considered as a possible homicide until proven otherwise. There are also more than 
30,000 missing persons in the UK annually. It is estimated that 750 of these will have been 
deceased (Missing Persons Bureau, 2012). Some might have met their demise through suicide or 
accident but inevitably some of these will be persons who have been murdered. Newiss (2006) 
examined historical data from the Metropolitan police and estimated that of missing persons 
found dead on an annual basis, one in fifteen were the subject of a homicide. This would equate 
to 50 persons nationally. This study does not consider the number of missing persons who may 
have been murdered but whose bodies have never been found. Since their bodies have never 
been discovered, and depending upon the circumstances of their disappearance, they will never 
be part of a homicide statistic. For the statistical analysis of the current study, this factor does not 
corrupt the outcomes of those cases where they have been treated as suspicious because if no 
cadaver has been found, this would be a case where no decision could have been made by police 
officers and therefore outwith the parameters of this study.  
Quantitative data concerning deaths and coroners investigations was obtained from the Ministry 
of Justice website which publishes figures for the number of deaths in England and Wales 
together with those referred to a coroner for investigation.  
In order to compare the numbers of forensic PM examinations with homicide data, it was 
necessary to collect data from each of the six pathology group practices. This data was used to 
analyse and compare the two sources to see if there was a changing pattern or correlation as 
anecdotally claimed by forensic pathologists, which had led to the original research question.  
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The analysis of both homicide data and forensic PM data was achieved by plotting both onto a 
graph using excel software, showing the respective forensic PM data as well as the homicide data 
from the ONS. These sets of data have never before been compared as the current study is 
unique, even though all this information is publicly available. Hakim (2000, p. 24) describes 
secondary data analysis as any re-analysis of data collected by another researcher or organisation. 
Fielding and Fielding (2000) used secondary data to analyse historical studies of crime and there 
are many other examples of producing new data from existing material, but with the examination 
of existing data Robson argues that the researcher must satisfy the question ‘what light can this 
information throw on our research questions?’ (Robson, 2011, p. 360). He goes on to describe 
that secondary data analysis may act as a starting point for unforeseen lines of enquiry.  
Hakim (2000) makes the point that instead of designing the study and then collecting the data, by 
using secondary data sources one must first identify what data exists. The first part of the 
research was therefore a factual description of the data as described for the period covering 2012 
to coincide with the audit dates.  
 
3.7 Selection of Research Design – Case Study 
The second and perhaps main part of the chosen design was to gather data in respect of the 33 
cases which were identified following the Forensic Science Regulator’s audit. It therefore 
appeared logical to treat each of the cases as a separate case study and to distance each from the 
opinions and views of the original audit team, but to independently collect more data on each 
case and to produce individual case summaries based upon the accounts of all decision makers. In 
that way, it was hoped to gather differing perspectives from which a more considered view could 
be obtained and which was not available to the FSR audit team. Clearly a case study consisting of 
one case will have little ‘generalisability’ to other cases. However, with a multi-case study, there is 
more likelihood of generalisation as it involves a larger selection. Bassey, (1981) states that the 
‘relatability’ is more important than its generalisability. In other words, the outcomes of the case 
study cannot claim to be the case for all other such events, but it may be able to ‘relate’ to other 
individual cases. Case study rarely involves the selection of a representative statistical 
generalisation typical of survey designs, however Ragin (1987) argues that this does not preclude 
generalisability beyond the specific context studied. The study may provide evidence for a set of 
mechanisms which operate to other similar contexts. 
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The obvious first consideration was to identify who the decision makers were for each of the 
cases and then conduct interviews with them to explore why decisions were made. It was 
necessary to think this through carefully as there were individual problems with this approach. 
The three main decision makers are clearly the coroner who is the only person who can authorise 
a PM and decide which sort it will be; the police because it is in reality their decision to make the 
initial call as they are at the scene and must make the initial assessment; and the pathologist who 
performs the PM. The problems with interviewing potentially what would be almost 100 persons 
scattered throughout England and Wales in terms of time and resource made the interview 
option non-viable. 
Although the size of the task was too large for a single researcher, consideration was given to 
selecting a smaller number of the cases at random to use for the study, however this was 
dismissed as it was thought to be beneficial to have all the collected cases which would give a 
wider spectrum of material, thus making it a richer and more of a representative collection.  
It was therefore decided to use all 33 cases but to gather the data by requesting each of the three 
decision makers in each case to submit documentation regarding their individual involvement in 
the case, using a data request form. This form was similar in nature to a questionnaire but 
differed as questionnaires usually seek responses as to views and opinions whereas the data 
request form sought to elicit facts and documents about each of the 33 cases. 
The coroner, police and forensic pathologist in each case was therefore sent a data request form 
to complete and return by a set date. Documents such as case summaries and autopsy reports 
were also requested. The ethical and practical difficulties in requesting this information has been 
referred to, but by making such a request to a coroner, it could be perceived that their 
independent judicial decision was being questioned. To ensure that coroners were supported if 
they decided to respond to the request for information, the Chief Coroner was consulted and 
agreed to the research if it was made very clear to each coroner that it was a matter for them to 
decide if they wished to partake and that the process would be anonymous. 
The issues with the police were slightly different. Requesting this information might make police 
officers believe that they could be subject to a disciplinary process and that the answers to the 
questions raised within the information request might be used against them. Again, permission 
was sought and granted from the National Police lead for Forensic Pathology, at Chief Constable 
level. The researcher undertook that the research was anonymous and there would be no issue of 
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discipline, subject of course to the ethical considerations discussed concerning possible 
miscarriages of justice. 
The forensic pathologists were less problematic in that they had already submitted their PM 
reports for the original audit and so they in general terms had no difficulty in the process of 
submitting information, although some questioned whether they could submit this information 
without the consent of the coroners in each case. When they were assured that the study had 
been approved by the Chief Coroner they were generally content to provide the requested 
information. Even so, permission for the research was also gained from the Pathology Delivery 
Board (PDB) which is the oversight body for forensic pathology in England and Wales.  
A decision was made not to include in this information gathering exercise the non-forensic 
pathologist or mortuary staff member who had highlighted that there were circumstances about 
the body that they were not happy with and which lead to the forensic PM being called. These 
cases only came to light where the PM examination was halted by the non-forensic pathologist as 
he or she had concerns that the case should be considered as suspicious due to the presence of 
injuries or other factors regarding the body or the surrounding circumstances of the case. The 
reason they were not included was that it was thought that they could not add any information to 
the case summary as their considerations and reasons for declining the PM or for ceasing the PM 
were documented within the coroner’s paperwork. 
Clearly, for the identity of the respective participant’s subject of this study to be obtained, it was 
necessary to gain the approval of the Forensic Science Regulator who had the identities coded by 
an independent overseer of the original audit. Agreement was given on the condition that the 
study was anonymous. This was mainly because it was apparent that the outcomes of the 
research might inform practice in the future and therefore was in the public interest. 
Separate data request forms, were prepared for each of the coroner, police and pathologist in 
each case. This was to reflect their differing roles within the investigation. The questions asked 
together with the rationale can be seen at table 5. They are all broadly similar and most of the 
questions are self-explanatory. There are therefore two academic method considerations in 
respect of this chosen way of gathering the data; data request and case study. The completed 
data request forms were piloted by using two SIO’s who were nominated by the National Police 
lead. These SIO’s were asked to consider the documents primarily for clarity and to ensure that 
the questions were understandable. The coroners data request forms were ‘reviewed’ by the 
Chief Coroner to ensure that they did not contain any inferences which might tend to challenge 
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the coroners independent judicial authority. A three-month return by date was given, which was 
in the autumn of 2014. Follow up emails and phone calls were necessary to chase those from 
whom there was no response. 
Bryman (2012 p. 263-264) recommends pilot testing questions, particularly because there will not 
be an interviewer present for clarification purposes and so each question must be capable of 
being a stand-alone and unambiguous question. One problem with questioning is of sequencing. 
If questions are ordered in the wrong sequence, it might appear to the respondent that one 
question follows on from the previous one as a sub or ancillary question. Unless this is intended 
by the researcher, it should be clear that all questions are self-contained.  
Some of the questions within the data request form were closed in nature as all that was required 
was a simple affirmation. Questions were constructed to elicit the maximum information. 
Questioning style is very important to the researcher as the over use of particular questioning 
styles can skew the answers given. Leading questions which inherently contain a degree of the 
questioners own bias can be particularly dangerous and research has shown that police officers, 
when interviewing adult witnesses, who use such questions risk obtaining erroneous information 
(Clarke and Milne, 2001; Shepherd, 2007 p183-193).  
Table 5: Rationale for questions to Police, coroners and pathologists 
No: Constituency Question Rationale 
1 All Question to identify role in the 
case 
Ensure that the respondent is the 
appropriate person 
2 Police What were the brief 
circumstances of the case? 
Outline of circumstances as an abstract 
to the full case summary from police 
perspective 
 Coroner What were the brief 
circumstances leading to the 
death of the deceased? 
Outline of circumstances as an abstract 
to the full case summary from the 
coroners perspective 
 Pathologist Were you requested to attend 
the scene by police, or 
otherwise briefed or consulted 
prior to the commencement of 
the post mortem examination 
by the non-forensic pathologist?  
Establish whether the HORFP had been 
consulted prior to the decision that the 
case was non-suspicious by either the 
police or the non-forensic pathologist. 
3 Police What information was known at 
the time of the decision to treat 
the case as suspicious? 
Identification of the circumstances and 
what was known by the police decision 
maker at the time the decision was 
made that the case was non-suspicious 
 Coroner What information was known to 
you at the time that the 
decision was made not to utilise 
the services of a HORFP? 
Identification of the circumstances and 
what was known to the coroner at the 
time the decision was made that the 
case was non-suspicious 
 Pathologist What were the brief Outline of circumstances as an abstract 
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circumstances of the case? to the full case summary from the 
pathologists perspective  
4 Police What was your assessment of 
the scene? 
Establish what the police officer took 
into account and the factors which may 
have influenced their decision, 
including whether any real assessment 
was made at all 
 Coroner What part did you play in 
deciding whether or not the 
post mortem examination 
should be conducted by a Home 
office forensic pathologist? 
The coroner is the prime decision 
maker in a death investigation but this 
question was posed in order to elicit 
whether the decision was truly that of 
the coroner or whether it was by a 
coroner’s officer or just a routine 
acceptance of the police report  
 Pathologist  When and by whom were you 
instructed to conduct the post 
mortem examination in this 
case 
To establish at what stage the original 
decision to treat as non-suspicious was 
changed and to identify whether the 
person briefing the pathologist was the 
police, coroner or some other person 
5 Police Were any experts utilised in the 
assessment of the scene? 
To establish whether the police called 
upon any assistance in making the 
scene assessment or whether this was 
done by the attending officers only 
 Coroner What was the rational for not 
referring the case to a HORFP in 
the first instance? 
To understand the factors that 
influenced the coroners decision not to 
use a HORFP 
 Pathologist What led to the case being 
deemed suspicious prior to your 
involvement? 
Establish what new information was 
discovered at post mortem leading to 
the decision to treat the case as 
suspicious 
6 Police If you were not the chief 
decision maker in this case, 
what rank and role was the 
chief decision maker? 
To establish whether the decision was 
referred on, and if so to what level was 
the decision made and what role holder 
made it 
 Coroner What would you say was the 
main factor that influenced your 
decision making in respect of 
considering the case as non-
suspicious? 
Identify the factor which was the main 
influencer in the coroners decision 
making 
 Pathologist Do you know if police personnel 
had been deployed to the 
mortuary prior to your receipt 
of instructions? If so what were 
the circumstances? 
To establish if the police, although 
having decided that the case did not 
warrant a HORFP, did however want to 
be present at the post mortem ‘just in 
case’. If they were present, for what 
purpose were they at the non-forensic 
post mortem? 
7 Police What factors were considered in 
deciding whether to advise the 
coroner on having a routine 
post mortem examination as 
opposed to a forensic post-
Identification of other factors which 
may affect decision making as to 
whether to treat the case as a 
suspicious one 
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mortem?  
 Coroner Was the case referred for 
inquest? (Please see note above 
concerning ongoing inquests.) 
If the case was referred for inquest, it 
suggests that there was some issue to 
be examined and an inquest could be 
the source of further information 
regarding the case. 
 Pathologist In your professional opinion, do 
you consider that the 
police/coroner should have 
declared this death to be 
suspicious (thereby requiring a 
forensic post mortem 
examination) from the outset? 
Obtain the HORFP’s opinion from the 
first examination of the body to see if 
there were any elements which should 
have been obvious to the police at the 
scene. 
8 Police What would you say was the 
main factor that influenced your 
decision making in respect of 
recommending a routine post 
mortem examination? 
Identification of any issues which drove 
the decision of the police officer making 
the decision not to treat the case as 
suspicious 
 Coroner What was the eventual outcome 
of the case? 
To identify the outcome as to whether 
the case was a homicide or whether the 
case transpired to be non-suspicious or 
whether it was unresolved 
 Pathologist Was the case referred for 
inquest? 
If the case was referred for inquest, it 
suggests that there was some issue to 
be examined and an inquest could be 
the source of further information 
regarding the case. This was asked to all 
respondents in case this information 
was not forthcoming from the coroner 
9 Police Was the case referred for 
inquest? 
If the case was referred for inquest, it 
suggests that there was some issue to 
be examined and an inquest could be 
the source of further information 
regarding the case. This was asked to all 
respondents in case this information 
was not forthcoming from the coroner 
 Coroner If the matter was referred for 
inquest but has not yet been 
heard; what date is the inquest 
scheduled for? 
This is a follow on from the previous 
coroners question 
 Pathologist What was the eventual outcome 
of the case? 
This question was included in case the 
information was not forthcoming from 
other respondents 
10 Police What was the eventual outcome 
of the case? 
This question was included in case the 
information was not forthcoming from 
other respondents 
 Coroner In general terms, do you have 
any other comments concerning 
the decision making processes 
employed in determining 
whether or not to use the 
A trawl for other data not included in 
previous questions 
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services of a Home Office 
forensic pathologist as opposed 
to a hospital pathologist? 
 Pathologist Please provide any additional 
comments or observations in 
respect of this case that you feel 
are relevant. 
A trawl for other data not included in 
previous questions 
11 Police If the matter was referred for 
inquest but has not yet been 
heard; what date is the inquest 
scheduled for? 
This is a follow on from question 9 
 Coroner If you are willing to, please 
supply a copy of the initial 
sudden death report submitted 
by the police*. (NOTE: This is a 
matter for each coroner to 
consider and you may feel it 
appropriate to gain permission 
of the family). 
Requested in order to get all of the 
information on which the coroners 
decision was made 
 Pathologist Do you have any general 
comments of observations 
concerning the approach of the 
police and/or coroners in 
assessing the status of death 
cases and their relationship with 
forensic pathologists in this 
regard? 
A trawl for other data not included in 
previous questions 
12 Police Please append a copy of the 
report which was sent to HM 
Coroner as part of the police 
investigation. 
Requested in order to get all of the 
information on which the coroners 
decision was made 
 Pathologist If you have any further 
examples of cases where there 
was the potential for a ‘missed 
homicide’ please provide 
details. 
Trawl for further cases of interest to 
this study 
13 Police Does your force have a policy in 
relation to the use of forensic 
pathologists? If so please attach 
and return a copy with this data 
request form, or signpost where 
this can be found. 
Trawl for force policies in order that an 
examination could take place and to 
see whether the attending police 
officers complied with them. Also an 
examination of the quality of each 
policy 
14 Police Have you received any training 
in scene assessment such as the 
ABC principle or 5WH + H? 
Establish what, if any training has been 
received by the officer 
 
Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) used several case studies to assess the impact of the police 
murder review process. Case study is a well-established research strategy where the focus is on a 
case or multiple cases and taking its context into account. Case study typically involves multiple 
Chapter 3 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 50 
methods of data collection and can include quantitative data, although qualitative data are almost 
invariably collected (Robson, 2011 p. 135). The use of case study in death investigation research is 
not new. Case study was used by Jones, Grieve and Milne (2008) to assess the quality of murder 
reviews. Stelfox (2006) used over 40 case studies to research the factors which lead to the 
successful conclusion of murder investigations within Greater Manchester Police. Greenwood, 
Chaiken and Pertersilia (1997) introduced a scientific model in investigating crime generally after 
case study research into a large number of crimes in the USA. Case study appeared therefore to 
be the appropriate means of conducting this part of the research. 
Case study is described by Robson (2011, p. 79) as ‘development of detailed intensive knowledge 
about a single case or of a small number of related cases’. Yin (2009, in Robson (2011 p136) 
defines case study as ‘a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of 
evidence’. Although case study methodology was selected primarily as it emerged to be the 
obvious choice given the availability of the 33 cases, it was also evident that the literature 
indicated it to be the best approach where little is known about the phenomenon being 
researched (Yin, 1994 p. 13). Yin describes case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clear’. Where the relationship between context and phenomena 
is unclear, case study is ideal in that by looking at each case, the individual characteristics can be 
compared and contrasted with others in the set (Yin, 1974).  
Two of the best known writers about case study are Stake (1995) and Yin (2013). They both base 
their approach to case study on a constructivist paradigm. In other words, that ‘truth’ is relative 
and that it is dependent on the individual’s perspective. Recognition is made of;  
‘The importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn’t reject outright 
some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular 
dynamic tension of subject and object’. (Miller and Crabtree, 1999, p. 10).  
According to Yin (2013) a case study design is particularly relevant when the purpose of the study 
is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. This is because the events which constitute the case in 
question has already taken place, the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviours of those in 
the case study, although of course the findings can still be the subject of manipulation. Yin (2013) 
also describes what he calls ‘contextual conditions’ as the phenomenon will be dependent upon 
the context. Baxter and Jack (2008) used a case study to examine decision making in student 
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nurses, but the case could not be considered without the context, which was in a classroom 
environment, not in the clinical environment which may have skewed the outcomes (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008). 
Yin (2003) suggests that the researcher must decide whether they are describing a case, exploring 
a case or comparing between case and the current research sought to do all three. Stake (1995) 
describes two types of case study; intrinsic is where the researcher is interested in a single and 
unique situation or event, whereby the researcher must acknowledge that the outcomes have 
limited transferability to other settings; and multiple case studies as instrumental where the 
research will seek to gain some insight and understanding of a particular situation or 
phenomenon. This research fits into both categories as it seeks to identify factors in each case, 
but also issues which may be transferable to unexplained death investigation more generally. 
Bryman (2012 p74) states that the main argument in favour of multiple case studies is that they 
improve theory building and they also have the potential to play a crucial role in understanding 
causality. In multiple case study research, the first stage is to analyse each individual case before 
one can start to look across at others (Stake, 1995). In other words, all cases in a multi case study 
need to be subjected to an ‘intrinsic’ analysis before an ‘instrumental’ analysis of all cases (Stake, 
1995 p. 3). The object of this intrinsic case study was to focus on the individual investigation as a 
unit of analysis. Of course, a single case study will be more akin to qualitative research, but the 
more cases examined in multi-case research, the research will tend to move towards quantitative 
research also. Table 6 is a description of this phenomena from Yin, (2003.)  
Table 6: Yin, 2003 
Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Explains and controls Understanding of complex 
relationships 
Simple causal relationships as 
observed 
Empathetic/experimental 
understanding using thick description 
Try to nullify context to generalise and 
arrive at a ‘grand theory’. Here, 
uniqueness of the case is treated as an 
error. 
Uniqueness of case is respected. 
Particularisation is an important aim. 
Multiple realities 
Use of scales and measurements Direct interpretations and 
observations 
Research question seeks relationship 
between small number of variables 
Seeking patterns of unanticipated and 
expected relationships 
Correlation or covariance Pattern 
Seeking meaning from repetition of 
phenomenon 
Seeking meaning emerging from a 
single instance 
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Case studies are important in social research as not only are they a method of generating 
hypothesis, but also for generating and testing theory. Patton and Appelbaum (2003) set out what 
they describe as a ‘road map’ which is explained at table 7. 
Table 7: Patton and Appelbaum (2003) 
Determine 
the Object of 
Study 
The first crucial step is for the researcher to decide what topic the case will focus 
on. It is important for the object of study to be broadly defined so that the 
researcher will have room to manoeuvre and allow the case to lead him or her 
into new directions. However, it is important for the aims of the research to be 
outlined and tentative hypotheses to be constructed 
Select the 
Case 
Case study research does not rely on random sampling techniques. Rather, the 
case study researcher must strategically select a case that is pertinent to the 
object of study and that will allow the subject to be investigated fully 
Build initial 
theory 
through a 
literature 
review 
The existing literature on the object of study helps frame the case study and is 
important for establishing validity in the research and confidence in the findings. 
If the theories and hypotheses in the existent literature coincide with the 
findings of the case, then confidence in the findings will be increased. Still, if the 
results of the case do not coincide with the literature on the subject, then an 
excellent opportunity arises to determine why and perhaps develop new theory 
Collecting and 
organising the 
data 
To avoid being overwhelmed with mountains of data, instruments and protocols 
should be established for the collection of data. While data collection is a 
constant process of grasping good opportunities as well as setting structured 
plans for observing events, interviewing sources and reviewing documentation, it 
is important that the focus remain on the object of study 
Analysing the 
data and 
reaching 
conclusions 
The danger of being overwhelmed by the quantity of data exists during the 
analysis phase. The goal of the case study is to uncover patterns, determine 
meanings, construct conclusions and build theory. As previously underlined, rich 
description is a crucial step before conclusions can be offered. Once context is 
determined, the data can be examined properly and findings can be presented. 
The quality of the context description, creating links back to the literature and 
triangulation will all play a crucial role in determining the validity of the research 
 
After the eventual cut-off date, prior to analysis, it was necessary to construct complete case 
summaries of each of the cases using the data contained within the completed data request form 
and also police and coroner’s reports. Each case summary was then checked to ensure that all the 
material was included. The completed case summaries were used as a central document on which 
to base the analysis. To check the accuracy of each summary, they were given to a colleague of 
the researcher to check using all the material provided. Amendments were made if facts were 
missed or if mistakes made.  
The second step was to carry out an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995 p3). This involved a 
cross case analysis with the objective of establishing common factors between them. On 
completion of the case summaries, one of the cases was excluded because the death was in fact a 
road traffic death. Although there is police guidance regarding such deaths (ACPO, 2007), there is 
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no prescriptive guidance concerning the use of forensic PM’s and in fact most deaths of this 
nature do not involve forensic pathologists opinions. This left a final case study count of 32 cases. 
Analysis of the collected data conducted using an excel spreadsheet and plotting the relevant 
factors or ‘categories’ across the horizontal axis, and each case was plotted onto the vertical axis. 
If the relevant factor was present, a score of one was placed in the appropriate cell. This was 
repeated several times as new relevant factors were identified. The outcome was a quantitative 
extraction of the number of relevant factors for each case and the number of cases for which each 
relevant factor was present. 
The narrative of each case was then plotted into the Nvivo database and Nodes were identified as 
relevant factors. From this, qualitative data was selected which added depth and meaning to the 
quantitative data. In order to cross check the collected data and the subsequent entries onto the 
spreadsheet, the material was passed to three other individuals. Two were serving SIO’s and one 
was a retired but experienced Special Investigation Branch (SIB) officer from the military. It was 
important that serving officers were used as they were current in the world of investigations and 
may have had a differing perspective in relation to the data. Opinions differed in some of the case 
studies and these are discussed in Chapter 8. 
The 32 cases were divided into three broad areas by a process of verification detailed in chapter 
3, but these were grouped as ‘suspicious’, ‘non-suspicious’ and ‘grey’. Those in the ‘grey’ category 
were where there was some divergence of view from the assessors. Factors present in each of the 
cases, such as issues concerning the circumstances of the death and vulnerabilities of the 
deceased were identified and plotted using Excel software. There are several multivariate 
algorithms available to analyse case study data. Ragin (1989) encourages the epistemological 
rigour of combining both qualitative and quantitative methods in comparative research through 
‘Qualitative Comparative Research’ (QCA). He rejects the use of correlation by which to compare 
factors in different cases (Ragin, 2006). Ragin claims that ‘a theory that is formulated in terms of 
set relations should be evaluated on its own terms, that is, as statements about set relations, not 
about correlations’ (Ragin, 2006, p. 1). Ragin favours what he describes as ‘fuzzy sets’; the process 
whereby instead of allocating a binary score to the factors within a case (where ‘1’ equals that the 
factor is present and ‘0’ equals where the factor is not present) he proposes degrees between the 
two extremes between 0 and 1 such as 0.5 would be between the two intervals. In this way, he 
combines case oriented methods which is a qualitative strategy with variable oriented methods 
which is quantitative (Vancea, 2006). Associations are compared using ‘Boolean Algebra’ instead 
of correlation. However, Ragin’s QCA form of multivariate analysis was not possible in the current 
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study as from the data available in the case study material, insufficient detail was known about 
the cases to identify more discreet determinations than the presence (1) or absence (0) of factors 
in each case. Therefore, an alternative algorithm was chosen, namely Multidimensional Scaling 
(MDS). MDS was used to analyse the relationships between the variables as it seemed to be 
appropriate to show similarities and ‘closeness of fit’ between variables identified across the 32 
case studies. MDS is a multi-dimensional scaling system which visually displays inter-correlations 
between each variable (Porter and Allison, 2006, p. 334). Associations between variables are 
represented by the closeness between points in Euclidean (geometric) space. The closer the 
points, the more similar the case (Garson, 2012). The technique has been applied in several fields, 
especially offender profiling (Canter, 1991; Canter and Heritage, 1990; Heritage, 1992; Canter, 
2000). MDS was used to analyse a correlation matrix, pre-programmed using Pearson’s 
Correlation Coefficient (r) between each variable. This treats correlation as a measure of 
similarity; the higher the correlation of variables, the closer they will be located on a visual 
representation in ‘Euclidean Space’. Each variable was plotted onto a two-dimensional map in 
relation to their similarity or dissimilarity. MDS within SPSS14 replaced ‘Smallest Space Analysis’ 
(SSA) which is commonly referred to in the literature. The MDS product is in the form of a 
scatterplot in which ‘the axes are the underlying dimensions and the points are the products, 
candidates, opinions, or other objects of comparison’ (Garson, 2012, Kindle location 269). The 
purpose of plotting the data using MDS was to identify closeness of match between relevant 
variables to see whether there were commonalities for those cases which were deemed 
suspicious, grey or non-suspicious. Again, there are various algorithms capable of achieving this 
and so two different algorithms within the SPSS database were tried to see if there was a 
difference by using separate systems.  
 
3.8 Focus Groups  
To follow on from the 32 case studies, it was thought appropriate to conduct a series of focus 
groups to drill into the qualitative aspects of decision making at death scenes from a 
representative sample of those in attendance and at a more strategic level. An obvious option 
was to interview those individuals who were involved in the 32 cases, but as already mentioned, 
this would have been a massive task for a single researcher. This was also dismissed as it was 
possible that respondents may have been defensive and concerned as to the consequences. Thus, 
                                                             
14 IBM Statistical Package for Social Science  
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to utilise focus groups seemed to be the most appropriate method to achieve qualitative data for 
the following reasons; 
 Participants are anonymous from the case studies; 
 A comparatively large amount of data can be collected in a short time; 
 Allowed for a good cross section of views from different parts of the country; 
 Sampled a range of perspectives from different levels of knowledge and experience; and 
 The researcher was accessible to these pre-existing groups. 
It was decided that the most appropriate participants for the focus groups would be police 
constables who would be most likely to be the first to attend death scenes. However, this option 
was not possible as many may never have experienced dealing with such a scene, and if they had, 
there was unlikely to be any with extensive experience. Therefore, Crime Scene Investigators 
(CSI’s) who would attend many such scenes and would routinely engage and discuss cases with 
first attending officers were chosen instead. CSI’s are the first line of forensic response to any 
incident and trained in crime scene assessment. Using CSI’s would therefore guarantee a depth of 
experience from which data could be drawn. CSI's are a homogenous group with shared interests 
and roles. 
The other ‘police’ focus group was SIO’s as they are the lead decision makers in homicide cases 
(ACPO, 2006, p. 25). It was necessary to ensure that there was representation from all ranks from 
Detective Inspector, Detective Chief Inspector and Detective Superintendent. The third focus 
group was that of non-forensic pathologists who it was thought might be able to add a different 
perspective. Focus groups involving HORFP’s were also convened in addition to the comments 
already received via the data request process. With all focus groups, it was necessary that they 
should be from a range of experience and from across the whole of England and Wales. Ideal 
opportunities were sought to get focus groups together. It was not possible to arrange a bespoke 
focus group due to the resource implications of getting several individuals together in one place 
from around England and Wales. Even the time of individuals engaging in a virtual video 
conference was ambitious, but such conferences can be confusing and where open dialogue is 
expected, non-face to face conversations can hamper discussion and exchange of views (Bryman, 
2012 p. 663).  
The College of Policing run a two-week Crime Scene Managers (CSM) Course for CSI’s who have 
been selected for promotion. They hold two of these courses per year and delegates are from 
forces in England and Wales. The researcher presented on this course in relation to the role of the 
SIO and how homicides are investigated. The College of Policing were asked permission to use a 
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30 to 45-minute slot at the end of that presentation to convene a focus group. The class timetable 
was adjusted for this purpose. Consent was obtained in writing for all the focus groups held at the 
College of Policing at Harperley Hall, near Durham. Similarly, the College of Policing host a one 
week ‘Criminal Justice Course for Pathologists’ which is organised and run by the researcher. This 
was an ideal opportunity to use the class of 8 to 12 delegates who were all histopathologists and 
organ specific experts. The College of Policing host two of these per year and they are funded and 
managed by the Home Office. These courses were ideal opportunities to use part of the class time 
as focus groups.  
The arranging of a suitable focus group for SIO’s was more problematic. The national SIO course 
was considered as that is also hosted by the College of Policing, however all attendees on this 
course are junior SIO’s about to embark upon the role and would therefore have little in the way 
of experience. Fortuitously, a focus group was about to be convened for the purpose of the 
Hutton review of forensic pathology services. It was due to be held at the Home Office and so an 
approach was made and granted to utilise this focus group to not only engage in the original 
purpose, but to use the last 30 minutes of it for the SIO focus group for the current study. 
Meetings of each HORFP group practice was arranged which constituted another six focus groups. 
It was necessary to decide upon a form of words to read to each focus group at the start. It was 
also necessary to have a basic structure to keep to in order that all the required points were 
covered and to avoid going off the subject. Prior to interview, it was important that the 
participant was aware of a number of factors, including the purpose of the interview; format; 
length of interview; confidentiality issues; purpose and permission for recording and note taking; 
assurance that the participant can ask questions and decline to answer questions (Rose 1994). 
All participants were asked permission and given an opportunity to decline involvement. The 
focus groups took place at as per table 8.  
Table 8: Focus Groups 
Focus Group Venue Number of focus 
groups 
Total number 
attended 
CSI’s Harperley Hall (CoP) 4 44 
Pathologists Harperley Hall (CoP) 2 20 
SIO’s Home Office (London) 1 18 
HORFP’s Group Practices 6 27 
 
To use a number of these opportunities when between 8 and 12 attendees are present in a group 
situation appeared to be ideal for the purpose of the focus groups. Morgan (1998) suggests that a 
focus group should consist of a minimum of 8 participants and each of the thirteen groups 
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achieved this minimum number. Krueger and Casey (2000) recommend 6 to 10. Bryman (2012 p. 
505) states that there is no hard a fast rule in relation to the number of focus groups that should 
be used, but at least 2 would be the norm but enough focus groups have been achieved when the 
facilitator fairly accurately anticipates what the next group will say (Calder, 1977 in Bryman, 2012 
p. 504).  
There are therefore similarities between the process of running a focus group and conducting a 
semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interview principles were therefore used and a guide 
document was produced to assist in managing each of the focus groups at figure 5.  
Figure 5: Semi-structured guide for focus groups 
Form of words to be addressed to participants in focus groups: 
"Thank you for attending this focus group. The purpose of the exercise is to gather information 
about the rationale employed by decision makers and other key personnel involved in any 
investigation where death occurs; and the decision whether to employ the services of a forensic 
pathologist to assist in the early assessment of such cases. 
In a recent audit conducted by the Forensic Science Regulator, auditors looked at a number of 
cases, initially deemed to have been non-suspicious by police or the coroner. In these cases, post 
mortem examinations had been conducted by a hospital pathologist but subsequently taken 
over by a Home Office forensic pathologist. 
The outcome of this research will be used for a doctoral study at the University of Portsmouth.  
It is emphasised that all information provided will be treated in strict confidence and that any 
future report will ensure the anonymity of individual persons and organisations. However, the 
final report may make comment in general terms regarding the conduct and decision making of 
police; coroners and pathologists in unexplained death cases. It is not known what the outcomes 
may be, however there is a possibility that critical comment could be made in general terms 
regarding how these cases are dealt with. 
I need to point out that if you do not wish to partake in this focus group, you are free to leave 
the room now. This will take no longer than 30 minutes and will be tape recorded. The recording 
will be destroyed after the product has been analysed. 
Key points for discussion: (Focus Groups) 
Pose question:  
 What is the quality of the initial investigation of scenes of unexpected death by first 
police attenders? 
Subsequent points to be elicited:  
 Has your force a policy in relation to actions at the scene? 
 What is the procedure for supervision of unexplained death investigations? 
 What training do first attenders receive? 
 Are there any factors which might encourage the practice of utilising a non-forensic post 
mortem instead of a forensic one? 
 Examples of good and poor practice 
 Contact me later if you wish to discuss further 
 Any other comments from the group/person? 
Record date and times 
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Semi-structured interviews are described by DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006) as ‘guided 
conversations' which originate from ethnographic and anthropological traditions, where key 
informants are chosen and questions emerge as the researcher learns more about the issues. 
Hand (2003) highlights that within the interview process, the prejudices and values of the 
researcher must be acknowledged and so a degree of reflexivity is required. Spencer, Ritchie, 
Lewis and Dillon (2003) list the three components of reflexivity as: 
 Demonstrating an awareness as to how bias may emerge; 
 Attempt to minimise the impact of the researcher on the data; and 
 Address bias through analysis; reflectiveness; and acknowledge the limitations of the 
study.  
(Spencer et al, 2003, p. 14). 
Interviews are one of the most common methods of data collection and it is important to note 
that there is a difference between structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. 
Structured interviews tend to be set pre-determined questions and are designed to collect 
quantitative data. They are fixed regardless of the response.  
The researcher relied upon the principles and skills intrinsic in the Investigative Interviewing 
PEACE model used by law enforcement and private companies charged with investigating and 
thereby interviewing people. Investigative Interviewing is defined within the context of generic 
interviewing, and it is important to outline the veracity of the technique as an aid to academic 
research in terms of questioning as it is argued that although developed for a law enforcement 
purpose, Investigative Interviewing is equally effective for academic research. A summary of the 
key features of investigative interviewing is at appendix 6. 
Focus groups research is the organised discussion with a selected group of individuals to gain their 
perspectives and views in respect of a particular topic (Gibbs, 1997). They differ from ‘group 
interviews’15 in that the latter concentrates on individual responses from participants to questions 
posed by the facilitator, whereas the focus group is also concerned with the interaction and 
conversations within the group (Morgan, 1997), and can lead to a ‘joint construction of meaning’ 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 502). There are several definitions of focus groups. Robson (2011, p. 293) 
describes focus groups as being similar to interviews but in a group situation and Bryman (2012, 
p. 501) describes them as group ‘interviews in relation to a certain topic’. The fact that the process 
of the focus group is in respect of a specific topic is where the word ‘focus’ is derived (Robson, 
20011, p. 294). Powell and Single (1996, p. 499) define focus groups as ‘a group of individuals 
                                                             
15 The term ‘group interview’ is sometimes confused with ‘focus group’ due to the latter’s popularity (Robson, 2011). 
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assembled by researchers to discuss and comment on, from personal experience, the topic that is 
the subject of the research’.  
Kitzinger (1994, 1995) sees a major value of focus group research because participants are able to 
ask questions of each other which can lead to re-evaluate and reconsider their own 
understanding of experiences, and participants can also probe each other’s reasons for holding 
with a certain view (Bryman, 2012, p. 503). In this way, the interest is in how people respond to 
each other’s views and form their own views from the interaction which takes place within the 
group (Bryman, 2012, p. 501). Differences of view and opinion can allow the facilitator to explore 
with the group these conflicts and the factors which underpin them (Kitzinger, 1994).  
The main reason for focus groups is to draw upon respondents personal experiences and views in 
an environment where their comments and attitudes are capable of challenge and support from 
other members of the group which sets it aside from other forms of data collection methods 
(Gibbs, 1997). This process of challenge can result in a more realistic account of what people think 
and possibly revise their own views (Bryman, 2012, p. 503). Morgan (1998) describes focus groups 
as a method in their own right or (as in the current study) as a compliment to other methods, 
especially for triangulating mixed method studies. Perhaps one of the main benefits of the focus 
group is that it is invaluable for grounded theory development and the generation of theory 
rather than the testing of existing theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Another benefit is that 
focus groups are capable of ‘filling in gaps’ and helping to explain issues already identified by 
other methods in a mixed method study (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 116). This was particularly relevant to 
the current study and in assisting in the exploration of issues identified in the case study stage. 
There are clear limitations on the focus group method, such as obtaining the views of less 
articulate and shy members of the group. The facilitator has an important role in encouraging 
those participants who are reticent to engage, by actively encouraging involvement by directly 
asking them their views (Bryman, 2012, p. 509). An over dominant character within a group can 
bring the whole group to share their point of view and to think uncritically, and thereby adopt an 
almost irrational attachment to a minority standpoint (Janis, 1982). However, the opposite can 
also be true, where individuals who would otherwise never be given an opportunity to express 
their view can be empowered (Gibbs, 1997), especially for minority groups (Madriz, 2000) and 
there is no discrimination against people who are reluctant to be interviewed or feel that they 
have nothing to say (Kitzinger, 1995, p. 299). The main disadvantage has to be acknowledged that 
‘group dynamics and ‘power hierarchies’ affect who speaks and what they say’ (Robson, 2011, p. 
294). Another limitation is that the facilitator by virtue of the process relinquishes some control 
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over the debate (Morgan, 1988). Focus groups therefore take much more skill to manage and 
control compared with interviews. It is desirable to allow some discussion which departs from the 
focus of the group as such debate may provide new insights that the facilitator has not 
anticipated (Bryman, 2012, p. 512). The facilitator must also be careful not to show either 
approval or disagreement with comments made as this could skew what participants will say to 
please or even challenge the facilitator (Kreuger, 1998). The facilitator must strike a balance 
between an active role to control and bring the required ‘focus’ or leading the group to reinforce 
existing expectations, and a passive role in order not to influence the outcome (Robson, 2011, p. 
296). The facilitator therefore must not be too intrusive (Bryman, 2012, p. 501). 
There are also practical difficulties in using the focus group approach in that they are logistically 
problematic to arrange and there needs to be comprehensive recording of the process to extract 
the detail of what was said. This can be complicated by such factors as ‘over talking’ each other 
which is inevitable in such group discussions (Bryman, 2012). Particularly in respect of the current 
study, the use of CSI’s as a homogeneous grouping which although facilitates communication and 
exchange of ideas and experiences, may result in ‘groupthink’ which is the ‘unquestioning 
similarity of position or views’ (Robson, 2011, p. 295). Nevertheless, the use of such homogenous 
groups can bring about consensus into an identity which can provide a powerful argument for the 
research as being a collective viewpoint (Munday, 2006). 
 
3.9 Evaluation of the data 
Evaluation of the statistical data has been described above, however the qualitative data from 
both the case study and focus group interviews was assembled into the Nvivo database. The focus 
of this part of the research was to examine what people said to provide a ‘richness’ to the 
statistical findings. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) state that ‘words are the way that most people 
come to understand their situations; ‘we create our world with words; we explain ourselves with 
words; we defend and hide ourselves with words’. Thus, in qualitative data analysis and 
presentation: ‘the task of the researcher is to find patterns within those words and to present 
those patterns for others to inspect’ (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994, p. 18). 
Although qualitative data analysis using Nvivo is a systematic process not designed to derive 
mathematical abstractions, but it can give numeric values. Some categories can be pre-
determined, but it was the experience of the researcher that categories emerged from the data 
throughout the evaluation and coding process. The process was to populate the database with 
the source material and then categorise the text into ‘nodes’. Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe 
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two sorts of categorisation; one that derives from the participant in terms of their customs and 
language, and one that the researcher identifies as significant to the focus of the enquiry. They 
describe that the first is intended to reconstruct the individuals own experience and their ‘world 
view’; whilst the second is to assist the researcher in developing theoretical insights. This leads to 
both descriptive and explanatory categories (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 334-341). 
 
‘the researcher simultaneously codes and analyses data in order to develop concepts; 
by continually comparing specific incidents in the data, the researcher refines these 
concepts, identifies their properties, explores their relationships to one another, and 
integrates them into a coherent explanatory model’ (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984, 
p126).  
 
One of the advantages of using qualitative research software is that it leaves an auditable trail 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1998, p. 167). Krippendorff (2004) describes the coding of data as an 
iterative process where the researcher is learning new things about the data as it is analysed. He 
describes eight phases shown in figure 6 (Krippendorff, 2004). 
Figure 6: Eight Stages of Qualitative Analysis 
 
 
Phase 1 – Transcribing qualitative comments and demographic and other profiling information into a table for import 
into a computer aided qualitative data analysis system (CAQDAS) known as Nvivo.  
Phase 2 – Open Coding will involve broad participant driven open coding of the chronological submissions supported 
with definitions so as to deconstruct the data into initial non-hierarchical general themes. These themes will have clear 
labels and definitions to serve as rules for inclusion of units of meaning (text segments) which will be coded from the 
content. 
Phase 3 – Categorisation of codes will involve re-ordering themes identified and coded in phase 1 into categories of 
themes by grouping related themes under these categories and organising them into a framework that makes sense to 
further the analysis of the data. This phase also includes distilling, re-labelling and merging categories to ensure that 
labels and rules for inclusion accurately reflect coded content  
Phase 4 – ‘coding on’ will involve breaking down the now restructured themes into sub-themes to offer more in depth 
understanding of the highly qualitative aspects under scrutiny such as divergent views, negative cases, attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviours coded to these categories and to offer clearer insights into the meanings embedded therein  
Phase 5 –Data Reduction will involve consolidating and refining codes into a more abstract and conceptual map of a 
final framework of codes  
Phase 6 – writing analytical memos against the higher level codes to accurately summarise the content of each category 
and its codes and propose empirical findings against such categories. These memos will consider 5 key areas:  
1. The content of the cluster of codes on which it is reporting. 2. The patterns where relevant (levels of coding for 
example although this could be used to identify exceptional cases as well as shared experiences). 3. Situating the 
code(s) in the storyboard –meaning considering the relatedness of codes to each other and drawing and describing 
inferences, and their importance to addressing the research question and sequencing disparate codes and clusters of 
codes into a story or narrative which is structured and can be expressed in the form of a coherent and cohesive chapter. 
4. Considering background information recorded against participants and considering any patterns that may exist in 
relation to participants’ profiles 5. Considering primary sources in the context of relationships with the  literature as well 
as identifying gaps in the literature  
Phase 7 – Validation will involve testing, validating and revising analytical memos so as to self-audit proposed findings 
by seeking evidence in the data beyond textual quotes to support the stated findings and seeking to expand on deeper 
meanings embedded in the data. This process involves interrogation of data and forces the consideration of elements 
beyond the category itself; drawing on relationships across and between categories and cross tabulation with 
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demographics, observations and literature. This phase will result in evidence based findings as each finding must be 
validated by being rooted in the data itself and will rely on the creation of reports from the data to substantiate 
findings.  
Phase 8 – synthesising analytical memos into a coherent, cohesive and well supported outcome statement or findings 
report. Finalising phase 8 will result in having produced two draft chapters; namely the findings and discussion chapters.  
 
Each focus group discussion was recorded on digital media and which was then transferred to the 
researchers home computer which was password protected. Each focus group recording was 
transcribed fully and the transcripts were uploaded onto the Nvivo software system and analysed 
and sorted into categories. The categories are identified and explained in chapter 7.  
In evaluating the data, Richards, (2011 p. 136) states that theories do not normally emerge 
themselves. Theories are constructed by researchers and although concepts may emerge from 
the data, a theory still must be constructed by the researcher (Turner, 1981). Research should 
answer three questions; the goals of the research; answering the research question and that the 
outcome should offer analysis and new theory or explanation, not just description (Richards, 2011 
p. 138). With this thesis, it is description, analysis, theory and explanation with a view to changing 
behaviour which was the ultimate goal. 
In analysing the data from this study, the intention was to reach saturation, which means to get to 
a stage where no new themes arise (Richards, 2011 p. 144). In practical terms, this meant going 
over old ground several times, as new themes emerged when new cases were analysed or when 
new topics were raised in focus groups or interviews.  
The main problem encountered during the data analysis phase was the sheer volume of material. 
It was therefore necessary to reduce the data to that which was directly relevant to answering the 
research question. This was done by identifying the categories at an early stage by speed reading 
the material and also with a knowledge of what was likely to be a relevant topic. Although this did 
change to some extent during the detailed evaluation stage, it kept the data to a more 
manageable level.  
Identifying these key themes was useful in allocating facts, comments and observations to each 
theme thus building a picture. The evaluation of the 32 cases and the material collected in respect 
of them was kept separate to the evaluation of focus groups and interview data. This was in order 
not to confuse the two and so that the 32 cases could be reported upon using the information 
provided, and then using the interview data as more general thoughts and views about the 
subject of how unexplained deaths are dealt with. 
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Key comments from participants are quoted directly where relevant, however more complex 
points made are paraphrased or interpreted by the author for the sake of clarity and brevity. It is 
acknowledged that the area of evaluation is one where the author’s own bias can affect 
interpretation; in particular overload, influence of the bias of first impression and confidence in 
judgements are three areas to be aware of (Robson, 1993, p. 274-275).  
 
3.10 Summary of Methodology 
Gray (2013, p. 19) suggested that the methodology for any research should naturally emerge from 
the research question and this was found to be the case with this study. In summary, this was a 
multi-method study utilising a literature search; quantitative analysis of secondary data; case 
study and focus groups. The methodology used is summarised in table 9. 
Table 9: Summary of Methods used 
Method Collection Storage Evaluation Reliability 
check 
Death and 
Forensic 
Autopsy rates 
Homicide Index. 
ONS. Home Office.  
Folders in 
Microsoft Office 
2013 
Material already in 
existence, but a 
secondary analysis was 
used comparing the 
data.  
Checked 
by 
Homicide 
Index 
staff. 
Peer 
reviewed 
Case Study Data request sheets 
sent to relevant 
persons.  
Electronic data 
stored on folders 
in Microsoft 
Office 2013. Hard 
copy material 
retained in 
folders in secure 
cabinet 
Excel spreadsheet used 
to categorise and sort 
the quantitative data.  
Nvivo software used to 
categorise and 
summarise qualitative 
data.  
Piloted by 
2 SIO’s 
and 
checked 
by Chief 
Coroner 
Focus Groups  Tape recorded and 
transcribed 
Folders in 
Microsoft Office 
2013 
Nvivo software used to 
categorise and 
summarise qualitative 
data.  
Checked 
by a 
colleague 
 
All material collected during the research will be retained in a form that is reviewable in order 
that it can be checked and the processes used can be replicated (Richards, 2011 p152). The 
outcome of the data evaluation is discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 4: The Social Organisation of Death Work  
4.1   Why Else Investigate Death? 
Before describing the system of death investigation in England and Wales, it is necessary to 
outline why investigating death is important. Apart from the obvious reasons of identifying 
homicide cases and finding and prosecuting offenders, there are a number of public health 
reasons that are also important. Timmermans (2006, p. viii) describes the investigation as for ‘the 
benefit of the living’. Hutton (2015) describes the accurate identification of the causes of death as 
being important for: 
 Trend data for public health planning; 
 Detection of geographical differences;  
 Assessing the success or otherwise of control measures and environmental policies in 
reducing occupational and environmental deaths;  
 Detecting changes in the incidence and virulence of a disease; 
 Assessing the impact of inequality and poverty; 
 Reviewing targeted interventions; and 
 Research. 
Hutton (2015) also describes the ‘personal’ reasons for accurate death investigations; 
 The peace of mind of relatives; 
 Inform the future pathway to death; 
 Providing information for the surviving relatives in case there are implications for them; 
 The cause of death is important to those who remain: the genetic code of the dead can 
advise the living; and 
 Religious shifts and the secularisation of society. 
Perhaps one of the most important of these for blood relatives is that of genetic information 
which can be used to improve the health choices and prevent similar fates for those left behind. 
Death investigation is also important to settle such issues as inheritance and insurance matters, as 
some causes of death may exempt life insurance payments (Timmermans, 2006). Another reason 
for effective investigations is that of the effects of a failed homicide inquiry, which leads to the 
acquittal of a suspect which in turn can devastate families leading them never to recover (Thiel, 
2015; Boelen, van Denderen and de Keijser, 2015). An example is the ongoing campaigning of 
Vicky Harper whose twin daughters were murdered in a barn fire in 1991, and to this day no one 
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has been brought to justice (Harper and Kay 1996). It is common for grieving families, particularly 
parents of homicide victims (Thiel, 2015; Armour, 2002) to dedicate their lives to the search for 
justice or to remedy a cause (Rock, 1998). They become ‘secondary victims’, especially if they are 
unsatisfied with the investigation either by the police or the coroner (Thiel, 2015). 
 
4.2   Homicide Rates in England and Wales 
The police are required to investigate cases of homicide in accordance with the Criminal 
Investigations and Procedures Act 1996 as; ‘An inquiry to ascertain if an offence has been 
committed, to identify who is responsible and to gather admissible evidence to be placed before a 
judicial authority’. This mirrors Innes (2002) three information needs. There is also a legal duty to 
investigate homicide under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in that the 
Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and investigators are trained and experienced, they are 
supervised, records are kept and that the inquiry is reviewed (ACPO, 2006, p 76). Grieve, Crego 
and Griffiths (2007, p. 580) also highlight this requirement. Therefore it can be seen that although 
the initial scene investigation by the first attending officers is part of the overall homicide 
investigation, the academic and indeed ‘grey literature’ concentrates on the process and 
structures which follow the identification of the homicide.  
To see the development of the police investigation of homicide, it is useful to reflect on the 
history of murder in England and Wales. Spierenburg (2012) describes the long-term decline in 
the instances of murder from medieval times up until the 1970’s when this decline started to 
reverse. Gurr (1981, p. 313) estimated high levels of murder in England dating back to 1200 A.D. 
but which has seen a continual decline. Although the historic murder rate can only ever be an 
estimate, it is based upon coroner records and records kept by the authorities but it clearly does 
not include the ‘dark number’ of unrecorded deaths which were never reported to the 
authorities, and so the numbers are likely to be higher (Gurr, 1981). Although coroners records 
date back as far as medieval times, medical records as to the cause of death only reach back 100 
years (Spierenburg, 2012, p. 4). The high instances of historic murder are thought to be mainly 
male on male violence due to reasons of ‘honour’, revenge and feuding as well as violence over 
food and religion and the killing of new born babies if extra-marital relations were suspected. 
Spierenburg argues that in medieval times, violence tended to be more ritualistic in nature and 
therefore ‘done for its own sake’ (Spierenburg, 2012, p. 7). Spierenburg puts the gradual decline 
of murder over the ages down to the reduction of honour based killing due to the introduction of 
the state and imposition of law and legal sanctions.  
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The actual homicide rate in England and Wales between 1800 and 1970 was the only reliable 
indicator of the rate of violence as there were no research surveys (Spierenburg, 2012, p. 167), 
although Taylor (1998) argues that budgetary constraints caused an under-investigation of 
murders by coroners and the police during much of the 19th century and early 20th century, mainly 
homicide of children and the elderly. He places the crime rate directly as a political tool of the 
police to secure better pay and conditions following the police strike of 1918. However other 
writers challenge this. 
The 1970’s saw a marked increase in violent crime which Spierenburg (2012) claims was due to 
several factors including large scale immigration and the emergence of night time recreation as 
well as ethnic and religious divisions. However, the most significant cause was that of the 
proliferation of organised crime connected with the trade in drugs and a greater willingness for 
the public to report cases (Spierenburg (2012, p. 209-211). Almost all the increase appears to 
have been cases of male on male violence, alongside no significant change on intimate or 
‘domestic’ homicide which has remained consistent. Spierenburg relates this increase in homicide 
to the honour violence which had disappeared in the early part of the 20th century (Spirenburg, 
2012, p. 214-215). Female perpetrated violence seems to have been historically consistent, and 
sometimes referred to as ‘Verkko’s Law’ which states that the ratio of female homicide will always 
remain constant (Wilbanks, 1981). The drop in homicide during the 1990’s in New York has widely 
been attributed to the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ which was adopted by the police, however 
Bowling (1999) argues that other factors may have caused the fall. 
The homicide rate started to decrease after 2003, which was the year that 215 murders 
perpetrated by Dr Harold Shipman were added to official statistics (Smith, 2002). The trend since 
1967 can be seen at figure 7. The reasons for this steady but real decrease has been the subject of 
several studies which include; efficiency in medical intervention (Shepherd, 1998); less alcohol 
consumption in public (Shepherd, Sutherland and Newcombe, 2006); issues affecting wealth and 
reduced poverty (Hannon, 2002); as well as other social issues, such as an increased use of 
information technology and social media diverting the youth from public nuisance activities 
(Ward, 2011). Other studies suggest that there is a direct correlation between the removal of lead 
in petrol in the 1970s to 90’s and the resultant positive effect on human behavior stemming from 
the removal of harmful pollutants from the atmosphere (Gesch, 2014). There is a theory put 
forward that this reduction is a natural progression since medieval times of continuous 
'civilianisation' in the western world (Pinker, 2011). Pinker plots the many reasons why violent 
crime has reduced over time but that human perceptions are that it is on the increase; 
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‘The decline of violent behaviour has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that 
tolerate or glorify violence, and often the attitudes are in the lead. By the standards 
of the mass atrocities of human history, the lethal injection of a murderer in Texas, or 
an occasional hate crime in which a member of an ethnic minority is intimidated by 
hooligans, is pretty mild stuff. But from a contemporary vantage point, we see them 
as signs of how low our behaviour can sink, not of how high our standards have risen’. 
(Pinker, 2011, p. xxii). 
The Home Office attempts to predict the longer-term trends in homicide and relies on a 95% 
confidence interval on the Poisson distribution error as at Figure 8 (Source Home Office, 2016). 
This shows an approximation as to whether the number of homicides in any two-year period are 
statistically different from one another. If the confidence intervals do not overlap, there is a 
presumption that there has been a shift in the underlying risk of homicide. One can see that there 
is a statistically significant reduction in homicides since 2003 and this reduction has remained 
stable since 2012. The vertical bar represents the range one might expect to record if the 
underlying risk of homicide was consistent.  
Figure 7: Recorded Homicides in England and Wales, 1967 to 2012/13   
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Figure 8: Homicide Incident and Trend Analysis using Poisson analysis 
 
 
The reduction of homicide is however not restricted to the UK, it appears to be an international 
phenomenon which started in the early 1990’s (Weiss, Santos, Testa and Kumar 2016). According 
to figures published by the World Health Organisation, the UK, with the exception of Japan has 
the smallest ratio of homicides per hundred thousand head of population (n = 0.75) out of all 
countries where statistics are available (Weiss et al, 2006, p. 5). Homicide is falling throughout the 
world with the notable exception of south and mid America and Russia (Weiss et al, 2006). As can 
be seen from figure 9 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013) world trends in homicide 
show a generally reducing picture.  
Figure 9: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2013).  
 
Whatever the situation in the rest of the world, there appears to be no question of an onward 
reduction in Europe as can be seen from figure 10 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Europe 2013) showing European trends in homicide. 
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Figure 10: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Europe 2013).  
 
Coupled with the reduction in homicide in England and Wales is the development and 
professionalisation of homicide investigation which has evolved over many years driven by the 
lessons of miscarriages of justice. One of the core elements of a homicide investigation which can 
direct whether it is dealt with as a homicide or a non-suspicious death is the medical examination 
of the body. So important is this element of the investigation, that it can sometimes be the single 
most important determinant of whether a homicide is identified as such, or missed. This part of 
the investigation falls to the forensic pathologist. 
 
4.3   Homicide Investigation in England and Wales 
 ‘No greater honour will ever be bestowed on an officer or a more profound duty 
imposed on him than when he is entrusted with the investigation of the death of a 
human being. It is his duty to find the facts regardless of colour or creed without 
prejudice and to let no power on earth deter him from presenting these facts to the 
court without regard to personality… no other assignment has the watched potential for 
success or failure through individual effort. The actions bring enormous prestige and 
accolades, or deep discredit’ (Baca, 2001, p1-2). 
Perhaps the first known murder was of ‘the iceman’ who was discovered in the Otzal Alps in 1991 
and had died from an axe injury to the head some 3300 years BC (Müller, Fricke, Halliday, 
McCulloch and Wartho, 2003); and so the origins of homicide are as old as mankind. The 
collective word ‘homicide’ includes the three separate criminal offences of murder, manslaughter 
and infanticide which are defined at figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Definitions of Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide 
Murder 
Murder is a criminal offence, surprisingly not defined in statute, but by common law. The legal 
definition is ‘when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth 
within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king’s peace, 
with malice aforethought, either expressed by the party or implied by law’ (Smith and Hogan, 
1996 p. 338). The only sentence available to a judge trying a convicted murderer is life in 
prison, the death sentence having been abolished by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) 
Act 1965. 
Manslaughter 
Manslaughter, also a common-law offence is the unlawful killing of someone without the intent 
which is necessary for an offence of murder and divides into ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ 
manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter occurs where a court is satisfied that the killing was 
committed due to loss of control, when the offender was suffering from diminished 
responsibility or in pursuance of a suicide pact. Involuntary manslaughter occurs where the 
killing is unlawful but there is no intention to kill the victim. Such offences are therefore 
unintended deaths resulting from an unlawful and dangerous act, or through gross negligence 
or recklessness.  
Infanticide 
Infanticide is a statutory offence defined under S1(1) of the Infanticide Act of 1938, ‘Where a 
woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being a child under the age of 
twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by 
reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason 
of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the 
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to murder, she 
shall be guilty of an offence of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished 
as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child’. This offence was 
introduced at a time when the death penalty was mandatory for offences of murder. In many 
cases where mothers killed their babies the only verdict available to juries was one of murder 
and they were often reluctant to convict, due to the specific circumstances of this offence.  
 
The investigation of homicide is a fundamental and significant indicator of the competence of the 
police in general; and the police recognise that the community may use performance in this key 
area as a barometer of the ability to investigate all crimes (Innes, 2003, p276; Lowe, Innes and 
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Roberts, 2003, p. 67). Homicide is one area over the last 30 years which has brought the 
reputation of the police into focus. It has taken on a symbolic meaning as an index of professional 
competence (Innes, 2003, p. 277). The investigation of murder should set clear standards of 
excellence that all other criminal investigations should follow (HMIC, 2000, p. 115). Although 
there are very low volumes of homicide in the UK, those that do occur often lead to high levels of 
fear in the local area and can act as ‘signal crimes’ (Innes, 2014; Lowe et al, 2003, p. 67). One of 
the main drivers for the way homicide is investigated in England and Wales has been so- called 
miscarriages of justice (see chapter 2), which has had a major influence on police policy and 
legislation (Poyser and Milne, 2015). 
 
4.4 The Role of Forensic Pathologists and Post Mortem Examinations 
Pathology is the science of the causes and effects of diseases; especially the branch of medicine 
that deals with the laboratory examination of samples of body tissue for diagnostic or forensic 
purposes (Home Office, 2016). There are nineteen different specialities within the profession 
(Royal College of Pathologists, 2015), forensic pathology being just one. The relevance of 
pathologists to the investigation of death is that when the police or a coroner is attempting to 
determine the probable cause of death, the services of a pathologist is often required. 
Pathologists are doctors who have specialised in this field. The majority of pathologists are 
‘histopathologists, who examine microscopic samples of human tissue to determine disease. 
However, there are several other specialties of pathology, which are concerned with the 
investigation of suspected homicide. These are primarily ‘forensic pathologists’, sometimes 
assisted by paediatric pathologists specialising in children. Organ specific pathologists, who 
specialise in examining brains, eyes and bones etc. are also used, depending on the complexity of 
individual cases. For ease of reference, histopathologists are referred to within this thesis as ‘non-
forensic’ pathologists. Forensic Pathology is perhaps the most significant profession within the 
generic title of forensic medicine.  
Forensic pathology is that branch of medicine which provides the investigation 
and interpretation of disease and injury for courts of law — the use of primarily 
pathological knowledge in criminal investigations and other enquiries, 
particularly in establishing the cause of injuries or death. (British Association in 
Forensic Medicine, 2016). 
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The term 'Home Office List' of Forensic Pathologists was first introduced in 1944 and included 
only those who practiced for police forces outside of London. Those on the list were given a 
choice of either a retaining fee or a case fee payable by the respective police force (Home Office, 
1989). Each pathologist was attached to an office of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). The 
Broderick Report (1971) endorsed the Home Office practice of maintaining a 'Home Office List' 
due to the dearth of universities training in forensic pathology outside of London. At the time the 
Broderick report was written, there were 25 pathologists on the list outside of London and about 
15 within the London area. The small number of just 40 pathologists serving England and Wales 
was recognised as being vulnerable due to the small numbers (Broderick, 1971).  
Today there are circa 35 HORFPs who work in group practices across England and Wales and they 
provide a 24/7 service to the police in suspicious death cases (Home Office, 2016). These 
specialist medical practitioners undergo over four years of extra training after they have fully 
qualified as doctors, must be a member of the Royal College of Pathologists and registered with 
the General Medical Council. They then apply to the Home Office for inclusion on the Home Office 
Register. Once on the register, they are subject to a strict Code of Practice16 and a protocol17. If 
the police are dealing with a death scene and require medical advice concerning the death, or 
wish to retrieve forensic trace samples from the body, a forensic pathologist can be called to the 
scene to assist and advise. This is always done with the agreement of the coroner. The forensic 
pathologist can also advise on body recovery to ensure that vital trace evidence is not lost when 
the body is moved to the mortuary (ACPO, 2006). When the body is removed from the scene, the 
police will ensure that continuity exists from the removal, until the time that the body is identified 
to the forensic pathologist. Once identification takes place, the PM, which is sometimes also 
referred as an ‘autopsy’ or ‘necropsy’ will commence. The process of the PM examination is laid 
out in general terms within the Code of Practice for Forensic Pathologists (Forensic Science 
Regulator, 2012). The police guidance is contained within the Police Approved Professional 
Practice database held by the College of Policing which is based upon the Murder Investigation 
Manual, but the police will supply a Crime Scene Manager (CSM) to the mortuary, together with 
Crime Scene Investigators (CSI’s), one of which will act as the exhibits officer (ACPO, 2006). A 
history and development of forensic pathology is included at appendix 3. 
The forensic pathologist will conduct the PM by firstly performing a detailed external examination 
of the body for signs of foul play (Forensic Science Regulator, 2012). They will also assist police 
                                                             
16 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115698/code-practice-forensic-
pathology.pdf 
17 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-for-home-office-registered-forensic-pathologists 
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forensic staff in the recovery of forensic trace evidence. They then eviscerate the body and take 
tissue samples for subsequent histological18 examination to assist in determining the cause of 
death. Samples for toxicological examination will be taken to determine whether the deceased 
had consumed drugs or alcohol. Sometimes whole organs must be removed for later examination 
by other organ specific pathology experts. Throughout the process, the police will ensure that 
high quality imaging is taken at all stages of the process for later evidential purposes. Any item or 
body part removed from the body will be clearly marked with an individual identifier and handed 
to the police exhibits officer who will document everything taken (ACPO, 2006). Increasingly, a 
complete three-dimensional scan is taken of the cadaver prior to evisceration from which 
subsequent interpretation can assist in injury interpretation (Rutty, 2012). Once the PM has 
concluded, organs removed but no longer required for further tests are replaced within the body 
cavity and the body closed (Home Office, 2016). Before the body is released to the next of kin for 
burial or cremation, there will often be a second or ‘defence’ PM which will be undertaken on 
behalf of the defendant in the case, and conducted by a different pathologist (ACPO, 2006). This 
second PM can be either a physical check of the first by opening the body and re-examining the 
organs, or it can be a desk top review of the original pathologist’s notes, report, histology and 
photographs taken (ACPO, 2006, p. 167). If at the time there is no suspect in the case, the coroner 
will usually hold a second PM by an independent pathologist and retain the pathologist’s report 
for the benefit of an accused should one be identified in the future (ACPO, 2006, p. 168). 
When all the results of tests are collated, the forensic pathologist will produce a report for the 
coroner and a witness statement for the police. Once this is done, it may not necessarily be the 
end of the case for the forensic pathologist. They may be asked to advise throughout the 
investigation by attending meetings and conferences as well as giving evidence at court (ACPO, 
2006). A HORFP is an expert witness within the context of a criminal investigation. However, it is 
important to differentiate between a ‘witness’ and an ‘expert witness’. An expert witness is 
broader in definition than a witness as to fact which is the traditional definition of someone who 
has witnessed a crime or event (Whitwell, Thorne, Kolar and Harvey, 2015, p. 378). Expert 
witnesses are important to the criminal justice system because there is not always a witness as to 
fact or forensic evidence available, and so to provide credible evidence, information may have to 
be collected and interpreted by a person who is an expert and with sufficient understanding, 
knowledge and training to satisfy a court of law that an opinion is a valid one (Whitwell et al, 
2015, p. 378-381). 
                                                             
18  Histology is the microscopic examination of tissue to diagnose disease. 
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A forensic pathological examination of a body is context based and it is not possible to determine 
all the relevant evidence from a non-context based examination alone (Timmermans 2006 p. 70; 
Forensic Science Regulator, 2012). This raises an important difference between laboratory based 
forensic examination and a forensic pathological examination of a body. Laboratory based 
forensic work should be conducted with minimal ‘contamination’ of contextual based information 
(Dror, 2013). This is to reduce the impact of bias into the results of forensic tests which is almost 
always opinion based, such as fingerprint comparison or DNA testing. Forensic pathology is always 
context dependent as an opinion as to the cause of death usually relies on the wider 
circumstances of the case. An example of this is that if a forensic fingerprint examiner was asked 
to compare two fingerprints, the context of the case would not be relevant to whether the two 
prints, in the opinion of the examiner matched. However, to ask a forensic pathologist to opine as 
to the cause and surrounding circumstances of death would be akin to expecting a general 
practitioner to diagnose an illness without asking questions as to the symptoms (Dror, 2013; 
Forensic Science Regulator, 2015). There will always be a risk of human error which many cases 
involving forensic pathologists have shown over the years (Rose, 2007; Foran, Wills, Kiley, Jackson 
and Trestrail, 2011; Goldsmith, 2007). Because the evidence of forensic pathologists is in part 
opinion, there are clear rules around what the expert must and must not do to satisfy the court. 
The CPS has issued guidance on expert witnesses in England and Wales, under the Criminal 
Procedure Rules19, an expert witness is required to be independent and address his or her report 
to the court. They are not expected to have any loyalty to one side or the other (Whitwell et al, 
2015, p. 381-382). 
Forensic pathologists are trained in not only the medical and forensic elements of PM 
interpretation, but in criminal justice issues. Non-forensic pathologists are trained only in medical 
elements of PM work and so the issues with their opinion in coroners cases are even more 
concerning and so they are far more likely to miss identify a homicide (Furness, 2006). 
 
4.5 The Non-Forensic ‘Histopathologist’ and Post Mortem Practice 
Forensic pathologists on the Home Office Register are highly trained specialists who deal with 
suspicious death cases routinely (Home Office, 2016). Non-forensic pathologists deal with 
coroners’ non-suspicious cases on an occasional basis and do not generally receive training in the 
interpretation of scene and body examination and the recovery of trace evidence. The practice of 
non-forensic PM pathologists is particularly concerning in the light of a report by the National 
                                                             
19 Criminal Procedure Rules are updated regularly. The latest version is 2015. 
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Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and Death (NCEPOD), (Furness, 2006), which found 
that many non-forensic PM examinations were inadequate. Concerns were first highlighted by the 
Broderick Report in 1971 when discrepancies were found between clinical and PM diagnoses 
(Broderick, 1971).  
Although the NCEPOD research is over 10 years old, the report was recently referred to the Royal 
College of Pathologists to establish whether its findings are still current. The unanimous view was 
that, if anything, the situation had worsened since 2006 (Hutton, 2015). One of the reasons given 
was the fact that the autopsy element of histopathology training was no longer compulsory 
leading to a reduced number of non-forensic pathologists willing or able to conduct coronial work. 
The NCEPOD auditors reviewed 1,877 autopsy reports and supporting documentation conducted 
in a one week period of 2005 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The report concluded that 
there was no improvement in the discrepancies identified since the 1960s (Harvard, 1960); that 
half of the cases produced findings which were unsuspected before death, and that at least one 
third of death certificates were likely to be incorrect. In 16 cases where the body was found in a 
decomposed state, where bodies were not examined and evaluated properly. A common 
denominator in these cases was that the deceased were either known alcoholics or drug users or 
found hanging from the neck. The following factors were also identified; 
 One in four autopsy reports were judged to be poor or unacceptable; 
 In one third of mortuaries, the mortuary technician opened the body and removed organs 
before the pathologist actually inspected the body contrary to guidance (Leadbeatter, 
Lucas and Lowe, 2014), 
 In one in seven cases the brain was not examined; 
 Histology was not taken when it was judged that it should have been in many cases; 
 In a fifth of cases, the cause of death was adjudged to have been questionable; 
 There was generally a poor quality of examination of the body and organs, and 
 Communication between coroners and pathologists was poor and there was insufficient 
information passed to the pathologist by the coroner. 
The report quotes; 
‘If one quarter of all surgical procedures undertaken on the living were deemed, by 
peers, to be poorly or unacceptably badly done, there would be a public outcry. The fact 
that there is no public outcry is a manifestation of the fact that families are unaware of 
the variable quality of the autopsy procedure’ (Furness, 2006). 
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When questioned about this, a common response from pathologists and coroners was “what do 
you expect for £87.70?”20 (Furness, 2006, p. 117). 
The NCEPOD report however did not review the actual PM examinations, but was a review of the 
paperwork, and so reliance on this report as empirical evidence of the poor quality of non-
forensic PM examinations should perhaps be treated with some caution. Undoubtedly many 
histopathologists conduct PM examinations to a high standard, nevertheless reliance on a non-
forensic PM is risky and potentially unlikely to identify a complex murder (Jones, 2014). This issue 
is further highlighted by a recent BBC news feature21 explaining the role of a London based non-
forensic histopathologist who claimed to do 50 autopsies a week on top of her full time ‘day job’, 
including complex baby deaths. In contrast, forensic pathologists on the Home Office Register are 
restricted to doing 95 cases in a year22. This demonstrates the difference in detail and expertise a 
forensic examination requires compared with a non-forensic procedure. Non-forensic PM’s should 
be subject to the same audit regime as forensic PM’s, because the outcomes are important and 
critical to grieving families who deserve to know the true cause of death (Rutty, 2006). Rutty 
points to the poor quality of non-forensic PM examinations from his considerable experience as a 
forensic pathologist in various parts of England. 
Another study (Johnson, 1969) attempted to estimate the frequency of unnatural deaths 
discovered at autopsy by reviewing over 5000 death cases not considered as suspicious over a five 
year period between 1963 and 1967. Of these cases, 263 were found to be suspicious in that 174 
were cases of poisoning; 34 were head injury cases; 14 had other injuries to the body; 11 asphyxia 
cases; 1 hanging; 1 cut throat; 1 electrocution; 18 definite homicides and 9 criminal abortions. 
This represented over 5% of all the original total number of cases. Johnson commented that 
although there was information which would bring these cases into the unnatural category they 
were missed as potential homicides, even though in some cases there were visible injuries. He 
identified that the main reasons were that the body had not been properly examined at the scene 
either by the attending doctor or the police officer, or because in some cases no examination had 
taken place at all. In other cases, no investigation appeared to have taken place at the scene of 
the death. There were also examples of deliberate deception and concealment of information by 
relatives in the deaths identified as being criminal. In many cases, assumptions had been made 
that because the deceased was either old or had been ill that death was due to natural causes. 
                                                             
20 The fee then payable for a non-forensic ‘routine’ autopsy which is now £96.80. An enhanced fee of 276.90 is payable 
by the coroner for a post mortem requiring ‘additional skills’. http://www.bma.org.uk/support-at-work/pay-fees-
allowances/fees/fee-finder/fee-finder-coroners. 
21 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31536753 
22 Protocol for forensic pathologists on the Home Office Register at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protocol-for-home-office-registered-forensic-pathologists 
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This again highlights the importance of the initial scene investigation by the police. At the time of 
the study, there was no formal training for police officers in death investigation (Johnson, 1969). 
Cases without an adequate medico-legal investigation of the person who has died a violent or 
sudden death of unexplained cause are fraught with danger (Harvard, 1960; Jones, 2014). Even 
the most competent physician if he or she attempts to certify the cause of such deaths on the 
basis of the available clinical history and external examination of the body, is likely to be proven 
wrong by a forensic PM in one out of every three cases (Harvard, 1960). This highlights the 
importance of a forensic PM in suspicious death cases. In 1942, the advisor to the Home Office on 
toxicology, Dr Roche Lynch reported that of eight exhumations he had examined, seven were 
homicide that had been missed due to inadequate investigation (Roche, 1942).  
Failing to use the services of a HORFP is of concern, as there are specific examples of police 
placing undue reliance on the findings of non-forensic or ‘routine’ PM examinations, believing 
that a non-forensic PM will reveal foul play. Reliance on a non-forensic PM could lead, at best, to 
forensic evidence being lost during the PM by unqualified practitioners, and at worst, to missed 
homicides (Jones, 2014). In every case where homicide is a possibility, the police must request 
that the coroner appoint a HORFP. The most recent study in relation to the quality of non-forensic 
PM examinations, compared the non-forensic pathologists report with the results of cross 
sectional scanning of the bodies prior to the invasive PM. The study found that 27% of 
pathologists’ reports were incorrect (Rutty and Morgan, 2016).  
It can clearly be seen that any police and coronial practice of engaging a non-forensic pathologist 
to conduct a PM procedure is therefore dangerous in terms of missing or failing to identify the 
case as homicide or losing vital forensic evidence in cases where there may be the possibility of 
third party involvement. Thus, the decision as to whether to treat a death as suspicious and 
ensure that there is an appropriate medical determination of death by a HORFP is critical to the 
investigation. This again opens the question as to how many homicides may be missed by non-
forensic pathologists conducting coronial PM examinations. 
 
4.6 Cases of Missed Homicide 
Stelfox, (2006, p. 108) found that 93% of the cases he examined were immediately recognised as 
homicide due to the existence of credible information including the offender present at the scene 
admitting to the offence. There were two cases within his study where the determination of 
homicide was not made by the first attending officers, but later identified as such. However, those 
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that may have been missed and never identified as a homicide would never have been included 
within the study as it only looked at confirmed homicide cases and so crime statistics on homicide 
although thought to be the most reliable of all crime statistics (Mawby and Walklate, 1994, p. 25) 
are likely to be higher than quoted in official sources. 
Dr Harrold Frederick Shipman was probably the most famous example of missed homicides in the 
history of UK crime (BBC, 2014). He practiced as a general practitioner in the Lancashire town of 
Hyde. Although some estimate that he committed over 250 murders during his 27 years of 
practice, the official number was put at 215; 171 women and 44 men (Smith, 2002). The Shipman 
Inquiry found that the failure of the initial investigation was put down to; 
 Inexperience of the investigating officer; and 
 Failure of supervision and management 
(Smith, 2003, p. 134). 
 
If management and support by way of supervision and allocation of appropriate resources is poor, 
it will be inevitable that poor decisions will be made on the ground (Stelfox, 2006). The link 
between poor strategic decision making and poor investigative decision making is mirrored in 
various inquiries, particularly the Byford Report (Byford, 1982) and the Macpherson Report 
(1999). The majority of confirmed homicides are solved quickly, Innes (2003). ‘Self-solvers’ are 
where solving homicide cases is comparatively easy due to the evidence at the scene, the suspect 
at the scene or the presence of eye witnesses able to inform the police what happened  (Innes, 
2003, p. 198). It therefore follows that these types of cases are more likely to be identified as 
homicides by first police attenders due to the fairly obvious nature of the scene with possibly the 
offender present and admitting to the killing. Those homicides which are less obvious and 
described by Innes (2003) as ‘whodunits’ are likely to be the ones which are more difficult to 
detect as homicide at the scene. Stelfox (2006) cites three reasons for failure to identify a 
homicide as such; i) failure to collect information effectively; ii) failure to interpret information 
correctly and iii) failures of supervisors to check the validity of officers judgements.  
Other cases where homicides were missed by those initially attending the scenes of sudden and 
unexpected death are numerous and some are reported within the press but most are hidden as 
the facts rarely emerge. The case of Ernest Andrew Brown - verses - HM Coroner for The County 
of Norfolk and the Chief Constable of Norfolk Constabulary, 201423 which was referred by the 
                                                             
23 Ernest Andrew Brown - and - HM Coroner for The County of Norfolk and the Chief Constable of Norfolk   
   Constabulary: [2014] EWHC 187 (Admin). 
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Attorney General was an appeal against a coroner’s verdict where suicide or homicide was not 
considered by the original coroner. The circumstances of the case were that a police constable 
attended the scene of death of a 31 year old female. The officer came to a quick conclusion that 
the death was non-suspicious and information and evidence was therefore lost to the subsequent 
investigation. The judge in his summing up criticised the police constable and his supervisors for 
failing to have an open-mind at the scene and coming to a decision based upon biased opinion.  
A more recent case of a clear homicide almost being missed was the death of infamous ‘Brinks 
Mat’ robber John Palmer24 in 2015. So disturbed by the failure to recognise the presence of six 
shot gun wounds, the HORFP shortly after conducting the PM on Palmer telephoned from the 
mortuary to alert the researcher about what he had found to express his dismay. The deceased 
was shot in the stomach area whilst at home in his garden. The police and ambulance crew 
considered that it was bleeding from a recent surgical operation and the scene was cleared. 
Another case where the police made decisions which were shown to be poorly judged was the 
case of elderly lady Una Crown who was murdered at her home and her body set on fire in 2015. 
The police originally assessed that she had collapsed and died of natural causes. The fact that she 
had been set alight was put down to an accident.25 Like the Palmer case, the investigation into 
Una Crown’s murder is still unresolved, partly because the crime scene was lost and could never 
be recovered.  
Perhaps one of the most tragic cases was that of Anthony Hardy in Camden, London in 2002. 
Hardy was suffering from mental health issues and despite protests from local residents, he was 
deemed to be safe to live in the community. The police went to his flat to make an arrest for a 
minor criminal damage incident but found the body of a female in a bedroom at his home. This 
was initially thought to be suspicious but Dr Freddy Patel, who at the time was a HORFP, deemed 
the cause of death to be heart disease. Hardy was released from custody and went on to kill two 
women and rape several others over the next few months26. The over reliance on medical 
opinion, even that of a HORFP is therefore not enough to make decisions as to whether a 
homicide is disclosed; the whole case and context must be considered. In this case, it was not the 
police decision making which influenced the outcome; it was the CPS in the knowledge that the 
medical evidence did not support the homicide hypothesis.  
                                                             
24 The BBC news report can be seen at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-33361180 . 
25 Mirror Website: 31 March 2015 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/killer-who-slit-elderly-womans-5434997. 
26 Camden New Journal http://www.camdennewjournal.com/news/2011/apr/baffling-tragedy-how-camden-ripper-    
   was-freed-murder-again. 
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Homicides are not only misidentified by the police but also by other agencies with responsibilities 
over vulnerable persons. There have been many such cases where criticism has been levied at 
social service departments. The latest was the case of ‘baby P’27 (BBC, 2014a) whose death at the 
hands of carers was missed by a litany of mistakes by medical professionals, social services and 
the police. Failures to properly identify and investigate deaths are not therefore solely a problem 
within the police service. In December 2015, there was wide national news coverage that the NHS 
had failed to properly investigate the deaths of over 1000 people since 2011 (BBC, 2015). 
Although the report commissioned by NHS England has not been published at the time of writing, 
according to the BBC coverage, the fact as to whether an investigation took place depended upon 
the profile of the deceased. Where the deceased had learning difficulties, only 1% of cases were 
investigated. For those over the age of 65, only 0.3% of cases were investigated. It is not known if 
any of the cases were homicide due to the fact that no investigation took place (BBC, 2015). 
Of particular concern are reports in the literature in relation to deaths of young children and the 
increased chances of homicide being missed. Brookman and Nolan (2006) examined 298 cases of 
under 1 year of age child deaths over a seven-year period and found evidence that there was 
under recording of homicide due to the difficulties posed in differentiating between infanticide 
and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS)28 and sudden unexpected deaths in infancy (SUDI)29. 
This is due to the lack of clear cut physical injuries one might expect to see in adult victims. They 
also found some evidence that parents have been wrongly convicted (Brookman and Nolan, 2006, 
p. 869). Children under one year old are the most vulnerable group to homicide, being at least 
twice as likely to be victims than any other age group (Brookman and Nolan, 2006, p. 870). There 
have been other studies which support the claim that children are more at risk to homicide than 
any other category of person (Marks and Kumar, 1993)  
There are many reasons why the number of child homicides remain a ‘dark figure’ (Vaughan and 
Kautt, 2009), not least of which is the ease of concealment of the body of a newly born child 
(Brookman and Nolan, 2006, p. 876; Fox, 2008), the fact that the death may be caused by a covert 
act such as neglect and the sheer vulnerability of young children. There is also a reported 
reluctance for paediatricians and pathologists to declare a death suspicious for fear of the 
consequences to the family (Brookman and Nolan, 2006, p. 877-881). A number of studies 
attempt to place an estimate on the number of ‘missed child homicides’ which range from 1.3% of 
cases to 40% of SIDS cases, however there is no empirical evidence to place a reliable figure, other 
                                                             
27 The BBC new report can be seen athttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11626806. 
28 Unexplained death, usually during sleep, of a seemingly healthy baby less than a year old undeterminable and was 
prior to 1971 referred to as ‘cot death’. 
29 Sudden Unexpected Death of an Infant over the age of one year old. 
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than to say that there would appear to be some missed homicides annually. Brookman and Nolan 
(2006) postulate that out of their study cohort, 123 cases could have been missed homicide.  
One of the reasons child homicides are missed may be the fact that there have been several high-
profile convictions overturned on appeal and this has caused a practitioner reaction amongst 
medical professionals afraid of the consequences of being criticised in court (Vaughan and Kautt, 
2009, p. 89). This shows the importance of having specialist forensic PM examinations in child 
death cases to assist in identifying homicide (Vaughan and Kautt, 2009, p. 90; Byard and Hilton, 
1997). The problem is made worse by the reluctance of medical professionals to engage in police 
cases involving children (Fox, 2008: Reeder and Nichol, 2004; Hutton, 2015).  
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Chapter 5: Results – Forensic Post Mortem verses Homicides 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter seeks to explain the outcomes of the research in terms of homicide statistics and 
their relationship and correlation with Forensic PM examinations. In order to add to the context 
of death investigation in England and Wales, using the information within the literature review, 
the chart at figure 12 was constructed which shows how homicide investigation fits into the 
whole picture of death investigation in England and Wales. This includes the positioning of the 
medical examiner30 role which does not affect the investigation of suspicious deaths unless of 
course the medical examiner identifies issues which are referred back to the coroner for further 
investigation. The focus of this study is the top right section of the chart where the initial 
investigation takes place. As can be seen, if after the emergency services have been called and 
conduct an initial assessment, the case will either fall into the suspicious or non-suspicious 
category. If the latter it will be referred to either the coroner, or the general practitioner for issue 
of the MCCD, overseen by the medical examiner. There will be an opportunity for the suspicious 
death to be identified at this stage but as previously discussed, this is less likely due to the biasing 
effects of expectation that the attending police or ambulance personnel have declared the case as 
non-suspicious.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 Medical Examiners are due to be introduced in 2017 under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
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Figure 12: Death Investigation in England and Wales 
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5.2. Statistical data analysis in respect of death investigation in England and Wales 
In order now to look at the relationship between homicide numbers and the overall numbers of 
forensic PM’s it was necessary to collect PM data from all forensic pathology group practices 
going back to the financial year 2009/2010 (when this data was first available), and comparing this 
with recorded homicide data for England and Wales. The contention is that the lower the ratio of 
forensic PM’s to homicide, the risk of missing homicide will increase. In other words, if the 
investigation into a death is denied the detailed medico-legal examination of the body, relying 
instead on untrained non-forensic pathologists to perform the examination, it is not unrealistic to 
postulate that the likelihood of missing a homicide will increase. The ratio between these two sets 
of data is therefore very important to establish whether there has been a shift in the historic 
average which might indicate the presence of an unknown variable. 
In a climate of reducing homicide rates, one might expect that forensic PM examinations would 
reduce to a consistent degree as homicides, as there would be a likelihood of a similar ratio of 
reducing numbers of suspicious death. However, if the falling number of homicides were to be 
inconsistent with the numbers of forensic PM’s, it might indicate the existence of other factors 
affecting the forensic PM rate. If forensic PM’s are not falling in numbers, it could indicate that 
the police and coroners are holding too many examinations leading to inappropriate use of public 
funds. If the number of forensic PM’s is reducing more than homicide rates, it could be evidence 
that decisions are being made not to hold a forensic PM for other reasons. Failure of holding 
forensic PM’s could be an independent variable affecting the homicide rate as suspicious deaths 
are not being dealt with properly and in accordance with practice laid out in police guidance such 
as the Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006). 
The starting point therefore was to establish the base rate ratio of forensic PM’s to homicides 
using historical data. The historic number of identified forensic PM’s ordered by the coroner in 
consultation with the police can be seen in Table 10. (Source: ONS for Homicide; Home Office for 
Forensic PM’s). In order to be comparable with the homicide data, the data are presented for 
financial years as opposed to calendar years. 
Table 10: The number of forensic autopsies, recorded homicides and percentage of autopsies 
demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015 –England and Wales  
Financial Year No. of Forensic 
PM 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Homicides 
Ratio of homicides 
to Forensic PM % 
2009/10 2047 626 30 
2010/11 1857 639 34 
2011/12 1740 553 32 
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2012/13 1797 558 31 
2013/14 1742 533 31 
2014/15 1664 534 32 
Average - - 32 
 
Put more simply, according to historical data, nationally, since 2009, the ratio appears to be a 
rounded average of 32, which means that 32% of all forensic PM’s transpire to be a homicide, 
roughly one in three. This is interesting as it was always anecdotally stated by pathologists that 
the figure was about one in three, but this is the first-time analysis has shown this to be the case. 
It will be noted that for the period 2010 to 2011, the ratio goes to 34, indicating that another 
variable may have come into play, however the figures are small and so any inferences are 
limited. Using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, there appears to be a correlation between 
forensic PM’s and homicides [r(4) = .82, p = .44], however due to the small size of the sample, this 
is not significant. 
Figure 13: Forensic PM cases and homicide from, 2009 to 2015  
 
Figure 13 (source Home Office, 2016) breaks down the annual numbers of homicides and Forensic 
PM’s into quarterly figures. This data shows the relationship between recorded homicide and 
forensic PM numbers per quarter.  
As can be seen, although the two trend lines appear to be falling slightly at a consistent rate, in 
order to more clearly show the relationship between the two sets of figures, it is necessary to 
index the two sets of data. Clearly there are more forensic PM’s than homicides but the process of 
indexing takes the first value = 100, then subsequent values relate to the first using the year on 
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year percentage differences. This produces a comparative chart between the two variables at 
figure 14. 
Figure 14: Indexed chart Forensic PM cases and homicide from, 2009 to 2015  
 
 
It can be seen from figure 14 that there is a fairly consistent relationship between homicides and 
forensic PM’s. The trend lines between forensic PM’s and recorded homicide appears from the 
available data to show a clear relationship although a non-significant correlation. 
 
5.3 Regional Variations 
The next stage was to look across individual police forces to see if they were all similarly 
consistent or whether the ratios of forensic PM to homicide data varied to any extent. However, 
many smaller forces have so few homicide and forensic cases that no real comparison was 
feasible, but by grouping forces regionally, it was possible to examine regional variations across 
England and Wales. The traditional ten Home Office police regions also proved to be too small in 
terms of the numbers available for comparison. Thus regions were combined geographically to 
make five ‘super regions’. These five larger geographic combinations were as follows: A) North 
West and North East of England; B) Yorkshire, Humber and East Midlands; C) West Midlands and 
Wales; D) East of England and London; and E) South East and South West of England. The 
following data show the relationship between forensic PM’s and homicides for the five identified 
regions. The raw figures appear as tables followed by two figures; the first showing those raw 
figures as a trend line and the second showing that data indexed to 100 in the same way as 
described in table 10, and figures 13 and 14 above. 
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5.3.1 Region A: North West and North East of England 
This geographic region includes the police force areas of: Cleveland, Durham, Northumbria, 
Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside.  
Table 11: Region A. North West and North East of England. The number of forensic autopsies, 
recorded homicides and percentage of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015 
Financial Year No. of Forensic PM No. of Police 
Recorded Homicides 
Ratio of homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 613 120 20 
2010/11 482 128 27 
2011/12 512 106 21 
2012/13 503 103 20 
2013/14 466 89 19 
2014/15 408 113 28 
Average   23 
 
Figure 15: Region A. North West and North East of England. Forensic autopsies and Homicides 
between 2010 and 2015  
 
Figure 16: Region A. North West and North East of England. Forensic autopsies and Homicides 
between 2010 and 2015 (indexed)  
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As can be seen, the forensic PM’s exceed the national average ratio to homicides in this region. 
This may indicate that there appear to be no reduction in the number of cases called as suspicious 
in comparison with confirmed homicide cases.  
 
5.3.2 Region B: Yorkshire, Humber and East Midlands 
This geographic region includes the police force areas of: Humberside; North Yorkshire; South 
Yorkshire; West Yorkshire; Derbyshire; Leicestershire; Lincolnshire; Northamptonshire and 
Nottinghamshire. 
Table 12: Region B. Yorkshire Humberside and East Midlands. The number of forensic autopsies, 
recorded homicides and percentage of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015  
Financial Year No. of Forensic PM No. of Police 
Recorded Homicides 
Ratio of homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 287 104 36 
2010/11 355 110 31 
2011/12 347 114 33 
2012/13 357 90 25 
2013/14 340 110 32 
2014/15 350 90 26 
Average   31 
 
Figure 17: Region B. Yorkshire, Humberside and East Midlands. Forensic autopsies and 
Homicides between 2010 and 2015 
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Figure 18: Region B. Yorkshire, Humberside and East Midlands. Forensic autopsies and 
Homicides between 2010 and 2015 indexed 
 
It can be seen that the trend lines are reasonably consistent with the national average of one 
homicide per three forensic PM’s. 
 
5.3.3 Region C. West Midlands and Wales 
This geographic region includes the police force areas of: Staffordshire; Warwickshire; West 
Mercia; West Midlands; Dyfed Powys; Gwent; North Wales and South Wales.  
Table 13: Region C. West Midlands and Wales. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded 
homicides and percentage of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015  
Financial Year No. of Forensic PM No. of Police 
Recorded Homicides 
Ratio of homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 303 109 36 
2010/11 274 95 35 
2011/12 213 76 36 
2012/13 207 94 45 
2013/14 230 72 31 
2014/15 192 80 42 
Average   38 
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Figure 19: Region C. West Midlands and Wales. Forensic autopsies and Homicides between 2010 
and 2015 
 
Figure 20: Region C. West Midlands and Wales. Forensic autopsies and Homicides between 2010 
and 2015 indexed 
 
Here it can be seen that prior to 2013/14, there was a lower ratio of forensic PM’s per homicide, a 
trend which appears to have reversed after that date. 
 
5.3.4 Region D: East of England and London 
This geographic region includes the police force areas of: Bedfordshire; Cambridgeshire; Essex; 
Hertfordshire; Norfolk; Suffolk; City of London and Metropolitan Police.  
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Table 14: Region D. East of England and London. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded 
homicides and percentage of autopsies demonstrating a homicide,2009 – 2015  
Financial Year No. of Forensic 
PM 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Homicides 
Ratio of homicides 
to Forensic PM 
2009/10 452 169 37 
2010/11 419 185 44 
2011/12 398 152 38 
2012/13 415 159 38 
2013/14 401 154 38 
2014/15 402 144 36 
Average   37 
 
Figure 21: Region D. East of England and London. Forensic autopsies and Homicides between 
2010 and 2015 
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Figure 22: Region D. East of England and London. Forensic autopsies and Homicides between 
2010 and 2015 indexed 
 
There appears to be a fairly consistent ratio between forensic PM’s and homicides in region D. 
 
5.3.5 Region E: South East and South West of England 
This geographic region includes the police force areas of: including the police force areas of: 
Hampshire; Kent; Surrey; Sussex; Thames Valley; Avon and Somerset; Devon and Cornwall; 
Dorset; Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.  
Table 15: Region E. South East and South West. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded 
homicides and percentage of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015 
Financial Year No. of Forensic PM No. of Police 
Recorded Homicides 
Ratio of homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 392 115 29 
2010/11 327 112 34 
2011/12 270 76 28 
2012/13 315 94 30 
2013/14 305 94 31 
2014/15 312 90 29 
Average   30 
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Figure 23: Region E. South East and South West of England. Forensic autopsies and Homicides 
between 2010 and 2015 
 
 
Figure 24: Region E. South East and South West of England. Forensic autopsies and Homicides 
between 2010 and 2015 indexed  
 
There appears to be a fairly consistent ratio between forensic PM’s and homicides in region E. 
 
5.4 Individual Police Forces 
There are a small number of police forces where there are sufficient numbers of both forensic 
PM’s and homicides to provide analysis and so these were looked at individually to identify any 
force trends. These were anonymised as explained in chapter 2 and described as Police Force 1, 2, 
3 and 4. 
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5.4.1 Police Force 1 
Table 16: Police Force 1. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded homicides and percentage 
of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015  
Financial 
Year 
No. of 
Forensic 
PM 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Homicides 
Ratio of 
homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 150 35 23 
2010/11 143 32 22 
2011/12 149 30 20 
2012/13 153 42 27 
2013/14 158 29 18 
2014/15 150 34 23 
Average   22 
 
 
Figure 25: Police Force 1. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 
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Figure 26: Police Force 1. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 indexed 
 
The ratio between forensic PM’s and homicide show that there are far more forensic 
examinations than the national average. 
 
5.4.2 Police Force 2 
Table 17: Police Force 2. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded homicides and percentage 
of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015  
Financial 
Year 
No. of 
Forensic 
PM 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Homicides 
Ratio of 
homicides to 
Forensic PM 
2009/10 77 32 42 
2010/11 111 27 24 
2011/12 116 42 36 
2012/13 115 17 15 
2013/14 97 26 29 
2014/15 79 22 28 
Average   29 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Police Force 1 (Indexed)
Homicides Forensic PMs
Chapter 5 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 96 
Figure 27: Police Force 2. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Police Force 2. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 indexed 
 
This data shows a ‘mixed bag’. Apart from 2011/12, generally there is an increase in the average 
ratio of forensic PM’s to homicides than the national average.  
 
5.4.3 Police Force 3 
Table 18: Police Force 3. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded homicides and percentage 
of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015. 
Financial 
Year 
No. of 
Forensic 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Ratio of 
homicides to 
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PM Homicides Forensic PM 
2009/10 300 120 40 
2010/11 268 134 50 
2011/12 258 100 39 
2012/13 270 109 40 
2013/14 253 108 43 
2014/15 278 102 37 
Average   42 
 
Figure 29: Police Force 3. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 
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Figure 30: Police Force 3. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 indexed  
 
The ratio of forensic PM’s to homicide is well below the national average as depicted by the data.  
 
5.4.4 Police Force 4 
Table 19: Police Force 4. The number of forensic autopsies, recorded homicides and percentage 
of autopsies demonstrating a homicide, 2009 – 2015. 
Financial 
Year 
No. of 
Forensic 
PM 
No. of Police 
Recorded 
Homicides 
Ratio of 
homicides to 
Forensic PM 
% 
2009/10 122 27 22 
2010/11 98 42 43 
2011/12 82 40 49 
2012/13 81 43 53 
2013/14 76 36 47 
2014/15 75 24 32 
Average - - 41 
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Figure 31: Police Force 4. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015  
 
 
Figure 32: Police Force 4. Forensic autopsies and homicides between 2010 and 2015 indexed  
 
As can be seen, between 2009 until 2014, the ratio was against the national average. The latest 
figures recorded show that the two lines have converged towards the end of 2014 when the trend 
is at the national average. This may indicate some kind of event or intervention which has been at 
play. 
The findings for the Police Force 3 and Police Force 4 sit outside the national average and this will 
be discussed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 6: Results – Case Study 
6.1 Case Study 
As set out in Chapter 2, data collection sheets were sent to each of the coroner, police and 
pathologist identified and involved in the 32 cases. The response rate for each constituency is 
shown in table 20. 
Table 20: Return Rate for Data Request Sheets 
 
 
 
 
The process of the case study is described at chapter 2 and involved requesting data from each of 
the police, pathologist and coroner in the identified 32 cases. The response rate was excellent, 
especially from the police at 94%. It was not surprising that the response from coroners was just 
63% as they hold independent judicial office and it was thought from the outset that some 
coroners might take the request for information as a challenge to their judicial authority, however 
it was probably down to workload and prioritisation as none complained about the research. 
Perhaps the lack of complaints was due to the support of the chief coroner which was clearly 
articulated in the request. 
The first stage of analysis was to identify when in the PM process the HORFP became involved. 
This was to see if there was any significance in terms of obvious injuries spotted and the potential 
of lost trace evidence. Table 21 sets out these stages which are explored in Chapter 4. 
Table 21: Point at which forensic pathologist became involved  
No of 
cases 
% of 
total 
Involvement of forensic pathologist 
3 9% PM not started by coroners’ pathologist because ‘suspicious’ marks 
noted on body by pathologist or mortuary staff 
16 50% Coroners pathologist terminated dissection when findings appeared 
to become suspicious, e.g. tears to liver 
13 41% PM completed. Forensic pathologist instructed at a later date when 
more information became available about the circumstances of 
death  
 
Constituency No. Returned % Returned 
Police 30 94 
Coroners 20 63 
HO Pathologists 26 81 
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In 30% of the cases the forensic pathologist noted that as they were not the first individual to 
examine the body, their own examination may have been compromised. The extent of this 
interference varied considerably, although in each case it potentially limited the conclusions to be 
drawn, for instance: 
 Organs had already been harvested for transplantation and consequently only a very 
limited internal examination could be performed; 
 The nature of the first examination prevented a full and detailed dissection of the neck; 
 The provenance of samples taken at the first examination could not be proven; 
 A mortuary technician had probed a deep hole in the skull prior to the first examination 
as he was demonstrating to a police officer the depth of a hole which transpired to have 
been the result of a gunshot wound to the head; 
 Bodies had been washed prior to evisceration thereby denying the potential for trace 
evidence recovery; and 
 Bodies had been eviscerated by mortuary staff prior to the arrival of the non-forensic 
pathologist and thus no visual examination of the whole body by the pathologist in 
accordance with Royal College of Pathologists guidance.  
 
Assessment of the cases was made by the researcher and consolidated case summaries were 
produced for each of the 32 cases. The fifteen cases which were considered as suspicious from 
the outset were identified following an internal and external assessment process. Initially the 
researcher considered that 20 of the cases were suspicious from the outset, but as this was an 
opinion based upon the available data in respect of each case, and using his knowledge and 
experience in managing such cases, it was thought beneficial to seek independent verification. It 
was essential that the verification process involved currently serving and suitably experienced 
police officers who were not involved in the research. The two operational verifiers each had a 
slightly differing perspective on some of the cases. For this reason, a meeting was arranged to 
explore each case in turn. Interrater reliability for coding the accuracy of the assessment of the 32 
cases measured by Cohen’s Kappa was k = 0.573, indicating a moderate level of agreement 
between the coders.  
The cases in which there was a variance of view were designated as ‘Grey’, leaving three distinct 
categories of cases labelled suspicious (n = 15); grey (n = 7) and non-suspicious (n = 10). Each of 
the case papers for the 32 cases were examined and factors identified and plotted onto a 
spreadsheet (see table 24). It was noted that the majority of cases involved deceased persons 
who were at the time of their death vulnerable by virtue of their age; use of alcohol or drugs; 
mental state of mind; poor physical health or subject of domestic violence. This perhaps is not 
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unsurprising in a person who is found dead, but the wider issues about how these factors may 
affect decision making by attending professionals is discussed in chapter 8. 
 
6.1.1 Analysis of the outcomes of the Case Study 
Upon analysis of the 32 cases, a total of 10 were confirmed as homicide by the police force and 
coroner. A further 5 were suspected homicide still under investigation and 17 were deemed by 
the subsequent investigation as non-homicides. These 17 cases were closed by the coroner and 
no further action is known to have taken place although at least two of these were closed as 
‘open verdicts’, where no cause of death could be reached at inquest. As can be seen from Table 
24, of the 10 confirmed homicides, 7 were in the ‘suspicious’ category. This means that these 
homicides should have been identified as suspicious from the outset with minimal investigation. 
Of the 5 possible homicides, 2 were in the suspicious category, 2 in the ‘grey’ category and 1 in 
the ‘non-suspicious’ category. Interestingly, of the 10 homicides, 3 fell into the non-suspicious 
category. The reason for this in all 3 cases was that there was no scene for the police to attend 
due to the fact that the victims had been conveyed to hospital prior to death and the fact that 
homicide was not identified until sometime later. Indeed, of the 10 cases to have been deemed 
non-suspicious, all but 1 had no scene visit by the police for the same reason that the deceased 
had died in hospital or the police were not initially called. To show these figures more clearly than 
the main table 24, these figures have been reproduced at table 22. 
Table 22: Breakdown of main table 24 showing categories suspicious, grey and non-suspicious 
cases against the outcome of coroners and police investigations resulting in findings of 
homicide, possible homicide and non-homicide 
 Suspicious Grey 
 
Non-suspicious 
 
Totals 
Homicide 7 
Cases: 
1/13/20/22/23/24/27  
0 3 
Cases: 
12/18/26 
10 
Possible 
Homicide 
2 
Cases: 
2/15 
2 
Cases:  
3/14 
1 
Case: 
19 
5 
Non-Homicide 6 
Cases:  
5/10/11/25/28/32/ 
5 
Cases: 
4/8/9/17/21 
6 
Cases: 
3/6/7/16/29/31 
17 
Totals 15 7 10 32 
 
The original key decision makers in each of the cases were identified from the available data. 
Table 23 breaks down the key decision makers in the 32 cases. 
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Table 23: Prime decision makers in each of the three categories of Suspicious, Grey and Non-
suspicious 
 Suspicious Grey* 
 
Non-suspicious 
 
Totals 
No initial 
police 
involvement 
3 
Cases: 
1 (H)/10,25(NH) 
0 6 
Cases: 
12,18.26(H)/19(PH)/3,29(NH) 
9 
Police Officer 
at Scene 
9 
Cases: 
13,20,22,27(H)/2,15(PH)/5,11,28(NH) 
0 1 
Case: 
7(NH) 
10 
Senior Police 
(SIO) 
8 
Cases: 
13,22,23,24(H)/2,15(PH)/5,11(NH) 
0 1 
Case: 
7(NH) 
9 
Coroner 10 
Cases: 
1,13,22,23(H)/2,15(PH)/5,10,11,28(NH) 
0 1 
Case: 
1(NH) 
11 
Attending 
Doctor 
6 
Cases: 
1,13,20,23,24(H)/2(PH) 
0 0 6 
Key: H=Homicide; P=Possible Homicide; NH=Non-Homicide. 
*There was insufficient data in the case papers reviewed to identify the initial decision maker in the Grey category of 
cases. 
Most coroners stated that they made decisions not to treat cases as suspicious due to the 
information provided to them by the police. There is therefore a clear indication that coroners can 
be unquestioning and accept the information given without further enquiry in the cases 
examined. In one case, the decision was made by the coroner alone as the police had not been 
involved and on one other case the coroner and an attending doctor made the decision, again the 
police not having been involved. 
The main category of case for the purpose of this study was the suspicious cases. Whether they 
transpired to be homicide was not material to the research as the focus was on whether 
regardless of outcome the case should have been treated as a homicide from the initial scene 
investigation. Therefore, taking just the decisions made in the suspicious category, the police 
made decisions not to treat the cases as suspicious in 13 of the 15 cases (2 were not referred to 
the police in the first instance). The attending police officer appeared to be the prime decision 
maker in 9 cases but had consulted senior police officers in 6 of the cases. There is no indication 
that the senior officer visited the scene and so a verbal briefing from the initial attending officer 
appears to have been the information on which the senior officer based their decision. Two cases 
were referred direct to a senior officer who made the initial decision not to treat the case as 
suspicious. It appears from these cases that the practice of referring sudden and unexpected 
deaths to senior supervisors is not universal practice and where this has happened, the 
supervision may be called into question.  
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In 6 of the cases, a doctor was called by the police and despite a medical assessment by the 
doctor, the decision was made not to treat the cases as suspicious, even though 4 transpired to be 
homicide cases and the remaining 2 cases were possible homicides. There was 1 case where there 
was no initial police involvement, the doctor had attended the scene and the decision to treat the 
cases as non-suspicious was made between the doctor and the coroner. This brings into question 
the practice of using an untrained medical opinion in these cases.  
In 5 of the 32 cases, including 1 suspicious case and 2 grey cases, there appeared to be no 
inspection of the body at all. This was inferred from the extent of the visible facial injuries not 
reported by the attending police officers. This may indicate reluctance on the part of some police 
officers to examine dead bodies.  
Perhaps the most striking finding in assessing the 32 cases and the suspicious category was the 
vulnerability of the deceased persons. All 15 suspicious cases were in circumstances where the 
deceased was vulnerable due to intoxication, by age, medical or mental health or situational 
circumstances such as subject to domestic abuse. Indeed, most of the grey and non-suspicious 
cases were of vulnerable persons. Of note was the number in this small sample of suspicious cases 
where the deceased was suffering at the time of their death from either medical (n=7) or a mental 
(n=6) condition. This is discussed further in chapter 8. 
The most significant difference between both the suspicious cases and grey cases compared with 
the non-suspicious cases was that in nearly all of the non-suspicious cases the police had not 
attended a scene and suspicion had arisen without reference to the police by the non-forensic 
pathologist.  
Of the 10 confirmed homicides, the failure to identify them as such was because of police decision 
making in 7 cases. Of the 5 possible homicides, failure to identify them as such was because of 
police decision making in 2 cases. Therefore, of the 15 cases in these two categories, police 
decision making accounted for the potential to miss a homicide in 9 of them. This equates to 60% 
of cases identified as homicide or possible homicide, and in 28% of all the cases represented in 
the study. However, if one also considers the cases that did not fall into the homicide or possible 
homicide categories, the overall number of cases where the decisions of the police was 
questionable was 47% of the cases submitted for audit. 
Drugs and/or alcohol were factors in 13 of the cases, 6 of which were either homicide or 
suspected homicide. One force visited by the HOFPU during the research period had identified 
(during their own in-force research) that alcohol and drugs were a feature of some death scenes 
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which had influenced officers to make decisions that the cause of death was not suspicious. 
Officers appeared to presume that death was because of alcohol consumption leading to injury 
through falling or some other cause due to intoxication. Whereas in fact, the presence of 
alcohol/drugs ought to alert investigators that extra caution should be taken.  
The 32 cases related to 23 different police forces, and the 15 suspicious cases related to 12 police 
forces. One force had 3 of the suspicious cases and one force had 2. This indicates that the issue is 
one which is not restricted to only a few forces and appears to be a problem throughout England 
and Wales. Continuity of approach between police forces was addressed during the focus group 
stages and the themes identified within the case study phase of the research were also explored 
by the focus groups and interviews. 
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Table 24: Abbreviated Spreadsheet showing factors identified in each of the 32 cases  
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Legend to Table 24: 
X axis 
Suspicious  A case considered by the researcher and the independent verifiers to be a sudden and unexplained death where from the circumstances there was sufficient cause to 
believe that the death was as a result of third party intervention. 
Grey   A case considered by the researcher to be suspicious as defined above, but for which the independent verifiers considered to be non-suspicious. 
Non-suspicious  A case where from all the known circumstances, there is no reason to believe that the death was due to the intervention of a third party. 
Y axis 
Case Number The number allocated to each of the 32 cases by way of identification of these anonymised cases. 
Homicide  Confirmed by the police/coroner. 
Pos Hom Possible Homicide: A case where from the available evidence it appeared that a homicide may have been disclosed but neither the coroner nor the police could confirm at 
the time of the study. 
No Scene                  A case where the police were never called to the scene. 
No police  A case where the police were not called until later in the coroners inquiry.       
Dec at scene Decision at the scene: A case where the initial decision as to whether the case was suspicious was made at the scene by the first attending officer. 
SIO Dec  Senior Investigating Officer decision: A case which was referred to an SIO and/or a senior officer who was the final decision maker. 
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Coroner Dec Coroner’s decision: A case where the coroner made the final decision regarding whether a case was suspicious. NOTE: Only a coroner can order a PM and so in reality will 
always make the decision, but in these cases the coroner stated that he/she made this decision after consultation. 
Doctor Dec Doctor Decision: A case where the doctor attended the scene and gave a determination as to whether the case was suspicious. 
Drugs/Alc Drugs or Alcohol: A case where there was evidence at the scene that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol or had been consuming illegal controlled drugs prior 
to death. 
No Insp  No inspection: A case where from the available data, there appears to have been no inspection of the body by the police. 
Eld Male  Elderly Male. 
Eld Female Elderly Female. 
Mid aged M Middle aged male. 
Mid aged F Middle aged female. 
18-40  A person aged between 18 and 40 years old. 
C and YP  Child or Young person: a person between the ages of 5 and 18. 
Infant  A child between the ages of 0 to 5. 
Mental  A person at the time of death was suffering from a diagnosed mental health condition. 
Medical  A person at the time of their death suffering from a diagnosed medical condition or was disabled. 
Dom Vio  Domestic Violence: A person at the time of their death had been the victim of domestic violence or threats from a partner or ex-partner. 
Vulnerable The deceased at the time of their death was subject to vulnerability whether this be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, very young, very old or suffering from a 
mental or medical health condition.  
Chapter 6 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 109 
6.1.2 Other Analysis – Multi Dimensional Scaling 
In order to plot the similarities between the factors or ‘variables’ in this study, multi-dimensional 
scaling (MDS) was used in accordance with methodology described at chapter 2. The variables 
were correlated with each other and then plotted in SPSS using the ALSCAL multi-dimensional 
scaling logarithm. Correlations between each of the variables were identified as can be seen in 
table 25. With the exception of those mentioned below, the correlations were not strong and so 
one must be cautious as to what claims can be made into the closeness of fit in respect of the 
variables in this exercise.  
Not all the factors identified within the analysis of the case study were used in the MDS process. 
Only those factors which may have had a bearing on the situational circumstances of the death 
were relevant as anything occurring after the death will not have influenced the circumstances of 
the death. For example; who had made the decision to treat the case as suspicious or not, or the 
fact as to whether the body had been examined or not are not factors which had any relevance to 
the initial cause of the death. Therefore, only those that may be so relevant were included on 
table 25. These factors were tested for ‘closeness of fit’ using MDS as described in chapter 2. This 
produced a scatter chart showing the distance between factors which indicate a relative 
association between them. The output from this process can be seen at figure 32. There is a close 
association between the ‘S’ suspicious cases and ‘H’ homicide but also several of the 
vulnerabilities of the deceased persons in this case study, including ‘Med’ medical issues; ‘V’ 
vulnerable (as a general category); ‘DV’ domestic violence; ‘M’ mental issues and ‘CYP’ children 
and young persons. It is interesting to note the distance in space between the cases which were 
suspicious (S) and the cases which were not suspicious (NS) indicating that the factors vary. The 
negative correlation between non-suspicious and suspicious death at figure 33 is strong, 
indicating the distance between these two variables may be the most significant finding from the 
analysis. It will be noted also that the negative correlation between the ‘grey’ (G) category and 
both the suspicious (S) and non-suspicious (NS) is also fairly strong. This may indicate that these 
three categories are indeed different types of cases. Due to the fact of the negative correlation 
between suspicious and grey, it does tend to give some credence to the views expressed by the 
independent verifiers who opined that the 7 grey cases were not suspicious in contradiction to 
the opinions of the researcher. The output data from SPSS can be seen at appendix 7. One 
apparent anomaly is the positioning of the Drugs/Alcohol (DA) variable on the MDS chart. 
Whereas one might expect that this should be proximate to the ‘suspicious and homicide’ points 
as it is a ‘vulnerability’, it is in fact closer to the non-suspicious point. This is due to the fact that 
drugs and alcohol consumption prior to death was common in all categories of suspicious (n = 5), 
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grey (n = 4) and non-suspicious cases (n = 4). The latter figure of 4 is only out of 10 non-suspicious 
cases which is a greater percentage than the 5 cases where drugs or alcohol were consumed in 
the suspicious cases of which there were 15. Thus, the DA icon is closer to the non-suspicious icon 
on the chart. This would appear to indicate that the consumption of intoxicants prior to death is 
common in all categories of death. The outcomes of this analysis are further discussed in chapter 
8. There are several algorithms available to analyse data in the way described and others were 
tried including PREFSCAL which uses different processes to examine the correlations. However, 
the ALSCAL algorithm produced the best model fit. The outcomes of the PREFSCAL analysis can be 
seen at appendix 8. 
 
Figure 33: MDS showing Euclidean Distance between factors 
 
Legend: S = suspicious; G = grey; NS = non-suspicious; H = homicide; PH = possible homicide; DA = 
Drugs/Alcohol; EM = elderly male; EF = elderly female; MAM = middle aged male; MAF = middle 
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aged female; YA = young adult; CYP = child or young person; I = infant; M = mental; Med = 
medical; DV = domestic violence; V = vulnerable. 
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Table 25: Matrix of factors correlated with each other factor 
 S G NS H PH DA EM EF MAM MAF YA CYP I M Med DV V 
Suspicious 1.000                 
Grey -.404 1.000                
Not Sus -.728 -.333 1.000               
Homicide .312 -.290 -.104 1.000              
Pos Homicide -.059 0.52 .022 -.290 1.000             
Drugs/Alcohol -.139 -.005 .148 .129 -.005 1.000            
Elderly Male .024 .098 .098 .153 -.163 -.313 1.000           
Elderly Fem -.108 .149 .000 .078 -.050 -.331 -.218 1.000          
Mid aged M .036 .050 .000- -.078 .149 .257 -.218 -.333 1.000         
Mid aged F -.087 .157 -.028 -.217 .157 .171 -.122 -.186 -.186 1.000        
Young adult -.043 -.228 .215 .133 -.020 .332 -.200 -.306 -.306 -.170 1.000       
Child/YP .191 -.077 -.139 -.121 -.077 -.149 -.068 -.104 -.104 -.058 -.195 1.000      
Infant .191 -.077 -.139 -.121 -.077 -.149 -.068 -.104 -.104 -.058 -.195 -.032 1.000     
Mental issues -.012 -.005 .016 .129 -.181 .093 .072 .110 -.331 -.048 .178 .217 -.149 1.000    
Medical  .178 -.158 -.067 .174 -.156 -.115 .098 .298 -.298 .194 .098 -.139 -.139 .274 1.000   
Dom violence .351 -.207 -.207 .194 .234 .092 -.182 -.092 -.277 .120 .327 .373 -.086 .255 -.041 1.000  
Vulnerable .243 .111 -.333 .174 .111 .214 .098 .149 -.149 -.360 .137 .046 .046 .214 -.067 .124 1.000 
Legend: S = suspicious; G = grey; NS = non-suspicious; H = homicide; PH = possible homicide; DA = Drugs/Alcohol; EM = elderly male; EF = elderly female; 
MAM = middle aged male; MAF = middle aged female; YA = young adult; CYP = child or young person; I = infant; M = mental; Med = medical; DV = domestic 
violence; V = vulnerable
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Chapter 7: Results – Focus Groups 
7.1 Focus Groups and Interviews 
Focus groups and interviews were conducted with a broad range of stakeholders, but the main 
groupings were police, both front line crime scene investigators and senior officers; forensic 
pathologists; non-forensic pathologists and coroners. The outcomes of these interviews were 
divided into these disciplines. Common themes were identified for each discipline and these 
outcomes are further discussed in chapter 4. The themes are summarised at table 26. 
Table 26: Categories and themes identified through Focus Groups 
Identified Issues 
 
CSI’s Senior 
Police 
HORFP’s Non-Forensic 
Pathologists 
Coroners 
Failure to call CSI to 
scene 
     
Inexperience/training 
of first attending officer 
     
Inexperience/training 
of police supervisors 
     
Quality of scene 
investigation 
     
No standard operating 
procedure 
     
Fail to inspect body      
Inappropriate use of 
doctor or other 
professional advisor 
     
Non- Forensic PM used 
to save money 
     
Evisceration by 
Mortuary staff 
     
Budgets and Resource 
constraints 
     
Vulnerability of 
deceased 
     
Mind-set of first 
attending officer 
     
Coroners hold too 
many PM’s 
     
Quality of non-forensic 
PM 
     
Availability of non-
forensic pathologist 
     
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In total, there were fifteen themes which emerged from the focus groups and interviews. Each 
are examined in turn and presented in respect of five categories of interviewee. Other 
interested persons involved in the oversight of death investigation were interviewed and had 
views on the provision of forensic and non-forensic PM’s and the quality of the police 
examination and investigation of the scenes of sudden and unexplained death. However, these 
views were not first-hand nor led by experience and tended to be anecdotal. They were 
therefore excluded from the study. 
 
7.2 Focus Group Outcomes 
Over 60 police and police staff were interviewed in accordance with the methodology in 
chapter 2. Unsurprisingly, there appeared to be a difference in perspective between senior 
police officers and SIO’s to that of junior staff who deal with sudden and unexpected death 
scenes. The more junior staff were in the main CSI’s. This group were interviewed in four focus 
groups. In total 18 senior police officers participated in the focus group ranging from SIO’s at 
Detective Inspector level, up to Chief Superintendent rank.  
Most of the HORFP’s were spoken to during the course of the research at their group practice 
meetings which acted as a focus group when other issues were on the agenda. There are six 
such group practices and they are referred to here as groups 1 to 6.  
Ten non-forensic pathologists were interviewed as part of a focus group as described in 
chapter 2. There was a consensus of opinion in respect of most of the issues which emerged, 
but it was clear that practice differs geographically across England and Wales.  
Numerous coroners responded with comments for the purpose of this study. The 
overwhelming message they informed was that coroners in the main make decisions based 
upon the information they receive from the people that attend the scene of death, whether 
that be the police, paramedics or some other authority such as the hospital or care home. 
Therefore, they are not the prime decision makers at the immediate scene of death although 
by law they alone can determine the type of PM which takes place. 
The outcomes of focus groups are described by individual theme below and discussed in 
chapter 8. 
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 Failure to use the CSI at the scene for the appropriate purpose 
One of the common themes amongst CSI’s was that they were not called to the scenes of 
sudden and unexpected death nearly as much as they think that they should be. Although in 
some forces CSI and supervisor attendance is policy, this was not the case in most forces and it 
was apparent that practice is not standard across the country (Focus groups 1, 2, 3 and 4). 
Whilst some CSI’s regularly attend sudden and unexpected deaths, many attend rarely. All the 
groups reported that they felt particularly rushed at the scenes of suspected suicide and a 
general feeling that the main reason CSI’s were called was to take imagery for the coroner’s 
investigation, not utilising their crime scene assessment skills but doing a mundane process of 
photography. As an example, one CSI from a small force described a ‘suspicious’ scene as; “…it 
could be something that is a very tidy well-presented house, and you may just be looking at 
little pockets of potential evidence.” (Focus group 2). 
It was generally expressed however that apart from cases where they were asked just to take 
imaging, if they were called to provide an opinion, they were listened to and their input was 
valued; “…when they do call us if they are not happy (with the scene) and its down to us to 
make the call” (focus group 1). There was a clear perception that CSI’s were underutilised in 
sudden and unexpected death cases and this appeared to be a phenomenon in the last few 
years (focus group 3). One CSI commented; “It’s interesting ‘cos we get experts in court and 
they are not allowed to stray outside their area of expertise but we are doing it with PC s at the 
scenes” (focus group 4). 
 Inexperience of first attending police officers  
CSI’s felt that the real decision making was left to inexperienced police constables who were 
first attenders and that the way in which the investigation progressed was very much 
dependent upon those initial decisions made by this officer; “…often the decision has been 
made so we don’t have an input whether or not we think it is suspicious…” (Focus group 1) was 
a common theme expressed in all four of the focus groups. They did state that some police 
officers were experienced and did a good job at scenes but described this as ‘hit and miss’; 
“You have some officers who investigate in full and then you get some who do little 
investigation and almost jump to conclusions without looking at background information” 
(focus group 2); “I think (of police officers) there are brilliant ones and not so brilliant ones as in 
any job, are thinking body cameras are good enough, lots of police officers are thinking what 
SOCOs do are to attend and take pictures” (Focus group 3). The experience of the police 
officers attending sudden and unexpected death was perhaps one of the main themes above 
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all else identified by the CSI’s. They identified that most officers may attend one or two such 
deaths in a year and thus had no experience base on which to draw in decision making (focus 
group 4). An example was;  
‘It’s not consistent. PC’s assess these cases on a different level. We had a lady who 
had a severe head injury which was written off as a fall but it could have been 
done by a claw hammer. It cost a lot of money we had an SIO and we had to 
recover the carpet’ (focus group 4).   
During the interviews with CSI’s, six cases were spoken of where wrong decisions were made 
at scenes which transpired to be homicides. Two were when homicides were eventually 
identified but forensic trace evidence was lost due to bodies being washed on arrival at the 
mortuary; “…we’ve had 2 in the last couple of years … went to normal post mortem, has been 
stopped and restarted as a forensic and we have been trying to back track ever since. Those 
two cases have gone to full investigation” (focus group 1). Another was described by a CSI from 
a large force of a man found dead in bed and the case was written off as non-suspicious but a 
week later more information came to light and it was realised the case should have been 
attended by CSI’s in the first place (focus group 2). 
In respect of training of first attenders at scenes, it was generally acknowledged by the SIO 
focus group that this was insufficient. It was suggested that there should be a ‘triaged’ 
approach to each case, whereby a considered assessment should be made by those with the 
skills to make a better decision. However, the point was made and supported by very many of 
those in the focus group, that; “You can’t change policy or strategy for odd instances which are 
totally off the wall” (SIO focus group). It was generally the case that for child death cases, 
these were better investigated due to a national protocol and force policies insisting that a 
senior detective attend the scene to take control over decision making. This degree of 
consistency was not achieved in non-child cases and consistency it was agreed was what was 
required across England and Wales.  
A HORFP commented: 
‘In my opinion everybody at the scene (if there is one) needs an experienced 
detective and/or crime scene investigator to attend before it is deemed non-
suspicious. The police and some coroners have a misplaced faith in the ability of 
non-forensic pathologists to spot any homicide that slips through the investigative 
net. These pathologists on the whole assume that if a case is referred to them it is 
not suspicious or a homicide. They do not have the appropriate suspicious mind-
set and they are not trained to deal with such cases. If the wrong call is made by 
the police/coroner the chances of things being retrieved are slim. 
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 Poor quality of scene investigation  
One experienced CSI stated “But they fail to document things like body position; stuff at the 
scene such as drugs and alcohol, blood and vomit at the scene that helps the pathologist” 
(focus group 2). Some CSI’s however reported that the quality of scene investigation was high 
which they felt was down to the forms the officers fill out which guides them through the 
process. One CSI pointed out that in his experience, one of the problems with decision making 
was that there is sometimes no notice taken of the background information to a case, where 
even though the scene looks ok, the suspicion arises from the history. For instance, a history of 
domestic violence or threats (focus group 2).  
Forensic Pathologists group 3 mentioned the quality of police scene investigations which can 
be variable depending on the police officer attending. One of the reasons they thought that 
this was the case was the squeeze on funding and downward pressures to save money both on 
police training and decisions not to hold forensic PM’s as a cost saving measure. Group 5 
stated that too many deaths were downgraded by the police to save money on forensic PM’s. 
Group 3 had also in the past regularly attended police awareness training but in recent years 
this had ceased. Mention was made of the lack of experience of police officers on the front 
line, although there was general agreement amongst all HORFP’s that the standard of 
detective who deal with homicides was high. Group 3 considered that all deaths should be 
attended by detectives and not left to uniformed officers. One HORFP commented; 
‘The current system does not allow for a staged investigation with the right 
expertise coming in at the right time. Well trained and experienced SOCO’s and 
Detectives are very good at identifying cases where they are entirely happy with the 
background and circumstances – or where the circumstances are obviously 
suspicious. The problem area is when they are a bit unsure. When unsure they need 
to be able to call a forensic pathologist and discuss the case perhaps with 
transmitted images. Often this will be sufficient – it may be clear to the pathologist 
that concern is unwarranted or alternatively, a course of action will be decided on 
which allows further investigation or provision of further information that will 
address the concern whilst not affecting evidence retrieval. In other cases, the 
pathologist will want to attend the scene and it may be that suspicion can be 
allayed at this stage. Other cases will need the full involvement with post mortem 
examination. Most of the queries we get from Police (who we encourage to call us 
with questions about death scenes, at no charge) can be dealt with by directing 
them towards further information gathering’. 
Another describing one of the cases included within the case study commented; 
  ‘I am at a loss to understand how this death got as far as it did before suspicion 
was raised. The assault related injuries were not subtle and this is nowhere near a 
borderline case. Any cursory examination of the body should have picked this up at 
the various levels involved in the investigation. Clearly if cases of this extreme 
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nature are being missed until later on, then it raises concern about the missing of 
more ‘borderline’ homicides’. 
Coroners all agreed that the role of the first attender at the scene of a sudden and unexplained 
death was crucial to the eventual outcome. One coroner also stated that there was a reduction 
in the experience and knowledge of front line officers allocated to deal with these cases over 
recent years and certainly since the financial crisis. An example of a case where the experience 
and competence of the officer dealing in a recent case the coroner had heard at inquest was 
emailed to the researcher at figure 34 with full permission to quote within this research.  
 
Figure 34: Email sent to researcher to highlight issues over police investigation of sudden and 
unexplained death 
Forgive a few brief details but this one was in the national press and I was surprised there 
weren’t adverse comments about a lack of police action at the initial scene. 
2 uniformed officers despatched to an alert by family that daughter/sister had not been seen 
for several days. Police gained entry to locked and secure flat and went in first, family 
remained outside.  Fully clothed, partially decomposed body found laid on side in bed. No 
signs of struggle or anything suspicious. (Police report*) specifically notes mobile phone on 
bedside cabinet and last call several days earlier. 
Officer notes that in the kitchen there were a number of packets of tablets.  I was told 3 packs 
of dihydrocodeine 30mg (28 tabs), 3 packs of Diazepam (28 tabs) and 100 Solpadine were 
found in the kitchen but all tidy and not indicative of lots of tabs having been taken. Uniformed 
sergeant attended and given lack of suspicious signs and no suicide note this was written off as 
a natural cause death. 
PM gave cause of death as dihydrocodeine overdose (therapeutic level of other drugs too but 
hard to quantify as had to use liver sample).  Family confirmed deceased had long history of 
mental illness and suicidal ideation as well as family history of suicide - 3 family members all by 
overdose.  They told me at inquest that when they went into the flat there were empty 
packets all over the side of the sink but worse still there was an empty glass caked in white 
powder right next to the deceased’s bed as well as a large carrier bag full of about 500-1,000 
tablets.  The officer sheepishly confirmed these items had not been seen and he couldn’t recall 
if he seized the dihydrocodeine or not.  No details of any medicines were recorded on the 
(police report*) so that meant the toxicologist was completely in the dark what to look for in 
the deceased’s liver (too decomposed for blood). 
The family were certain this was a suicide and all the signs were clearly visible in the house. So 
my conclusion was indeed suicide. 
I appreciate this was not a suspicious death but if you look at the final box for non-suspicious 
death it just says complete coroner report.  There is no reminder to seize obvious items like 
the glass in this case or record the drugs properly. It’s just a question of flagging early that the 
officers who attend the first scene should also complete a quality coroner investigation as they 
are likely to be called to inquest if there is one. 
*Name of the form was mentioned in the email which identifies the police area 
 
 
 Lack of a standard operating procedure or clear national policy 
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There was discussion where suggestions of using a ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ may assist 
inexperienced officers (focus group 3). Another CSI said that; “There is no clear guidelines or 
standard Op Procedure. I attend cases in other force areas and it is different. It depends on the 
officer who attends that day” (focus group 4). There was however a conversation regarding the 
limitations of standard operating procedures which it was said could limit initiative (focus 
group 4). 
The HORFP’s did notice differing approaches between different police force areas. One 
commented; 
‘There is a variable relationship between police/coroner and forensic pathologist. In 
the main it is very good, but the fundamental flaws mean that under the current 
approach there Is no prospect of progression. There are clearly other issues - those 
that cover more forces identify differences’.   
 
 Inspection of the body by the first attending police officer 
There was a degree of frustration expressed by some CSI’s that by the time they get to the 
scene, sometimes the attending police officer has already made their mind up that it was not a 
suspicious death and has; “been all over it (the scene), searched the body before I even got 
there, not preserved the scene … I want to see the scene as it should be” (focus group 1). This 
was interesting as others complained that there has been no search of the body and so there is 
some conflict of opinion on whether to search the body. An example of failure to search the 
body was given as; “elderly gentleman found outside of his house, paramedics had been, police 
officer went; oh no, he’s had a heart attack. So the CSI goes and moves his arm and there is a 
knife sticking out of his chest and nobody had moved him or touched him” (focus group 3). The 
point was made however that if the police service is too critical of officers decision making, 
they would become risk averse and “we would get overwhelmed with death (investigations) as 
they will call everything as suspicious” (focus group 3). 
 Inexperience of police supervisors  
An area of universal concern expressed was the competence of police supervisors. Police 
supervisors at sergeant level were reported to lack experience and knowledge. One senior CSI 
stated; “…I have seen a difference in the last 10 years with a lot of supervisory sergeants, 
where they go to a scene of sudden death, they do not have a lot of experience and don’t 
understand peoples roles” (focus group 1). Similar comments were made in all focus groups 
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and this was a real area of concern as it was often police sergeants who the attending police 
constable relied on for advice and guidance.  
It was stated by a Scottish officer that in Scotland, all such deaths must be attended by a 
supervisor and there was general agreement that this should be the case in England and Wales 
by the SIO focus group, but it was also realised that many supervisors had little experience or 
training in this area. One senior forensic manager stated that;  
“What happens is that the first officer attends the scene and makes up his mind 
what has happened. His sergeant turns up and the PC briefs him by saying, it ok 
sarge, its natural causes. Then the sergeant takes on the bias and then the 
inspector is told the same thing and on it goes and so everyone is biased by the 
first officer who may not have done it properly”.  
The SIO focus group was summarised and the main points were agreed that: 
 The language used needed to be constructed with care around words such as 
‘suspicious’, ‘crime scene’, and ‘unexpected’; 
 The training of young police recruits was variable across the country; 
 A common-sense approach is what is required, but starting from an open-mind which 
treated unexplained deaths in the community with a high index of suspicion and; 
 Each case should be treated on its merits with a low threshold for escalation. 
 Other issues which formed part of the conversation were that coroners tended to be 
‘idiosyncratic’ and there was a lack of consistency in decision making across coronial 
areas.  
 
 Role of the police surgeon (or attending doctor) and other attendees at the scene 
Another area of universal concern was the role of the doctor called by the police. One senior 
CSI stated; 
 “The doctor will do all the investigation and I have seen it on our logs where it says 
the doctor has not found anything of a criminal nature, or suspicious. To me that is 
totally wrong because what the hell is the doctor doing looking at that, I have 
recently been to scenes where instead of working in conjunction with us the doctor 
will go and do his own Sherlock Holmes to try and work out the scenario whether he 
could have ambled this way and whether he done this or that and come out with his 
opinion and some of it is medical then that is fair enough but basically the new 
supervisors on the ground, people who are first arriving are allowing them to do the 
investigation” (focus group 1). 
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Again, this was a common theme in all focus groups; an expectation that a doctor would 
provide the reassurance that the case was not suspicious although with no specialist training 
to be able to do so. Other professionals also were identified as unduly influencing police officer 
decision making. The following are two examples;  
“Either you’ve got the ambulance crew saying, oh this is definitely suspicious and it 
is clearly not, or you’ve got the quite a high profile one recently where …was found 
with shooting injuries, 6 bullet wounds and the paramedic attending say they are 
keyhole surgery scars that have opened up somehow, and the police officer has just 
bought it and called the undertakers and only one police officer attended, 
fortunately he put his body camera on so we had something to go on but we didn’t 
pick up for some time so the family had wandered around the scene and the press 
had wandered around the scene. That was quite high profile (focus group 3).   
“Another one, fire brigade saying they are the be all and end all and write off fire 
scene like that. A family of 5 dead and they said it was a cigarette. We had a family 
of 5 die and they tried to write if off in 1 ½ hours. We had to claw it back” (focus 
group 3). 
Some police forces have a policy where police officers do not routinely attend sudden death 
reports as this is left to the ambulance service who get no training at all (focus group 2). 
The issue of doctors attending scenes and directing the investigation was recognised by the 
SIO/Managers focus group and they generally wanted detective officers to attend to ensure a 
thorough investigation. They did not all appear to have a great deal of awareness of this unlike 
the CSI groups. 
 Non-forensic pathologists being used instead of a HORFP/ quality of a non-forensic PM 
Perhaps one of the most concerning activities which was clearly commonplace from all four 
focus groups, is the practice of using a non-forensic PM as a ‘filter’ in case the death is a 
homicide where there is some uncertainty. This involves briefing the coroner that the case is 
not suspicious in order that a non-forensic pathologist conducts the PM, but securing the 
scene of the death until the outcome of the PM. This may sound like a sensible idea, but in fact 
if the case then transpires to be suspicious, although the police would still have a secure scene, 
trace evidence from the body will have been destroyed. Approximately half of the focus group 
participants had experienced cases where this had occurred. One experienced CSI stated; “We 
often attend a non-suspicious post mortems to take the photographs in case it is suspicious” 
(focus group 1). Another stated; 
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“It is either suspicious or it is not suspicious. I personally believe it is black or white. 
You either know what has happened or are pretty confident, or you are not. I know 
there are other arguments. If you can imagine you are a non-forensic pathologist; 
you go in with a mind-set that it is not suspicious, so you are not looking for 
anything suspicious. If a forensic team turn up then there must be something 
suspicious, they are looking for something suspicious” (focus group 1). 
This practice was not universal with some CSI’s having never witnessed such a procedure but 
all clearly recognised the dangers of adopting a process which was sub-optimal. One CSI from a 
small force stated; “… if you are not sure you call a forensic PM. You can have what you want… 
if I am not sure and the boss says yes” (focus group 1). In the case of one region of police 
forces, a written proposal to formally adopt the practice of using non-forensic PM’s was shared 
with the researcher. The stated reason for this was to save money on the case fee paid to 
forensic pathologists on the Home Office Register. Several of the CSI’s stated the main 
problem of undertaking a non-forensic PM as a filter was the fact that the body was washed at 
the mortuary and thereby losing forensic trace evidence (focus group 2). One participant 
stated that she had not experienced this practice for five years due to the fact that non-
forensic pathologists declined to conduct PM’s if the police had an interest in the case (focus 
group 1). Cases were cited where the non-forensic pathologist reads the notes and then works 
out what happened even before looking at the body. One CSI commented that;  
“I was at … hospital mortuary just a couple of weeks ago and they had 4 bodies 
laid out...there was a pathologist doing them all and it was really confusing 
moving between 4 bodies. It’s nothing to have 8 bodies to do in a morning which is 
their spare time before they do their day job. It’s a system set up to fail. Their 
objectives are different to forensic pathologists so it’s like comparing apples and 
pears” (focus group 4). 
The issue of the variance in quality between a forensic and non-forensic PM was widely 
discussed in the SIO and senior manager’s focus group. One SIO described as a comparison; 
“It’s like comparing a seaside donkey to Red Rum” (SIO focus group). The difference between 
the two types of PM process was understood by some but it appeared that some SIO’s were 
unaware of any significant difference. The ‘derisory’ fees paid to non-forensic pathologists 
were seen as part of the problem. A senior police officer commented that greater integration 
between forensic and non-forensic pathologists would increase the quality of the coronial 
cases. 
There was universal agreement amongst forensic pathologists that the standard of non-
forensic PM processes had much to be desired. The practice of the mortuary technicians 
conducting the evisceration and the failure of the non-forensic pathologist to properly inspect 
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the body which they described as commonplace. They gave the examples of practice in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland which had very different systems, where all PM’s are carried 
out to forensic standards. Most mentioned the ‘mind-set’ of non-forensic pathologists, which 
is to “assume an innocent rather than a malevolent cause which can lead to sub-standard 
findings and reports” (group 1). All the HORFP’s spoken to were aware of the NCEPOD report in 
2006 into the quality of non-forensic PM’s and expressed the view, almost universally that 
things had not changed in the last 10 years since the publication. They were also of the view 
that the minimum standards for coronial autopsy issued by the Royal College of Pathologists 
were not generally adhered to (group interview 1). Comments made were; 
‘A preliminary post mortem examination had already been made, but its standard 
was so poor as to have obscured rather than elicited any useful information’; 
‘…appallingly poor standard of first autopsy and cynical 'back covering' by 
reporting 'broken neck' led me to write in strong terms to the coroner’. 
‘Histopathologists don’t like doing PM’s, particularly for the derisory sums the 
Ministry of Justice deems as adequate for professional services in this matter: 
there is a saying that if you pay peanuts, you get monkeys, and there is an element 
of truth in that one in some hospitals. I am (anecdotally) aware that in some 
hospitals, much of the dissection is done by the mortuary technician in ‘routine’ 
PM’s. I would far rather a hospital pathologist decided at an early stage that they 
were worried and then STOP and call us (or properly, HM coroner in the first 
instance) rather than ploughing on, finishing a dissection (invariably without a 
proper neck dissection) and then deciding they are worried After which, the 
findings are invariably messed up and we cannot put the toothpaste back in the 
tube’. 
‘There will always be cases that slip through the net when the link between a 
criminal act and a death is not recognised in the early stages. The Coroners 
pathologists should be encouraged to raise concerns when they are unhappy 
about any background information or findings. However, coroner’s pathologists 
should not be considered a safety net as they are not trained to recognised 
features of forensic interest and are led by the information provided to them which 
are often exceptionally brief and usually states categorically that there are no 
suspicious circumstances’. 
‘I believe that once the body was examined externally in the mortuary, concern 
should have been raised regarding the external injuries, particularly to the right 
eye area and the pathologist should have discussed this with the coroner’s officer 
and halted the examination. This did not happen and the pathologist continued to 
dissect the organs. Even, given that the head may not have been dissected and the 
cranial contents examined until examination of the other organs, once the 
subdural haematoma was found, the pathologist should not have continued to 
dissect the brain. In other words, there were at least two opportunities to halt the 
examination that were missed. Instead the pathologist continued to complete the 
examination despite the initial information that the death was drug related, was 
at variance with the actual findings’. 
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Group 2 mentioned that the quality of the PM results were sometimes compromised by the 
refusal of coroners to fund toxicology tests which they considered as one of the most 
important tests forming part of the PM process. Group 3 however felt that the standard of 
coronial autopsy practice in their geographic location was generally high, showing that 
standards vary across the country. Group 1 felt that the advent of cross sectional scanning31 
may improve the situation in the future. One of the issues identified was the ‘derisory’ fee of 
£96.80 paid by the coroner for a PM which would be insufficient to provide a salary to a full-
time autopsy pathologist.  
Most of the pathologists stated that some coroners tended to be idiosyncratic although they 
acknowledge that many were very good and supportive. There was a mixed view as to whether 
non-forensic pathologists should receive some forensic training. Whilst some considered this 
to be positive as it would aid the detection of suspicious cases, others thought that such 
training would give unqualified pathologists confidence to delve into cases where their skills 
were insufficient, thereby destroying medical and forensic evidence. Group 4 discussed that 
the number of PM’s were because of coroners not wanting to miss a homicide, but this has 
inadvertently caused more likelihood of the opposite happening and will perversely increase 
the chances of homicide being missed. 
The group felt that in general terms the quality of work they do for coroners PM’s was good 
considering the ‘derisory’ payment they receive from the coroner. One commented “what do 
you expect for £96.80?” The attitude of the NHS employers was varied across the group. Some 
hospital employers dissuaded pathologists from doing coroners PM’s but other areas there 
was support from employers. All reported that there are too many coroners PM’s and that 
many are a waste of time as the cause of death is obvious from the history and circumstances. 
Sometimes this is because the deceased general practitioner cannot issue a certificate because 
they have not seen the patient for 14 days, and the coroners can be risk averse. A pathologist 
who was a senior manager at NHS England commented that the decision to carry out a 
forensic autopsy and what type it should be, both from coronial and police instructions can be 
variable. The decision as to what type of PM will take place carries with it significant cost 
implications for the service and remuneration differentials for the practitioners. She stated 
that funding and its anomalies remained a significant problem. Another senior person from the 
Royal College of Pathologists referring to the 2006 NCEPOD report (Furness, 2006) confirmed 
that the standard of coronial non-forensic autopsy had not improved, and in fact had probably 
                                                             
31 Computerised Tomography (CT) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) are the most common 
methods. 
Chapter 7 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 125 
worsened. This was due to a number of factors, not just the case fee, but also many trainee 
histopathologists are opting out of the autopsy practice element of their training which used 
to be mandatory but is now optional. This was done to attract more doctors into the 
profession as autopsy is seen to be an unpleasant activity. Another senior pathologist 
commented that if coroners insisted that pathologists abided by the minimum standards 
issued by the Royal College of Pathologists, quality would increase but coroners are unwilling 
to do this as pathologists will refuse to do the work. A pathologist with experience of working 
under the Scottish system stated that the problems south of the border do not exist in 
Scotland, as PM’s are conducted as part of the pathologists work plan and paid by the NHS. 
In general terms, there was acceptance amongst coroners that the standard of coronial non-
forensic PM’s had not improved in quality since the 2006 NCEPOD report and there was 
evidence supplied which gave rise to believing that in fact the situation had worsened.  
 Evisceration of the body by mortuary staff prior to the pathologists inspection 
Many CSI’s had witnessed non-forensic PM’s where the bodies had been eviscerated prior to 
the pathologist attending and described the whole PM as lasting as little as ten minutes (focus 
groups 1,2,3 and 4). The CSI’s spoke at length about the quality of a non-forensic PM and some 
stated that in their experience, it was common practice for mortuary technicians to eviscerate 
the body prior to the pathologist arriving in the mortuary. One comment was; 
“The hospital pathologists, and all respect to hospital pathologists, if they are 
asked to do 7-8 PM’s in the morning, and one of those is the old chap from the 
scene which is locked down, he’s going to go, yeah it’s ischemic heart disease, I’m 
happy. The hospital pathologist tends to have an idea what they are focusing on. It 
depends on what information they get from the coroner’s officer about the body.  
You may get a 2-liner saying: body pulled out of water and the pathologist isn’t 
wanting to know any more because he has 8 to do before lunch” (focus group 2). 
One HORFP explained the importance of a visual inspection of the body prior to 
evisceration which is denied by the practice of the mortuary staff;  
Furthermore, many ‘routine’ P.M.’s are now eviscerated by APTs, and external 
examinations which are often of prime importance in suspicious cases- are of poor 
quality. It is not the obvious cases-such as stabbings- which are the problem but 
the more subtle cases. 
 
 Budgets and resource constraints 
The subject of reduced budgets was cited as one of the factors for very little training being 
given to front line police officers. There were several examples of CSI’s no longer having inputs 
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into initial police training as training time had been reduced. This also impacted on 
attachments of uniform officers to forensic teams which some stated used to take place but 
had stopped. Lack of training was cited as one of the main reasons for police officers not 
knowing how to deal with sudden and unexplained deaths. The consensus was that officers 
were given an average of a half day training on managing a crime scene at the beginning of 
their police career, and that a lot of training was now delivered using interactive distance 
learning methods whereas they considered that a more experiential method was required; 
“It’s not really death training, it’s packaging training, this is how you see something, rather 
than, when you turn up at a death, this is what you should be thinking” (focus group 3). 
Finance was also seen to be a large factor into decision making as to whether to hold a forensic 
PM or not. The perception amongst CSI’s was that this was one of the main reasons why there 
is a reduction in forensic PM’s and that is driven from managers above. They stated that 
money would not be an issue for junior officers attending scenes, but it was definitely a 
consideration for SIO’s and other bosses (focus group 1, 2, 3 and 4). One example given was a 
case where the body of a middle-aged man was found in a burned-out car and the CSI 
requested a forensic pathologist to attend the scene, but the SIO refused and decided on a 
non-forensic PM due to the cost (focus group 2). I t was generally accepted however that the 
police are required to save money; “I am always weary because a Home Office Pathologist is 
very expensive. So you can’t just give a nod to everything. You have to prioritise…otherwise 
you’ll give a nod to everything and get expert opinion on everything” (focus group 3). One CSI 
suggested that if forensic pathologists were paid a fixed sum for providing a service not 
dependant on the number of cases, the financial issues would be reduced (focus group 3). One 
area where some CSI’s found that financial cut backs had an impact on being called out at 
night and that they were more likely to be called to scenes in the day time than at night as a 
consequence due to overtime restrictions (focus group 3 and 4). 
In relation to the SIO and senior managers focus group, they were asked about funding and 
whether this was an issue in respect of dealing with sudden and unexpected death. Without 
exception, all stated that of course funding is an issue in the current financial landscape, but in 
terms of compromising a death investigation it would never be problem. One comment was 
that; “Forensic pathology is not an area to save money when the force reputation is at stake” 
(SIO focus group). Several discussed the benefits of having a scaled fee system for forensic 
PM’s depending on whether the case transpired to be a homicide which would reflect the 
amount of work each case involved. Another view expressed was that with a mixture of 
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confirmed homicide and natural death cases being examined, the current fixed fee structure 
balanced out and there would be no benefit of a scaled fee. A senior police officer stated that 
there may be occasions when “middle management budget holder may inadvertently create 
unintended decision making pressures on the lower ranks” (senior police officer interview). 
Several SIO’s raised the anomaly of coroners insisting on forensic PM’s for cases where 
prisoners had died in prison but where the deaths were expected and confirmed by prison 
doctors to be natural causes. This was a waste of police resources and had caused conflicts 
between police and coroners, especially in one police force area. The conflict of using police 
powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act to undertake a forensic examination where 
it was not believed to be a crime was a legal issue of misusing those powers and perhaps 
acting illegally in breach of the act. An example given was expected deaths in prisons of a 
diagnosed condition and deaths in health care settings where technically patients were 
‘detained’ by the state32 but coroners are obliged to conduct an inquest for which some insist 
on a forensic PM.  
The HORFP’s were convinced that there was a culture of ‘cost cutting’ generally in the police. 
One commented;  
‘There may also be a cost-cutting culture in the police. You could look at the 
percentage of cases that turn out to be homicide in each forensic pathologists 
workload. If it is a very high percentage then I suspect that police force is missing 
some. Probably should be no more than 1 in 3 to 1 in 4 being genuine homicide’. 
Others similarly commented; 
‘…police are now strongly motivated to save money. Obvious homicides get 
referred to HO pathologist but the obscure ones (the very ones that ought to come 
our way) often do not. During 2013 in particular, the proportion of homicides to 
other cases rose markedly in my personal practice’ 
‘…the right person to call would have been the Home Office Pathologist but I can 
understand – given the way the case fee works – why they would seek a less 
expensive opinion first, which might be sufficient’. 
‘The case fee system is a big disincentive to Police and it doesn’t encourage 
sensible working practices – which should be focused on investigative needs and 
priorities, the dignity of the deceased and sensitivity towards families’. 
‘There has been a decline in the number of suspicious deaths over the last few 
years which seems to correlate with the start of the financial crisis. From my 
perspective and confirmed off the record by officers is that there is a push to 
                                                             
32  Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) where a person is in care for medical reasons but technically detained 
by the state. 
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reduce the PM numbers. This is being complicated by a slowly changing profile of 
Senior SOCO’s33 from people who have been promoted by experience and ‘nouce’ 
to those with qualifications and courses. There remains no understanding of the 
quality and destructive nature of the routine post-mortem’. 
‘Coroners and their officers are generally dependent of the say so of the police as 
to whether a case is suspicious or not, but there have been a few cases in the … 
where the police have had no interest in a case but the coroner has insisted on a 
forensic examination and has funded one themselves due to their concerns. The 
decision on whether to have a forensic examination is clearly affected by financial 
constraints with some borderline cases that warrant a more detailed examination 
sometimes being passed to routine pathologists. These are not necessarily 
significant cases of missed homicide but cases that warranted more detailed 
consideration than that achieved by the average routine PM’. 
 
The non-forensic pathologist focus group similarly commented that budgetary considerations 
were an issue they encountered. Some had experienced pressure to conduct PM’s where they 
thought from the outset that the case should have been conducted by a HORFP. They felt that 
the driver for this was financial and several specific accounts were given of this. One claimed to 
have been pressured to take on a child death case and in the end flatly refused to conduct the 
PM. The focus group consensus was that it was a regular occurrence to be asked to do cases 
which they considered should be forensic cases. 
‘I got to the point where I had enough and I mean admittedly it’s a grey area … the 
coroner would phone and the police would come and we would do a single-handed 
police case with only a paediatric pathologist’ (non-forensic pathologist focus 
group). 
One pathologist whose mortuary covered several police force areas considered that the 
question of money and availability of forensic PM’s depended on which force was paying for 
the examination. The group gave many examples of being used for what they viewed as 
inappropriate cases.  
Coroners were concerned that the finance available to fund the autopsy provision in England 
and Wales was problematic and that the downward pressure on police budgets was a strong 
disincentive to pay for forensic PM’s which in turn would increase the risk of missed homicide. 
The funding of NHS mortuaries was also seen as being poorly provisioned. It was interesting to 
note that coroners pointed out that the use of terms such as ‘coroners PM’s’ and ‘forensic 
PM’s’ were used as common parlance, but in fact all PM’s are authorised by the coroner and 
thereby ‘coroners PM’s’. One coroner felt that there was pressure from the police to 
downgrade cases to avoid the police case fee. There was general agreement that the coronial 
                                                             
33 SOCO is a Scenes of Crime Officer, now described as a Crime Scene Investigator or ‘CSI’. 
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fee of less than one hundred pounds was far too low and was a contributory factor to the 
standard of autopsy.  
 Vulnerability of the deceased and mind-set of the police officer 
Another general theme was that the CSI’s perceived that they were more likely to be called the 
younger the deceased was. They thought that death was more expected amongst the elderly 
and so were less likely to be required to attend. All the focus groups considered that the 
vulnerability of the deceased such as the elderly, alcoholics or drugs users was a factor in 
sudden and unexpected death decisions. An experienced CSI speaking of a recent case stated;  
 ‘…she is 68 …It’s not an age thing (speaking of vulnerable people) write it off... 
they go in and they are told it’s a sudden death, they attend, their mind is set this 
vulnerable person has died, therefore... They are making them (decisions) fit’ 
(focus group 3). 
An experienced CSI gave an example of the effect of vulnerability on decision making when 
describing an elderly female found dead in her bed;  
‘… when they peeled back the scalp a huge great big crack all the way down and 
because she had been in the flat for 2 weeks after death by the time the PM was 
done so when it was a huge back-peddling exercise trying to make up for lost 
ground and that caused a lot of issues’ (focus group 3). 
There were a few comments about some police officers not beginning the investigation with 
an open-mind;  
‘They seem to take things at face value. Example; death in a care home, they 
automatically think it is a natural death and might not look any further into it.  
They don’t consider medication, abuse etc. In care homes, there must be all sorts 
of unknowns there because they are all coming to light now. It is ridiculous. (Focus 
group 3). 
There was strong support amongst all six forensic pathology groups for the principle that all 
deaths should be considered as suspicious until otherwise shown. Not a single HORFP 
disagreed with this stance.  
 Too many coronial autopsies  
Another theme was that most HORFP’s were of the view that there are too many coronial 
autopsies in England and Wales and these could be reduced by better non-medical-
investigation which would show that a certificate could be issued without a PM (group 4). 
Group 5 considered that the number of coronial autopsies could be reduced by a third to a 
half. One HORFP commented: 
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‘Usually there is a reasonable assessment of cases prior to PM. Occasionally there 
will be problems and the forensic pathologist is reliant on the coroner’s pathologist 
to suspend any examination as soon as difficulties arise. The external assessment 
of cases by pathologists prior to any evisceration by technical staff is essential to 
avoid artefact in cases where suspicion arises following initial assessment of the 
case as non-suspicious. Pathologists without extensive experience of Coronial work 
and non-natural deaths in particular often have a low threshold for referral to a 
forensic pathologist but often the case has already been eviscerated by the 
technical staff and the case is then much more difficult to assess’. 
One HORFP commented that the mind-set of the non-forensic pathologist will guide him or her 
into believing from the outset that the case presented will be non-suspicious; 
 
‘The distribution of cases is changing as a result being homicide rich (which in the 
main is straightforward) and there is a decline in the borderline cases (which 
invariably are difficult). A circle of false reassurance develops. A routine 
pathologist will not touch a suspicious case so at the bottom of every coroner’s 
report by the police is ‘no suspicious circumstances’ to reassure the (non-forensic) 
pathologist. The routine pathologist for his 90 pounds will be presented with a 
bucket of mentally non-suspicious organs and ultimately deem it non-suspicious in 
turn reassuring the police. Police happy. X walks into the police station years later 
and confesses. Police blame pathologist somewhat dishonestly’. 
A common theme amongst HORFP’s was that non-forensic pathologists treat all autopsy 
examinations on the assumption that it will be a non-contentious coroner’s PM; 
‘It could be argued that the first pathologist should not have started the post-
mortem in view of the nature of the bruises present. This is perhaps a consequence 
of the common approach to coroner’s post-mortem where a detailed external 
examination may not be undertaken prior to opening of the body. However, the 
coroner’s history provided to the pathologist stated that there were no suspicious 
circumstances a non-forensic pathologist should not be expected to recognise 
marks of forensic importance. I would say credit is due to the pathologist for 
exploring her concerns as I suspect in many departments a case like this would just 
slip through the net completely’. 
A non-forensic pathologist gave an example of the pressure on them to continue with a non-
forensic autopsy even when their suspicions were aroused that it should be a forensic case;  
‘…there was a case of a man in his 40’s, a known drinker. I had been sent the case 
details, rocked up at 8am, looked at him and see that he has had a kicking. Having 
worked in A and E34 and things before, I knew that he looked like a man who had 
had a kicking and I thought I am not going anywhere near this. I called down the 
supervising consultant and he said that the man probably has bad clotting, it will be 
fine, there won’t be anything, don’t worry about it. It could be demographics - 
known drink and drug problem, but it is that sort of person who would have had a 
kicking. There was a complete reluctance. The default position is that it will fine, 
                                                             
34 Accident and Emergency Department in a hospital. 
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we’ll find something at the examination, we’ll do it. Nothing mentioned that it 
would be anything else’ (non-forensic pathologist focus group). 
One pathologist approached the researcher outside of the meeting and wanted to speak about 
a particular case that they did not wish to share with the rest of the group (although the 
interview was tape recorded and she was happy for it to be used in the study) at figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Case example from a Non-Forensic Pathologist 
“When I was a histopathology trainee, I was asked to perform a PM on an elderly lady. My 
educational supervisor did not want to be present and so left the mortuary. There were no 
suspicious circumstances and the case looked quite straightforward. On external examination 
of the body, I noticed bruising on the arms which looked like fingertip bruises. I called the 
consultant who explained that this was probably caused when an attempt had been made to 
resuscitate her. I continued her evisceration and found the hyoid bone in the neck had been 
fractured and surrounded by haemorrhage. I therefore called the consultant again who insisted 
that I must have caused this during the dissection of the neck. I denied that this was the case as 
the haemorrhage would require flowing blood. I was told to get on with it and so uneasily 
continued my examination. However, when I examined the arm, I noticed it was fractured in 
two. I then went to see the consultant who became angry with me and insisted the death was 
due to natural causes which is what went into the coroner’s report which he completed. There 
is pressure on pathologists to do a quick job which I feel uncomfortable with. It is in the 
interest of professionalism, the families and the court system, whether it be coroners or not, 
that it gets done properly. This is a human being still a human body and just because they are 
dead doesn’t mean that they don’t deserve the right to have a thorough examination. Many of 
the histopathologists I know turn up to work at 7.30 in the morning to bash out a few post-
mortems before they get to 9 o’clock and have to start theirs days’ work and that is the 
attitude, which you can kind of understand because that is how the system is set up, they can 
do that, but just as much as they would never send out a tumour diagnosis on live tissue unless 
they were absolutely sure because if that person got the wrong diagnosis, they got the wrong 
treatment, then the implications would be huge, they should allow the same level of scrutiny 
to the cause of death”.  
 
One non-forensic pathologist had noticed a shift in the types of cases coming to them. It was 
stated that all drugs related deaths used to go to HORFP’s, but these cases seemed to be going 
to non-forensic pathologists now. The stated reason was again, financial and that no additional 
training was given to non-forensic pathologists to identify suspicious cases. People who are 
brought in as drugs deaths are thought of a ‘tox’35 cases which are quick as there is no real 
pathology. In relation to the number of cases non-forensic pathologists conduct in coronial 
cases, it was universally agreed that they were all in their own time and usually before they 
commenced their NHS work at the hospital. The practice of the mortuary staff eviscerating 
bodies was also commonplace. One pathologist commented; 
                                                             
35‘Tox’ refers to toxicology. The examination of tissue to identify the presence of substances absorbed into the 
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‘You get the pathologist who comes down and fits in around other work, the APT36 
do eviscerations so that is done already; the pathologist has a cursory glance of 
the body and there is a little bucket of organs on the bench. They come down and 
do six (PM’s), the body has already been eviscerated, not much importance to the 
external observation’ (non-forensic pathologist focus group). 
Only one of this focus group could recall a case which they had spotted as a potential homicide 
which was eventually dealt with as such. This particular case was said to be non-suspicious 
because the deceased, although found dead in a bath and with head injuries, had no sign of 
break in at the house in which the body was found. He then called the coroner who in turn 
called the police but the police were insistent that it was a non-suspicious death, but 
eventually they agreed to pay for a forensic PM and it transpired that the deceased had been 
battered to death. This non-forensic pathologist commented that the police appear to be 
happy that it is non-suspicious if there is no sign of a break in to the property where the body 
is found. It was interesting to note that one pathologist stated that on average it took 20 
minutes to perform a coronial PM. However, when he was spoken to later he changed this to 
about an hour. This may have been due to peer influence. A common complaint was the 
information and history about the death they receive from the coroner which they considered 
insufficient. 
The results of the research will now be discussed in chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
36APT refers to Anatomical Pathology Technician. 
Chapter 8 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 133 
Chapter 8: Analysis and Discussion 
8. 1 The ‘Perfect crime?’ 
It has long been the material of crime writers and mystery films to depict stories setting out the 
‘perfect crime’ – a murder where due to meticulous planning and forensic awareness, the 
murderer can thwart the most skilled and observant detective. However, perfect murders cannot 
exist as once they are identified as a murder, the crime cannot be perfect. If they are not 
identified as a crime in the first place, they will never be investigated as such and someone will 
get away with murder. Without doubt these unidentified perfect crimes have taken place and will 
continue to do so in the future. These are impossible to research as we do not know whether they 
even exist. The research in this study does not consider these perfect crimes because it cannot. 
Though it does concern itself with those near perfect potential homicides which are not identified 
as such due to the quality of the initial scene investigation. 
It is the experience of police officers spoken to that most homicides are obvious from the outset; 
such as a knife wound; gunshot; a body outside a night club with many witnesses; the husband 
walking into a police station confessing to killing his wife. These cases are not problematic and 
most would fit into Innes’ (2003) ‘self-solvers’. These are not the ones identified by the skilled 
forensic pathologist or the scientist called to the scene. In most cases where a forensic pathologist 
conducts a PM in these obvious cases of homicide, the process is to confirm what the police have 
already established or suspected. The forensic examination has a treble purpose: the first is to 
establish a cause of death; the second is to retrieve trace evidence from the body, including 
samples for histological and toxicological examination; and the third reason is to attempt to 
disprove and therefore eliminate any possible defence that the death was in fact due to other 
factors. This is one of the reasons why some police forces in England and Wales insist on a 
forensic PM for road death cases which is not necessarily required in policy (ACPO, 2007). It can 
therefore be seen that even in the clearest cut case of homicide, the necessity of a forensic 
medical examination is still present. It is the type of case Innes (2003) describes as ‘whodunits’ 
which are more likely to be the focus of this research. It is those less obvious homicides which are 
more likely to go unnoticed and become a perfect crime. Failure to identify a murder can 
represent a miscarriage of justice as demonstrated in chapter 2 (Milne et al, 2010; Grieve et al 
2007). 
Five overarching themes emerged from the three strands of the research: 
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 The lack of a national police policy in dealing with scenes of sudden and unexpected 
death; 
 The lack of training for officers attending sudden and unexpected death; 
 The mind-set of those tasked with making decisions in the early stages of a sudden and 
unexpected death investigation; 
 The use of other professionals in advising the police as to whether the case is suspicious 
or not; and 
 Financial considerations. 
Each of these themes together with their constituent sub-themes will be discussed in turn. 
 
8.2 National Policy 
A clear national policy exists regarding the investigation, process and conduct of a homicide 
investigation as referred to in previous chapters in the form of the Murder Investigation Manual 
(ACPO, 2006) and the Guidance on Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures 
(ACPO, 2005a). There are numerous supporting documents to these main manuals. There are also 
well documented processes within the grey literature and policy in respect of how a crime scene 
should be managed and processed from the time of the discovery of a crime to the time the scene 
of the death is released by the police. However, there is little or no national policy in respect of 
the stage prior to the confirmation that a crime has been committed as evidenced in chapter 2 
and 7. This appears to be one of the most important shortfalls identified as part of the research. If 
the first actions at a scene are not performed correctly and in accordance with identified good 
practice, the risk of failing to identify homicides will continue as cases will be denied an expert 
medical opinion. Some police forces do have policies (Doyle, 2011) but as identified these are 
inconsistent and variable. A clear and standardised way of dealing with sudden and unexplained 
death is a natural extension to all the other measures adopted or imposed on the police service as 
outlined in chapter 2, such as the Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006), MIRSAP (ACPO, 
2005a) and the Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b) as well as legislative changes into the 
way the police operate such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) and the Criminal 
Procedures and Investigations Act (1996). Currently, the first of the ‘key information needs’ of an 
investigation as identified by Innes, (2002) and Maguire and Norris, (1992) of determining that a 
crime has taken place (see chapter 2) appears to be missing or at least unclear in policy.  
The most important elements of a national policy appear to be the process of dealing with a 
sudden and unexpected death, and the mind-set of the persons charged with decision making. It 
Chapter 8 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 135 
therefore appears appropriate to set out clearly what an attending decision maker needs to do at 
the outset of dealing with a sudden and unexpected death. There also needs to be systems in 
place to manage and overcome natural bias in coming to premature conclusions (Eyre and Alison, 
2007; Sanders and Young, 2003; Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa, 1998).  
To highlight the need for a national policy and to standardise decision making, one can look at the 
outcomes of the analysis of homicide and forensic PM data in chapter 5. The reason this ratio of 
forensic PM to homicide is important is that if police forces were deliberately reducing the 
number of forensic PM’s to save money or for some other reason, one might expect that the ratio 
may alter to less than 1:3. This assumes regarding the relationship between homicide and the 
number of PM’s. First, a reducing PM rate might result in a reduction of homicides as some would 
be missed. However, the numbers of missed homicides may be lessened by the fact that most 
homicides are obvious cases of ‘self-solvers’ and readily identified as such from the outset (Innes, 
2003). Therefore, by reducing the number of forensic PM’s, the police would still be holding 
autopsies for the obvious cases of homicide. The small numbers of the more ‘borderline cases’ 
which are the ‘whodunits’ (Innes, 2003) are more likely to be the ones missed. Because these less 
obvious cases are the ones more likely to be unidentified as homicides the numbers of missed 
cases will probably be less than the 1:3 ratio would suggest. The issue is that reducing the ratio to 
below 1: 3 is likely to increase the risk of missing homicides. If all cases were inquired into 
properly with high quality investigation and risk assessed at the scene in accordance with a 
national policy, the number of forensic PM’s would probably reduce thereby saving the public 
purse. However, there does not seem to be any evidence that the quality of scene investigations 
is generally high across the country from focus group evidence. The second assumption is that the 
number of homicide cases is falling but this may not necessarily be relative to the number of 
instances where people die in circumstances where there is a degree of suspicion regarding the 
cause of death. There is however a reasonable assumption that the homicide and forensic PM’s 
are relative to each other due to the historical and consistent ratio. The final assumption is that 
some police forces may have very different policies and practices (Doyle, 2011) whereby decision 
making is more robust in some police force areas compared with others which may account for a 
reduced number of forensic PM’s in some geographic areas. The data from interviews and focus 
groups failed to reveal any evidence which indicated any police force having more robust 
practices and procedures. One force claimed that the ratio of PM’s to homicide was low not 
because of money saving decisions or poor scene investigation, but due to close supervision of 
such cases. The force in question had the largest number of death investigations in the case study 
and continues to have further such cases reported where PM’s were stopped by non-forensic 
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cases in favour of forensic ones. This would indicate that the perceptions of managers as to the 
efficiency of internal systems may not be as effective as they believe them to be. 
The relationship between forensic PM’s and homicide at chapter 5 shown as a ratio is significant 
but to see variations, it was intended to examine the ratios individually of each of the police force 
area in England and Wales. This was not possible however due to the very small numbers in most 
forces. The police forces were thus grouped into five regions, by combining the existing ten 
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC)37 policing regions to achieve numerical significance. It was 
then possible to delve into each region to identify individual police forces where issues might be 
found. As can be seen from Region A, the ratio of forensic PM’s to homicide was high in terms of 
there being far more forensic PM’s per homicide than the national average. There would appear 
therefore to be a more cautious approach within all the forces in region A. Due to this, it is 
postulated that there is less likelihood of missing medical evidence leading to suspicion of 
homicide. Police forces having too many forensic PM’s evidence a risk averse decision making 
regime where resources are potentially wasted and reveal possibilities of savings both in terms of 
finance and personnel. There may of course be other factors at play in region A, but further 
research would be needed to establish the reasons for the ratio to be significantly different to the 
national average. 
The ratios of forensic PM’s and homicide seem to be fairly stable and reflect the national average 
in regions B, D and E, although in region D there may be variations amongst police forces due to 
the slightly higher ratios there. Region C was outwith the national average to a significant degree 
from 2012 up until 2014, showing that forensic PM’s had reduced as a ratio to homicides. This 
required more detailed analysis of each force within region C. It was also decided to look more 
closely at the forces in region D. It was interesting to note that police forces within regions C and 
D had been the subject of complaints from HORFP’s which was the driver for commencing the 
research in the first instance. 
Dealing first with region C, one force stood out as being the reason for the deviance with the 
national average. All other forces in that region, although numbers were low as to not be 
significant, did not reveal any clear evidence that they were at variance with the national average. 
The police force in question is referred to as ‘police force 4’. Between 2010 and 2014, the ratio for 
police force 4 was at significant variance to the national average, with 2012 to 2013 showing a 
ratio of one homicide for every two forensic PM’s. This force had several interesting factors which 
may relate to this. Firstly, the force was served by several HORFP’s which did not enjoy positive 
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three way relationships with the police and coroners. This was for a variety of reasons, but several 
complaints were received in 2008 regarding one of the pathologists which culminated in him 
being ‘struck off’ the Home Office Register in 2009. Further complaints were received regarding 
another pathologist in 2010 culminating in him being struck off in 2013. Three other pathologists 
resigned from the HO Register for various reasons. It could be that there was a breakdown in 
mutual trust between the police and the pathology team serving the police force 4 at that time 
which could have led to reduced usage of the pathologists. When the previous team of HORFP’s 
ceased to operate for that force, the current cadre of HORFP’s reported that they felt that their 
services were not be utilised appropriately. Because of this, in May 2013, the researcher 
contacted the force and explained the concerns of the HORFP’s that they were not being used for 
cases which were clearly suspicious and that the HORFP’s felt that this was for financial reasons 
and the force were attempting to save money. The information was received by the force which 
acted positively and set about reviewing their policy on the use of forensic pathologists. The 
situation continued to prevail with numerous complaints and examples of cases inappropriately 
being dealt with by non-forensic pathologists. The researcher therefore held another meeting in 
July 2014 between two HORFP’s and a senior police officer in the force. The two HORFP’s 
expressed their concerns and the situation was explained at length with statistical analysis and 
practical examples where homicides could have been missed. The researcher was informed that 
the new policy referred to after the 2013 meeting had now been implemented and that the force 
would ensure that the use of Home Office pathologists would be monitored and supervised. This 
action on the part of the force may be the reason for the fact that in 2015, the force was at 
exactly the national average and there have been no further complaints from the HORFP’s serving 
the region. It is interesting to note that this change of policy was adopted by the force and there 
was tacit acceptance that they were not using HORFP’s appropriately as evidenced by the change 
of approach. One wonders how many more homicides would have been identified as such in the 
five-year period from 2010 and 2014. It would be very difficult to research this further other than 
an estimate as it is notoriously difficult to recover reports and paperwork concerning deaths 
which were never recorded on the police crime recording database. It might be possible to use 
statistical data to form an estimate but due to the small numbers and the fact that homicide is not 
numerically constant, this exercise was not considered worthwhile. 
Analysis of the police forces in region D showed a similar pattern with one force, ‘Police Force 3’ 
having a larger ratio of homicides to forensic PM’s. The force was made aware of this and the 
ratio will be monitored going forward. However, the ratio is now nearing the national average. To 
see whether this phenomenon was to the two police forces, 3 and 4, which had attracted the 
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initial complaints from the HORFP’s and which were largely urban, two other large urban force 
areas were similarly examined, ‘Police Force 1’ and ‘Police Force 2’. Both were similar in make-up 
and demographics to police forces 3 and 4. As can be seen, police force 1 shows a very different 
picture with very low rates of homicide against forensic PM’s (between 1:4 and 1:5). There is 
therefore a case to explore this issue with the force to see if financial and resource savings could 
be made. Police force 2 was slightly lower than the national average ratio although in 2011 and 
2012, this situation reversed briefly. This may have been because of the initial impact of the 
spending cuts announced by the government just prior to that time, but this would need some 
further detailed analysis. The analysis of police forces 1 and 2 shows that the low ratio of forensic 
PM’s to homicide does not tend to be due to the size or urban nature of the police force, but 
could be because of internal policies and management of different forces, or it could be because 
of some very busy police forces being under strain of resources or financial constraints.  
To progress the formulation of a national policy a separate focus group was arranged in February 
2016 with the full cooperation and agreement of the NPCC and the College of Policing. This focus 
group consisted of 28 attendees from a mixture of police forces and representing all ranks, 
including police constables, supervisors as well as police managers, SIO’s and those responsible 
for managing forensic teams and holders of forensic budgets. All members of the group were sent 
a draft policy document prepared by the researcher consisting of all known aspects of dealing 
with an initial scene. This formed the basis of focus group activity and discussion. Views and 
experiences were fed into a plenary session facilitated by the researcher. The final draft 
document was agreed and can be seen at appendix 9.  
The draft national policy covers all issues identified in the three strands of the research but also 
broader issues so that the policy document was an all-inclusive reference document which will 
form the basis of the initial death investigation. It covers the following areas in figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Contents of the proposed National policy in respect of dealing with sudden and 
unexpected death 
 
ACTIONS AT THE SCENES OF SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED DEATH 
DEVELOPING THE STRATEGY  
STRATEGY CONTENT  
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY  
KEY ROLES  
INITIAL RESPONSE AND PRE-POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION ACTIONS  
CRIME SCENE ATTENDANCE  
MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE PATHOLOGIST  
VICTIM IDENTIFICATION  
TIME AND CAUSE OF DEATH  
THE POST MORTEM EXAMINATION  
EXHIBITS  
THE POST- MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT  
INTERPRETING POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION RESULTS  
DEFENCE AND SECOND POST-MORTEM EXAMINATIONS  
RELEASE OF THE BODY  
RETENTION OF MATERIAL AFTER POST MORTEM EXAMINATION  
DISPOSAL OF MATERIAL HELD ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE POLICE 
 
 
These topic areas were identified from the focus group discussions conducted as part of this 
study, failure to call the appropriate personnel to the scene to assist with decision making. Many 
of the CSI’s who participated in focus groups expressed the frustration of rarely being called to 
sudden and unexpected deaths. This same concern was not mentioned by any other of the 
categories of participants. The CSI’s argued that they had the specialist skills to assess a scene and 
routinely attended crime scenes, including suspicious deaths. They felt they would be able to best 
judge whether scenes were suspicious using their specialist skills. This fits with the fact stated in 
chapter 2 in terms of the numbers of cases a police constable is likely to attend being very limited 
and the arguments by Eyre and Alison (2007) that with little experience, no memory structure is 
built up. CSI’s would be more likely to develop a repertoire of responses as they would routinely 
attend sudden and unexpected deaths (Adhami and Browne, 1996). It appears therefore that one 
of the measures which could improve the quality of the scene assessment for sudden and 
unexpected deaths would be a policy of ensuring that CSI’s attend as a matter of routine in order 
that they can assess the scene whilst the police officer deals with other issues such as intelligence 
checks and interviews of family members and witnesses. This of course has resource implications 
in sending two staff to these scenes. 
There is a built-in irony therefore to this research. The initial driver for the research, namely a 
perception amongst HORFP’s that there were fewer forensic PM’s, may lead to the adoption of a 
national policy which if implemented, may lead to better quality scene investigation which may in 
turn lead to a reduced number of forensic PM’s. The success or otherwise of such a national 
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policy cannot however be judged upon the process of scene investigation leading to a successful 
prosecution. It must be judged upon ‘outcome success’ as well as ‘procedural success’ and 
‘preventative success’ (Brookman and Innes, 2013). It is hoped that the formation of a national 
policy will standardise and improve scene investigations; however, a national policy will achieve 
nothing unless its message is properly and efficiently trained to the front-line officers and 
supervisors. 
 
8.3 Training 
One of the most significant reasons cited for poor scene investigations from the focus groups was 
the lack of training given to front line officers who are the most likely to be deployed to sudden 
and unexpected deaths. This was supported by the findings of the case study. In some pockets of 
the country training was non-existent and in others at best patchy. It is fair to say therefore that 
training was reported as insufficient to equip those officers attending sudden and unexpected 
death to deal with the scene and make reasoned and informed decisions. Training therefore 
needs to be developed and given to all front line and supervisory police officers. This training 
needs to be standardised and consistent (Home Affairs Committee, 2016) in order that the quality 
of scene investigation is the same across England and Wales. Before a training package or learning 
descriptors can be developed, they must be based upon a standard and agreed national policy 
and also a standard operating procedure (SOP). The benefits of a SOP or ‘check list’ is shown to 
improve performance in many professions as described in chapter 1 (Gwande, 2010; Kahneman, 
2011; Meehl, 1954 and 1986). The importance of training to aid decision making is highlighted by 
Rossmo (2006) who identified the importance of study based training. Fahsing and Ask (2013) also 
identified that experience and training were the single most important safeguards against biasing 
influences which may affect decision making in the death investigation context. The specific issues 
which emerged during the research concerning the lack of training are summarised as follows:  
Inexperience and lack of training of first attending police officer; the inexperience and lack of 
training of police officers was one of the most significant issues identified in interviews with 
coroners and police focus groups. There appeared to be a general acceptance that the training of 
new police joiners in death investigation is limited. There were pockets of good practice and some 
CSI’s stated that they attend training sessions with police officers and teach them scene 
management. This was however a very mixed picture. The need to strengthen training provision 
echoes previous literature going back to Johnson (1969) who was critical of the lack of training in 
the 1960’s. Rossmo (2006) describes the single most important measure to improve decision 
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making as the training of officers. It therefore appears entirely sensible that there should be a 
nationally approved training package delivered to all police attenders and refresher training, 
supplemented by a simple standard operating procedure (Meehl, 1954 and Gwande, 2010) which 
guides officers through the basic process.  
The experience base of professionals was explored in chapter 2 and in particular Klein’s (1993) 
‘Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPM)’ was outlined. Experience enabled decision making 
by being able to allow clear assessment of the ‘typicality’ of the situation and act appropriately 
(Klein, 1993; Klein, 2008; Eyre and Alison, 2007, p. 215). In addition, those with experience made 
more correct decisions than those with less experience (Klein, 1993). See also Eyre and Alison 
(2007), Saunders (2001), Adhami et al (1996) and the Core Investigative Doctrine (ACPO, 2005b). 
Wright (2013) showed that skills, knowledge and experience influence the decision making of 
homicide detectives. Those with the greatest experience and knowledge base were better 
equipped to make intuitive decisions (Wright, 2013). Possibly more relevant to decision making at 
the scene of a sudden and unexpected death is the effect of ‘framing’ (Kahnamen, 2011), when 
the first attender is asked either ‘do you want the body recovered from the scene by the 
undertaker?’ or ‘what time do you want the body recovered by the undertaker?’ These two 
questions are addressing the same issue, but they are framed differently and under different 
pretences. The first, is framed in a more passive manner, leaving the decision to the officer, while 
the second implies that the body will be recovered from the scene by the undertaker which would 
not be the case necessarily in a suspicious death case. (A similar effect may be caused by ‘priming’ 
as discussed at chapter 2). 
Inexperience and training of police supervisors; the inexperience and training of police supervisors 
was similar to that of first attending officers. In the context of critical incident management, Eyre 
and Alison (2007) found that less experienced managers do not possess a complex memory 
structure which contains a broad repertoire of typical situations from which to generate first and 
best options and are more likely to be prone to error. Saunders (2001, p226) also found that 
police officers did not rely on a formal decision making process, instead responded in ways that 
they had done in previous similar situations. The shortfall of this experiential learning model is 
that when dealing with a relatively rare event such as a homicide, the repertoire of responses is 
likely to be more limited (Adhami, Browne and Laycock, 1996). In respect of the supervision of 
first attending officers, Dror (2013) discussed the effect of ‘base rate’ on the cognitive mechanism 
whereby the human brain gets used to base rate regularities which adjusts cognitive attention 
and processing. In the context of this study, a supervisor effectively scrutinising a junior officer’s 
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decision making by failing to objectively assess first decisions in favour of that presented on face 
value. A clear example of this was given at the senior officer focus group, where such base rate 
acceptance can affect the decisions of several layers of management. The supervisor can easily 
take on the hypothesis presented and through a process of confirmation bias, find evidence which 
supports that hypothesis to the exclusion of information that challenges that hypothesis (Brandl, 
2009).  
The lack of experience and training for police supervisors also referred to by Stelfox (2006), was 
postulated by CSI’s to be in part because of the push for promotion speared on by a preference to 
recruit graduates who by definition hold expectations of early promotion, but have not been 
exposed to the operational setting long enough to equip them with the knowledge and 
experience to supervise sudden and unexpected death investigations. There appears to be no 
academic research which supports this view, but it poses an interesting subject for future 
research. With a few exceptions, such as the SIO program and the management of public order 
situations offered by the College of Policing, it would appear that the suite of available training 
given to police managers tends to be leadership and management focussed as there is an 
assumption that the operational aspects are already mastered. The reason for this is that there is 
an emphasis on maintaining professional ethics and standards as well as influencing the change of 
police culture which were key to the setting up of the College of Policing (Neyroud, 2011). To 
expect a nationally approved training package specifically aimed at death scene investigation to 
be delivered to police supervisors and managers in the light of the political agenda focussed on 
cultural change and ethical standards would be ambitious, but a standard operating procedure 
would be equally relevant to supervisors as it would to first attenders. 
Quality of scene investigation; the two main areas concerning the scene investigation indicated by 
CSI’s, HORFP’s and coroners was the failure to preserve the scene and the failure to inspect the 
body for signs of trauma. The issue of reluctance to examine the body of the deceased was 
articulated by the CSI focus groups appeared commonplace (see Timmermans, 2006). This is 
possibly because of the lack of exposure that police officers have to the dead. It used to be 
standard for new probationer constables to attend PM’s to familiarise themselves with dead 
bodies, but this is now seen as in bad taste and overly traumatic to new recruits. Failure to 
examine the body supports that which Johnson (1969) found and indicates that this is not a new 
phenomenon. Complaints regarding the practice of police officers attending PM’s have led to it 
now being rare. Failing to preserve the scene again appears to come back to the issue of officer 
training. If the officer does not identify that the death may be suspicious, they will consider that 
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there is no scene to protect and therefore the question of investigative mind-set and keeping an 
open-mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) is crucial. Failure to properly assess the scene can be as 
a result of time constraints, stress, ambiguity, emotion, fear of being criticised and organisational 
culture which can lead to ‘premature closure’ of the investigation and ‘decision avoidance’ (Eyre 
and Alison, 2007). ‘Confirmation Bias’ can also be a factor (Kersholt and Eikelboom, 2007; Brandl, 
2009; Jones, 2014). This in turn can lead to ‘case construction’ or the opposite of ‘case denial’ 
where the investigation is led into ‘premature closure’ whereby an officer may rely on 
confirmatory evidence of an existing hypothesis (Sanders and Young, 2003) rather than 
objectively assessing all new evidence on its own merits. 
Failure to conduct background intelligence checks; a general observation was made concerning 
the lack of background intelligence checks made when police officers attended sudden and 
unexpected deaths. The failure of police officers to conduct background intelligence checks when 
dealing with cases was evident from the case study. Such checks are essential as intelligence can 
alert the attending officer as to factors which may influence the extent of the investigation at the 
scene. It is important that both the attending officer and the call takers are alert to the need to 
conduct such checks, not only to inform of known threats to the deceased, but also for health and 
safety reasons such as dangers inherent at the location of the body.  
The single most critical stage of the investigation into a death is the first ‘golden’ hour (Cook and 
Tattersall, 2010) where key decisions are made and actions put into train but these are down to 
the least experienced and trained officers. There are several examples of when training was 
shown to improve police performance in the past. The adoption of investigative interviewing 
(Clarke and Milne, 2001; Clarke and Milne, 2016) which has improved the quality and ethical 
standards in suspect interviews. 
Before a training package can be developed, it is necessary to have something on which to base 
the training and so the first stage was to write the national policy and from that develop the SOP. 
The use of guides to take a decision maker through the process of dealing with such incidents as 
sudden and unexpected deaths is described within the literature at chapter 2, but the work of 
Meehl (1954; 1986) who argues that the use of a ‘system’ is superior to that of relying on 
experience. Algorithms may be more reliable in that they are not susceptible to the ‘frailties of 
system 1 thinking’ (Kahneman, 2011). From examination of a variety of professions, the use of 
‘check lists’ prevents poor decision making by limiting the chances of making simple errors of 
judgement (Gawande; 2010). List however must be simple, with no more than nine items which 
Gawande (2010) claims is the maximum the average person can recall and reflect the language of 
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the relevant professional context. The use of such guides commonly referred to as a ‘standard 
operating procedure’ has been shown to be effective within police (for example Cook and 
Tattersall; 2010 and Jones et al; 2010).  
It is the SOP which is the focus of training. At the focus group formed to review the draft policy 
written by the researcher, the issue of a SOP was addressed and much of the time was spent in 
discussing the requirement of such a document. The plea from uniformed officers was for 
simplicity and brevity. The overwhelming opinion was that a SOP should be contained on a one 
page document and be linear in form or consistent with a simple phone app. The draft SOP was 
developed from the discussion and sent to all attendees at the focus group. It was sent out for 
consultation and refined. The final draft can be seen at figure 37. It is intended that this will be 
widely distributed to police forces and will form the basis of a training package being developed 
by the College of Policing. One will note the inclusion of the ‘ABC rule’ described at chapter 2 
(Cook and Tattersall, 2010). 
One of the major issues which must be addressed with any measures to improve the investigation 
of sudden and unexpected death was the mind-set of police officers which attend and deal with 
these cases. This is a difficult area to address but one which figured significantly in the findings of 
the research. 
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Figure 37: Standard Operating Procedure; Guidance on first actions at the scene of a sudden and 
unexpected death.  
 
 
8.4 Mind-set 
The influence of factors which can affect the ‘mind-set and thus decisions is well documented in 
the literature (see chapter 2). However, the seminal work of Kahneman (2011) and Dror (2013) in 
describing a number of biasing effects show that the mind set of police officers dealing with 
sudden and unexpected death are equally susceptible to external factors (see also Appendix 4). 
Heuristics can play a pivotal role in the outcome of these cases and no profession is exempt from 
the effects of bias, which includes ‘framing’ and ‘priming’ (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; Schvaneveldt, 1971). The taxonomy of biasing factors is described by Dror, 
Thompson, Meissner, Kornfield, Krane, Saks and Risinger (2015) as ‘Linear Sequential Unmasking’, 
a hierarchy of biasing influences which decision makers should attempt to restrict access to as low 
a level as possible within the taxonomy to reduce the biasing affect.  
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The overriding issue which has emerged from the analysis of the 32 cases was that all the 
deceased in the suspicious category were vulnerable in some way. Whether that vulnerability was 
through alcohol or drugs, was medical through physical or mental illness, older adults or 
situational through domestic violence. The fact that vulnerability in all the suspicious cases was a 
factor bears some comment. The multi-dimensional scaling analysis demonstrated a close 
association of vulnerability with both the confirmed homicide cases and the suspicious cases as 
well as the ‘grey’ cases. The analysis also showed a large spacing between the vulnerability factors 
and non-suspicious cases tending to suggest that there is a closer association between 
vulnerability and the suspicious cases than the non-suspicious cases. The sample size is too small 
to make claims that the police are more likely to treat a death as non-suspicious if the deceased 
was already a vulnerable person, and most of the correlations between factors are not strong but 
in this study vulnerability seems to be a factor which may affect the way an attending police 
officer views the death. This supports the findings of Harvard (1960) and Johnson, (1969). The 
existing vulnerability being the cause of death is not an unreasonable conclusion for the attending 
officer to make, as although dead people tend to have a vulnerability prior to death which may 
expose them more readily to the risk of death, a pre-existing vulnerability may also be a reason 
assumptions are made by those investigating the death. It is suggested that vulnerability instead 
of being the most obvious cause of the death, should in fact be an indicator signalling suspicion 
contrary to the principle of just going with the more likely explanation (O’Connor and Robertson, 
2005).  
Timmermans (2006) describes that there appears to be positive assumptions about death 
amongst most people. People are basically good human beings and therefore they have the 
benefit of the doubt as to whether a death involves a third person unless the circumstances of the 
death reveal an obvious homicide. It is therefore unsurprising that attending police officers at the 
scenes of these deaths may start with the presumption that they are not dealing with a homicide. 
There is a clear indication therefore that dealing with sudden and unexpected death is ripe for 
biasing effects where suspicious circumstances are not expected or assumed as a starting place 
for the investigation. This was further explored during the focus group stage of the research. 
Most sudden and unexpected deaths are quickly diagnosed as non-suspicious events and these 
tend to be people who are already ill in some way or that are under the care of either the health 
service or carers. These persons are probably considered to be the most vulnerable both in terms 
of their general standing in life and their life expectancy. As most deaths occur to this vulnerable 
group it is unsurprising that an estimated 75% of deaths are amongst cared for people 
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(Timmermans, 2006). People whose personal circumstances make them vulnerable may also 
make them the most likely to be the victims of homicide. Death by non-suspicious means is the 
most probable and the easiest explanation for a death. The attending doctor attends, issues a 
certificate and the disposal of the body, usually by cremation. The evidence of foul play is 
therefore lost forever. 
There are several categories of vulnerable persons who it is argued are more susceptible to being 
victims of undiagnosed homicide. This includes people who die under medical care who may be 
subject to medical negligence or poor practice; people in the care of family or institutions through 
old age or medical and mental disability may be subject of abuse, assault and victimisation 
through potential gain from the inherited estate. Also, young children are totally dependent upon 
parents who can be inadequate carers, or subject to neglect or assault (Brookman and Nolan, 
2006; Marks and Kumar, 1993; Vaughan and Kautt, 2009) albeit unintentional. Drugs users and 
addicts whether it be controlled substances, alcohol or ‘legal highs’ place themselves in self-
induced vulnerability exposing the possibility of death. These groups share an increased likelihood 
of death due to their vulnerability, but also they all share the increased chance of their death 
being written off because of that same vulnerability, and homicides being missed. 
A police officer attending a sudden and unexpected death is charged with investigating the 
circumstances of the death and identifying whether there may be third party involvement. The 
officer will be looking for any evidence to explain the death. The presence of a vulnerability will 
therefore be an explanatory factor in making a decision as to the cause of death. It is suggested 
that instead of a vulnerability being sought to explain the death, the mind-set of the officer should 
be such that the existence of a vulnerability should be a signal of suspicion. Rather than explaining 
the death, the vulnerability should be a reason to question the death. The maxim should be ‘the 
higher the vulnerability of the deceased prior to death, the higher the index of suspicion’. This is a 
big shift in the psyche and culture of the police service, which will not be easy to achieve. There 
are precedents for changing culture within the police service. The change of culture in the context 
of Investigative Interviewing (Clarke and Milne, 2001) regarding the purpose of the suspect 
interview from obtaining a confession to that of obtaining an account took many years and some 
may argue is still not fully embedded (Clarke and Milne, 2016). This change in the way a sudden 
and unexpected death is approached must be core to the training that police officers receive and 
must act as a signal for further inquiry. 
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It is not only police officers involved in the investigation of sudden and unexpected death. Other 
professionals have inputs into the decision making process and issues identified in their practice 
has also been identified within this research. 
 
8.5 Other Professionals 
Analysis was conducted as part of the case study to determine at what stage during the non-
forensic PM process was it halted in favour of a forensic PM. Expectations were that most would 
not even commence due to the non-forensic pathologist conducting an external examination of 
the body and discovering injuries. In fact, this was the case in only 12% of the cases. In almost half 
the cases the non-forensic PM was halted after the commencement of dissection but as soon as 
the pathologist realised that there were issues which they were not happy with. Perhaps most 
surprising was that in almost 40% of cases it was not until a later date that the forensic PM was 
ordered by the coroner due in the main to further information coming to light, either because of 
medical evidence or the coroner’s inquiry. In all but four cases forensic trace evidence on the 
body had been contaminated or lost due to the PM process and washing of the body. This is 
further evidence that even if the case is eventually identified as homicide, the consequences of 
identifying a suspect through forensic evidence are severely reduced as in the case of Una Crown 
and John Palmer as described in chapter 4.  
The main ‘other person’ involved in the case study part of the research was the non-forensic 
pathologist. It must be stressed that in the 32 identified cases, there were examples where the 
‘back-stop’ of the coroner’s PM worked. The pathologist identified that the cases were not 
straightforward and brought this fact to the attention of the coroner. There is a question as to 
how many cases occur in England and Wales every day where due to the quality of the PM 
process (Furness, 2006), and the lack of training given to non-forensic histopathologists leads to a 
homicide being missed? It is not possible to estimate the numbers of missed homicides that occur 
in England and Wales each year from the data collected in this study. It is possible to highlight 
that due to the current system of pathology delivery in England and Wales the risk of missing 
homicides is high. This heightens the importance of the police investigation at the scene and one 
is drawn to making the link that if the police make a wrong call, the homicide is highly likely to be 
missed by the non-forensic pathologist (Furness, 2006; Leadbeatter, Lucas and Lowe, 2014; Rutty, 
2006; Rutty and Bruno, 2016). The example stated in chapter 3 of a CSI describing multiple bodies 
eviscerated prior to the arrival of the pathologist who then conducts a superficial examination of 
organs is evidence of the dangers in reliance on the coroner’s PM. The practice of mortuary staff 
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eviscerating the body prior to an external examination by the non-forensic pathologist is one 
which should cease (Leadbeatter, et al, 2014). The Human Tissue Authority conducts audits at 
licensed mortuaries and does discourage the practice, but some non-forensic pathologists may 
take the view that if they have to do the evisceration as well as the organ examination they will be 
dissuaded due to the small coroners fee payable. There is no incentive for coroners to insist that 
the practice of mortuary staff eviscerating the body no longer takes place through fear of losing 
what is now a limited resource with non-forensic pathologists increasingly unwilling to do coronial 
work (Hutton, 2015). The use of a non-forensic pathologist to undertake a PM poses a significant 
threat to the criminal justice system (Jones, 2014). 
The current system of autopsy service provision compounds the problem (Hutton, 2015) in that 
the current two tiers of forensic and non-forensic pathology brings inconsistencies in what is a 
fragmented service. Hutton (2015) recommended a National Autopsy Service overseen by the 
Department of Health and run within the National Health Service. However, in the current 
financial climate such a service is unlikely to be funded. The real short fall is that no one ministry 
within the government ‘owns’ the problem of coronial non-forensic autopsy provision (Hutton, 
2015). Consequently no one organisation with governmental oversight is responsible for the 
issues identified in this research (Hutton, 2015). The first step in ensuring that there is a good 
quality coronial PM service in the future is ownership by a government ministry as only then will 
there be the political will to address the issues of recruiting, training and quality control of 
coronial pathology provision through a national system, which encourages histopathologists and 
rewards them for their work with a reasonable fee structure. 
Only the coroner can authorise a PM. Therefore, one might suggest that the coroner bears 
responsibility for all the cases which were suspicious and not treated as such. In reality however, 
the coroner acts only on the information he or she is fed by the police and so if the coroner is 
assured that the case is not suspicious, the coroner will usually take this at their word. There were 
three cases within the study where coroners questioned the police about their advice that the 
case was not suspicious. On all three cases the police assured the coroner and the coroner went 
with the police advice. Coroners were very quick to point out their reliance on the police for the 
decisions they have to make. 
Another professional involved at death scenes other than those invited by the police is fire service 
personnel and in particular fire investigation experts in cases where death occurs due to fire or 
contaminants. Although it is accepted that fire personnel are highly professional and trained, it 
was expressed by the CSI focus groups that their advice can be flawed and no substitute for the 
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presence of a forensic fire scientist. In such cases where fire is the likely cause of death, it is 
recommended that a scientist is called to the scene and in every case a forensic PM takes place. 
The reason for having a forensic PM is the possibility that the fire was caused in order to destroy 
the body and therefore evidence that death occurred due to foul play. 
A difficult area and one which police officers seem to misunderstand is the role of the police 
doctor, sometimes called a Force Medical Examiner (FME) when attending sudden and 
unexpected deaths. It is custom and perhaps for good reason, for FME’s to be called to all sudden 
and unexpected deaths for the prime reason to certify that life is extinct. That is not to certify 
death at that stage due to the fact they cannot issue a MCCD if they have not satisfied the criteria 
for doctor certificated deaths (Furness et al, 2015). In many sudden and unexpected cases, the 
fact of death is obvious to even a non-medically trained person. Such cases include bodies found 
which are decapitated or in a state of decomposition. Police officers seem to insist on calling the 
FME ‘in case they are not dead’. It appears that in cases where the officer is unsure that death has 
occurred, they should be calling an emergency ambulance as it could take over an hour for the 
FME to arrive at the scene. It is also evident from the case studies and from speaking to officers, 
that they seem to assume that the FME has forensic training which equips them to advise the 
police whether the death is suspicious or not. In fact, the FME will have no specialist training in 
forensics other than a general awareness of evidential contamination issues. The curriculum for 
FME training run by the College of Policing was examined and confirmation made that no scene 
forensic training is given or indeed appropriate. The training they receive equips them only for 
their main function to advise police of the suitability for questioning of arrested persons, and to 
obtain body fluid specimens under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In five of the suspicious 
cases within the study, the advice of the attending FME was unquestioned by the police and led to 
the wrong outcome. It is advised therefore that FME’s should not be routinely requested to 
attend the scenes of sudden and unexpected death. The police should confirm death using 
emergency ambulance staff if indeed such confirmation is required in the first place. It is accepted 
that the FME can be a useful liaison doctor to doctor with the deceased general practitioner who 
may be able to issue a death certificate due to known illness, but beyond this, it is recommended 
that the FME is not involved in sudden and unexpected death investigations. One might consider 
that it would be desirable for FME’s to be trained in forensic issues. However, the complexity of 
this together with the cost is prohibitive. The cost considerations in the current financial climate 
will always be a determining factor and was certainly raised in this research. 
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8.6 Financial Considerations 
In making the assessment of each case within the case study and as described in chapter 3, the 
three categories of ‘suspicious’, ‘grey’ and ‘non-suspicious’ were arrived at due to a collaboration; 
the conjoining of the views of the researcher and a colleague with two operational SIO’s. As part 
of the process, those cases where there was a divergence of view were discussed at some length 
and the main area of contention were those cases where the researcher considered to be 
suspicious but the SIO’s stated that from the circumstances their opinion was that from a 
resource perspective, they would not consider them as such. This may demonstrate a differing 
perspective from a retired officer who has been outside the world of policing for several years, 
and operational detectives who have been forced to prioritise in the light of budgetary 
restrictions caused by the recession from 2008 to the present time. This may also be an indication 
that financial pressures will and have inevitably influenced all areas of policing, including the 
investigation of death. Financial considerations may have been a factor in not treating some of 
the cases in the case study as suspicious as these were determined as such by more senior 
officers, although most SIO’s spoken to claimed that financial constraints were not a 
consideration in a death investigation. Cost however is unlikely to have been a factor in the cases 
where the officers at the scene made the decision that the case was not suspicious. They would 
not have an awareness of budgetary issues as the authority for the forensic PM in all forces comes 
from a senior officer. Clearly the HORFP’s were unanimous in their view that police budgetary 
savings were a major factor in decision making as to whether to hold a forensic PM. Indeed, all 
other groups forming part of the research considered that budgetary considerations were a major 
factor except the SIO’s who are at the end of the day the decision makers in respect of authorising 
forensic PM’s and hold the budget to pay the major part of the pathologists’ fee. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the SIO’s stated that budgets were not an issue, but they are in a difficult 
situation being required to ensure cases are properly investigated using forensic PM’s but at the 
same time being required to stay within tight forensic budgets. The overwhelming view stated by 
SIO’s was that death investigation was not an area to seek to save money due to the increased 
risk. There is some evidence in the cases analysed and certainly the perceptions of all other focus 
groups that money is a significant factor in decision making in some force areas. One can 
sympathise with police forces who are expected to save money due to cuts and it is therefore 
legitimate to look at savings in all spheres of police work. There is a difference in taking an 
informed decision as to whether to hold a forensic PM and taking a risk. It is recommended that 
the annual police force budget for forensic PM’s is ring fenced to remove the risk factor of saving 
money in cases of human death investigation. During discussion with both the CSI’s and the SIO 
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focus groups, the subject of a ‘staged fee’ system for PM’s was raised whereby the HORFP would 
be paid a smaller figure if the case did not transpire to be a homicide. This was immediately 
dismissed as it could be seen to be an incentive, real or perceived, for cases to be deemed 
homicide due to financial gain and which the defence could use in their favour.  
 
8.7 Other issues identified 
One of the ancillary issues which very strongly emerged was the view of almost all the 
participants in focus groups other than the CSI’s, that there are too many coroners non-forensic 
PM’s in England and Wales. The reason for this was not subject of the research but when one 
compares the numbers of PM’s in England and Wales, there are far more PM’s as a percentage of 
mortality than any other western country (Hutton, 2015; Cooper et al, 2007). The reasons for this 
were postulated as being due to non-medically qualified coroners wanting the reassurance of a 
medical expert (Tait, 2010) and a risk averse mentality not wishing to miss identify a homicide 
case (Cooper et al, 2007; Tait, 2010; Luce, 2003; Smith, 2004). There appears to be more reliance 
upon the medical report from the pathologist than the scene investigation from the police 
(Carpenter and Tait, 2007), which could be because of a lack of confidence in the police 
investigation. Perversely, the fact of coroners wishing to ensure no homicides are missed could 
actually increase the risk due to base rate cognitive regularity leading to expectations that cases 
are non-suspicious (Dror, 2013). Too many PM’s may lead to a mind-set that coroners PM’s are 
never suspicious and the vast majority are routine non-suspicious deaths. In addition, in these 
cases, if the police have no concerns one can see that the non-forensic pathologist will not expect 
or be prepared to identify a potential homicide (Dror, 2013).  
It emerged during the background research for the study that the statutory power of the coroner 
to take tissue at the PM had been omitted from the Coroners and Justice Act, 2009. In the 
previous legislation, there was a statutory power for coroners to take tissue at the PM for analysis 
for the purpose of the coronial inquiry into a death. The new act which came into force in July 
2013, repealed all previous coronial legislation but no such power for coroners was included. 
Technically therefore there remains no statutory power for the coroner to take tissue to assist in 
the determination of the cause of death. The police rely on section 19 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 for the power of seizure and so forensic cases are unaffected. Nevertheless, it 
appears to be a gross omission on the part of legislators to have missed the point that coronial 
power of seizure does not exist. This is especially so since the 1998 Human Rights Act whereby 
Chapter 8 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 153 
powers exercised by the state are deemed to be permissive whereby any act not allowed by law is 
deemed to be unlawful.  
It is worthy of mention that the purview of homicide has of recent years extended beyond that 
which was traditionally described as such. A good example of this is the relatively new concept of 
corporate manslaughter and the increasing instances of investigation of death where negligence 
and breach of care are considerations. Homicide is therefore broader than was hitherto the case. 
Historical reviews such as the Hillsborough Inquiry (Panel, 2012) are now interpreted in the light 
of both new evidence but also a differing legislative and social understanding of what is deemed 
to be an acceptable level of service by police and the authorities. The role of the forensic 
pathologist is therefore likely to increase to include these corporate and historical cases, if not at 
a PM, by a historical review of these types of cases. 
New forms of homicide also include the increasing number of allegations against professionals 
such as doctors in respect of a whole range of issues such as assisted suicide, euthanasia, 
mistaken medical treatment, negligence and experimentation with new techniques. In the USA, it 
is estimated that 44 to 98 thousand people die of medical malpractice per year (Timmermans, 
2006) and so the number of homicide investigations could increase. The role of the homicide 
investigator and the forensic pathologist is made more complex by such cases commencing with 
internal investigations within health care settings, self-regulation and lack of external scrutiny but 
also an assumption that if the death is in a medical setting the death must have been non-
suspicious (Timmermans, 2006).  
An interesting debate with the SIO focus group concentrated on the ‘idiosyncratic’ nature of some 
coroners. This was also commented on by Hutton (2015). This leads to a whole discussion beyond 
the scope of this thesis which is the role of the coroner. The role of the coroner as described by 
Knight (2008) is steeped in history (Palmer, 2012) for reasons connected with revenue collection 
and a system shared with many countries of the old British Empire. In the USA, there is a move 
away from appointing coroners towards medical examiners (Timmermans, 2006). Although, the 
American version of medical examiners is very different from the version that will operate in 
England and Wales (Furness 2012). The role could develop in North America creating a debate 
about the need for coroners in England and Wales, but coroners remain a very powerful group 
and so any real reform is not on the immediate horizon. It certainly appears that there could be 
more efficient systems of managing death investigations (Cooper et al, 2007; Berry and Heaton-
Armstrong, 2005) in England and Wales. As independent judicial appointees, coroners are without 
any performance or regulatory oversight short of judicial review, but the individualistic nature of 
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their decision making is likely to prevail (Carpenter and Tait, 2010; Mclean, 2015). The coronial 
system’s fitness for purpose in the twenty first century has been challenged repeatedly (Luce, 
2003). The Constitutional Affairs Committee38, when reviewing the draft bill that became the 2009 
Coroners and Justice Act was similarly critical in 2006 and the act itself, it is argued, failed to 
ameliorate the shortfalls in the system. There remains some significant cause for concern 
regarding the current coronial system (Hutton, 2015).  
In some parts of the country, especially the East Midlands area, it is commonplace for the police 
not to attend sudden and unexpected death. Several police forces have service level agreements 
in place with the ambulance service whereby paramedics called to the scene will make the 
assessment using a check list and if no pre-defined factors are found, the police are not involved. 
The paramedic will complete the coroner’s report and leave the body for the undertaker to 
collect. This raises more issues regarding the process and training of police officers as of course 
any such training must include paramedic and ambulance crew in those police areas where this 
policy prevails. 
There was debate amongst all the focus groups about the mind-set of the attending officer at 
scenes of sudden and unexpected death. The views differed between an ‘open-mind’ to that 
where suspicion should be assumed until proven otherwise. The consensus was that it should be 
the latter – assume the case is homicide until proven otherwise. The only group which tended 
albeit not unanimously, to prefer the attending officer to be open-minded as opposed to 
assuming homicide were the SIO’s. They considered that if all cases were commenced as 
suspicious, it would cause a risk averse element in decision making and would present a drain on 
resources. The SIO view appears to be well founded. The appropriateness of treating all deaths as 
suspicious from the outset when there are grieving families and a sensitive supporting authority 
figure is needed appears to be disproportionate. The mind-set is paramount, but to go into a 
situation with a pre-determined starting position that the case is suspicious appears to be as 
flawed as going in with believing the case to be non-suspicious. To start with either mind-set 
appears as dangerous for the outcome as the other. It is therefore recommended that the starting 
point for an investigation into a sudden and unexpected death is one of an ‘open-mind’. Although 
one might argue strongly that there is no such thing as an open-mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981) in the context of the investigation of sudden and unexpected death, the nearest we can 
                                                             
38 Reform of the coronial system and death certification: Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/902/902i.pdf 
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aspire to is reliance on a standard operating procedure and better training rather than a ‘gut 
feeling’. 
 
8.8 Answering the Research Question 
This research set out to answer the following question; are decision makers at the scene of 
unexpected deaths utilising the services of Home Office Registered Forensic Pathologists 
appropriately, thereby reducing the possibility of missed homicides? The sub questions were; 
How are decisions about whether to undertake a forensic post-mortem made, and what are the 
key influences upon these? 
Why aren’t forensic post-mortems commissioned when they should be? 
What are the implications for policy and practice that can be distilled from the findings? 
This question is an important one; as Baca (2001) identified, the investigation into the death of a 
fellow human being is surely one of the most fundamental responsibilities and legal39 
responsibilities for the authorities to fully investigate. There can be no greater priority for the 
police, the criminal justice system and indeed society than to identify crimes of homicide and 
bring those responsible to justice.  
This research was concerned with the initial scene investigation in a sudden and unexpected 
death and the quality of that investigation in identifying homicide cases. Without a high quality 
initial scene investigation, there may be no homicide investigation, and no justice for families and 
indeed exposing the public to further threat from killers potentially at large amongst the 
community. There is a dearth of research into the pre-homicide death investigation (Stelfox, 
2006), which is left to junior officers or non-police, untrained individuals.  
This thesis has demonstrated that there is significant evidence that the services of HORFP’s are 
not being utilised in all cases appropriately. Whether ‘appropriate’ is deemed to be failing to use 
their services in cases where their expert medical opinion would have identified suspicious cases, 
but also where from the divergence of practice throughout forces in England and Wales, there 
could be over-use thereby expending public resources unnecessarily. The thesis is primarily 
concerned with the former, because the over use of forensic opinion in cases does not increase 
the risk of missed homicides and thereby miscarriages of justice. All three elements of the mixed 
method study indicated that there is a significant risk of missing to identify cases of suspicious 
death. The statistical analysis at chapter 5 shows inconsistencies in decision making between 
                                                             
39 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 and Human Rights Act 1998. 
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police forces whereby some under use of HORFP’s heightening the risk, whereas some are 
indicative of over use. The case studies show clear evidence from real cases of flawed decision 
being made in almost half of the cases identified in the sample and the focus group interviews 
demonstrate clear differences in approach between police forces together with a lack of structure 
as to how decisions are made. 
This research has demonstrated that ‘how’ decisions are made at the scenes of sudden and 
unexpected death are subject to a number of key influences which include the mind set of 
decision makers whether that be through the various biasing effects the human mind is subject 
to, including ‘framing’ and ‘priming’ as well as simple lack of training and a standard way of 
operating. These influences undoubtedly affect the decision made at the scenes of sudden and 
unexpected death and those flawed decisions are accountable for why HORFP’s are not utilised 
when they should be. In addition, the more sinister and concerning influence of financial 
considerations were clearly evidenced by the focus group interviews. 
The implications for policy and practice are therefore clear. The formation of a standard national 
policy with a simple but comprehensive standard operating procedure which overcomes the 
influence of bias in its many forms as well as removing the temptation of using death investigation 
as an area for financial savings is essential. The case also to introduce standardised and quality 
training for officers dealing with death scenes is also overwhelming. This thesis puts forward the 
case for these measures to be put into place immediately.  
This research using the methodology described in chapter 3 is the first of its kind in respect of 
dealing with death and the factors which can affect decision making, in particular the biasing 
effects investigators are subject to. It therefore provides a unique insight into death investigation 
and adds to the body of knowledge not previously researched. If the investigation at the early 
stages is insufficient, poor or ill-considered, the possibility of missing a homicide will exist; if the 
wrong call is made, someone may get away with murder – a fatal call. 
  
8.9 Limitations of the Research 
As with much research, there will be limitations as to what can be claimed as being the truth and 
thus applicable to the wider world. It will always be the case that police forces fail to inform the 
Homicide Index of cases, and it will always be the case that pathology group practices fail to notify 
the Home Office of PM numbers. Therefore, the statistical data produced from official statistics 
are the best that are available. 
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The case study consisted of 33 original cases. Since the commencement of the research further 
instances where non-forensic PM’s have been stopped in favour of forensic PM’s have been 
identified. Up until the time of writing, a further 230 cases have been identified but not yet 
analysed. From this study, it is estimated that there are approximately 100 cases per year. 
Therefore 33 cases are a small sample and not necessarily representative of all the additional 
cases. If it were representative, taking the percentage of the 32 cases used in the case study, 
extrapolating this over 100 cases per year, this would reveal almost 50 cases of potential missed 
homicide per year where the police could have made erroneous decisions. This would also 
indicate amongst the 100 cases at least 30 confirmed homicides. No such claim is made however 
in this study, but these additional cases must be examined to see if the same issues prevail. It will 
be interesting to analyse these cases and to see whether with the training and the 
implementation of a national policy, the numbers of such cases reduce in time.  
The main limitation with the case study element was the fact that it was not possible to interview 
the actual decision makers in each case. Doing so would have potentially revealed specific data in 
respect of each case and would have enhanced the intimate knowledge with those who were 
faced with decisions. Interviewing the actual decision makers could also have revealed a defensive 
response which could have clouded the real issues identified. It may be that the analysis of the 
additional 230 cases might include interviews with the actual decision makers. For this to happen, 
each of these additional cases might have to be sent back to the respective forces to review 
internally. However, the analysis of these additional cases is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Another limitation of the case study was that the decisions on the part of the researcher as to 
what was a suspicious case and what was not was that of opinion. Although an independent 
verification process was used, another researcher using the same cases may form different views 
and thus altering the outcomes.  
Focus groups will always have limitations as to whether participants say what they believe or 
think or whether they go along with the crowd. This research using this method is no different. 
However, the use of multiple focus groups using different participants for the CSI groups does go 
some way to mitigate the limitations and increasing the significance of the general themes which 
emerged.  
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8.10 Future Research 
There are a number of areas which this research has identified which require further inquiry and 
already referred to within this thesis. One of these is an in-depth analysis of those police forces 
which have a below average number of PM’s to homicide to identify factors which have caused 
this. The contrary is also an area of future research whereby an in-depth analysis of those police 
forces which have an above average number of PM’s to homicide to identify factors which have 
caused this. Particular to the financial issues identified within this study were the effect on 
investigations and therefore research is required into an analysis of the spending cuts within 
police forces on forensic budgets to establish the effect and the risk. It is pointless in introducing a 
new initiative without properly evaluating whether it is working or whether it needs adjusting. 
Therefore, should the proposed national policy and standard operating procedure be 
implemented there should be a timely review of the impact of the National Policy and Standard 
Operating Procedure on the quality of initial investigation of sudden and unexpected death. 
Similarly, there should be a review of the effectiveness of the new training given to front line 
officers and supervisors to assess whether it is appropriate to skill them in the management and 
supervision of dealing with operational decision making and especially death investigation cases. 
Finally, the additional 230 cases identified since the original 33 in the case study should be 
reviewed and reported upon and future such cases monitored to see if over time, the instances of 
cases being referred to a non-forensic pathologist inappropriately reduce. This will provide 
perhaps the best barometer for assessing the effectiveness of the measures taken to improve the 
investigation of sudden and unexpected death. 
 
8.11 Recommendations 
Because there is no governmental oversight of non-forensic pathology services in England and 
Wales, the profession operates in a vacuum and as Hutton (2015) identified, it will continue to 
diminish, denying coroners with the ability to properly function. The system of delivery of non-
forensic pathology services in England and Wales therefore needs to come under the ambit of a 
Government Department with Ministerial responsibility. Coupled with this, the government should 
consider the recommendations within the Hutton Report (Hutton, 2015) of forming a National 
Autopsy Service and combining the two strands of forensic and non-forensic pathologists. Only 
with a national service will there be proper oversight and strategic planning of the service for the 
future. The government through the Ministry of Justice should review the omission of coronial 
powers from the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and seek to implement by legislation powers of 
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coroners to take tissue from the deceased to assist with their investigation into the cause of death 
in non-suspicious deaths. There is a convincing case that the practice of mortuary staff 
eviscerating the body of the deceased prior to the visual inspection by the pathologist should 
cease. This practice can have the effect of removing any possibility of identifying homicides and 
will certainly destroy trace evidence from the body prior to visual inspection by the non-forensic 
pathologist. In addition, the use of untrained doctors and force medical officers should not 
routinely be deployed to scenes of sudden and unexpected death and should play no part in the 
investigation. On the theme of attendance at scenes in cases where fire or contaminants is a 
contributory cause of death which remains suspicious, a forensic scientist should be called to the 
scene instead of reliance on fire scene examiners. In order to protect the current forensic budget 
from the temptation to reduce expenditure of police forces, the annual forensic budget for 
forensic pathological examination of the dead in suspicious cases should be ring fenced by each 
police force in accordance with annual average calls for service. Current police policy and practice 
advise on dealing with sudden and unexpected deaths should be reviewed and the new policy 
identified as part of this thesis in the form of ‘Practice Advise’ at appendix 9 should be adopted by 
the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing and become national policy on how 
to deal with sudden and unexpected deaths. Coupled with this practice advice all police joiners 
and supervisors should receive training in how to deal and manage the scenes of sudden and 
unexpected death. This training should be based upon a Standard Operating Procedure for dealing 
with such cases.  
 
8.12 Final Comments 
In conclusion, although the system of homicide investigation in England and Wales appears 
robust, well trained and embedded into policy, the investigation at the initial scene of a sudden 
and unexpected death is variable and will lead to the potential to miss a homicide. It cannot be 
estimated how many homicides are missed each year, but this study has shown that it is not 
unreasonable to assume that some will be missed and become ‘perfect crimes’. By not dealing 
with the scene appropriately and making well informed unbiased decisions, the investigation is 
denied the expert opinion of a Home Office registered forensic pathologist and therefore 
increases the risk of missed homicide. The adoption of a national policy on how to deal with death 
cases, along with a standard operating procedure and good quality training to front line officers 
will hopefully improve the investigation by giving police officers the tools to make better 
judgements and decisions – to make a fatal call and stop people getting away with murder. 
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Appendix 1: History of the Coroners System in England and Wales 
 
The Coronial System: A Short History 
The system of death investigation in England and Wales is complex and its origins based in history 
and commonly referred to as the ‘coronial’ system (Knight, 2008). The coronial system was 
established in England during the reign of Richard 1st (Knight, 2008). The word ‘Coroner’ was 
derived from the original title of ‘Crowner’ and their purpose was primarily the collection of 
revenue to support King Richard’s conquests in the Holy Land. This was done by establishing an 
inquisition into the death of a person and recovering any assets due, but also enquiring as to the 
cause of death with a view of identifying cases of murder and in particular suicides. Suicide was an 
offence against god and therefore all assets of the deceased were taken by the state and became 
the property of the King (Knight, 2008, p. 3). 
The origins of the ancient office of ‘coroner’ appears to be lost in time, but the standard textbook 
about the law and practice of coroners known as ‘Jervis on Coroners’, states at the beginning ‘the 
office is of such great antiquity that it’s commencement is not known’ (Jervis, 1829). The first 
known reference to the office of coroner was formally established in England by Article 20 of the 
‘Articles of Eyre’ in September of 1194 to ‘keep the pleas of the Crown’ which effectively meant to 
investigate a criminal offence against the crown which included murder and suicide (Knight, 2008, 
p. 5). A description of the coroners duties at the time Edward I became King in 1272 was as 
follows:  
“The office and power of a Coroner are also like those of a Sheriff, either judicial or 
ministerial, but principally judicial… and consists, first, in inquiring, when a person is 
slain or dies suddenly, or in prison, concerning the manner of his death. And this must 
be upon sight of the body; for if the body be not found, the coroner cannot sit. He 
must also sit at the very place where death happened, and the inquiry must be made 
by a jury from 4, 5, or 6 of the neighbouring towns over which he is to preside. If any 
be found guilty by this inquest of murder or other homicide, the coroner is to commit 
them to prison for further trial and must certify the whole of his inquisition, together 
with the evidence thereon, to the Court of King’s Bench, or the next assizes.” 
(Blackstone, 1879, p. 347). 
Due to the fact that the coroner could not try a person for a crime, the suspect would have to 
await the next time the ‘assizes’, or in other words, the judges and their court visited the 
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coroners jurisdiction. This was the periodic visit of the Kings judges or what would now be 
referred to as ‘Circuit Judges’ to visit that part of the country which was often a wait of many 
years. The job of the coroner was to record the facts of each case, examine the body and report 
this to the Judges, a process known at the time of ‘keeping of the pleas’ (Knight, 2008). The Latin 
for this term was custos placitorum coronas which is where the word ‘crowner’ and ‘coroner’ was 
derived. When a body was found, the person who was the ‘first finder’ was required by law to 
commence a ‘Hue and Cry’, which was the commencement of the search for the murderer. 
However, complex rules emerged and the coroner fined those who had not obeyed them, thus 
securing another source of revenue for the King. This led in many cases to people hiding, burying 
or even dragging bodies to another area in order that no fines were levied in the community 
where the body first lay (Knight, 2008). There was a requirement that all males over the age of 12 
years had to come to the coroner and assist with the decision as to what had happened to cause 
the death. This was later amended to include nominees of communities and was the basis of the 
jury system we have now (Knight, 2008). Part of this process was to establish the ethnic origin of 
the deceased, or as was known as ‘Presentment of Englishry’; or in Wales ‘Presentment of 
Welshry’. This was to identify whether the victim was a Norman or Saxon. If the deceased was a 
Norman, the Saxon community had to pay a ‘murdrum’ fine. Clearly the word ‘murder’ is 
linguistically derived from this expression (Knight, 2008). 
By the 1700’s coroners were severely underpaid; they were not required to be medically or legally 
qualified and received no additional fee for conducting an inquest unless the case was a murder 
where a conviction was secured. Only on conviction was a coroner entitled to a proportion of the 
convicted persons goods and chattels. This system naturally encouraged corruption and neglect. 
Many murders were never investigated at all (Forbes, 1978). However, from 1738, a fee was 
payable to coroners for an inquest ‘Duly Held’ but an inquest was not considered duly held unless 
there were obvious signs of violence. The medieval system of death investigation invited the 
concealment of murder (Harvard, 1960 p. 38) but it was not until 1836 that coroners were 
permitted to pay for a medical opinion as to the cause of death (Knight, 2008). However, the costs 
of autopsy and the inquest was from the coroners own pocket for which he had to request 
reimbursement (Harvard, 1960). The reimbursement process required the coroner to provide 
evidence of his expense under oath. Justices were reluctant to award reimbursement in cases 
other than homicide and so there was a built-in motivation for cases to be disguised as murder. 
Child homicide was commonplace due to the poverty of the time and burial clubs emerged which 
further encouraged the murder of children by parents with the favourite method of child killing at 
Appendices 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 163 
the time was laudanum and other opiate preparations. There was little risk of detection (Forbes, 
1978). 
In 1860, the County Coroners Act placed coroners on a salary and the number of inquests and 
counts of murder at the behest of coroners increased significantly. In 1874, medical practitioners 
became legally obliged to fill out a death certificate if they attended a patient at their last illness. 
The call for coroners to be suitably qualified either in law or medicine was championed by Thomas 
Wakely, who was the first medically trained coroner for London in 1839 (Forbes, 1985). The 
responsibility of collecting revenue for the King ceased in the 12th century, but little changed in 
the role until the middle of the 19th century when it became almost exclusively concerned with 
the investigation of the cause of death. 
The primary role of a coroner in modern times therefore, is to enquire into the death of a human 
being within their jurisdiction. Their role was directed by several statutes and rules but has now 
been consolidated into current legislation under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 1 of 
the Act defines the primary role of the coroner to investigate a death where the body lies within 
their jurisdiction if:  
a) The deceased died a violent or unnatural death,  
b) The cause of death is unknown, or  
c) The deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. 
In practical terms, this is any death where a medical practitioner cannot issue a Medical 
Certificate of Cause of Death (MCCD). 
The purpose of the coronial investigation is to establish who the deceased was, how, when and 
where the deceased came by his or her death, and the particulars (if any) required to register the 
death (Fairbairn, 2014). The detailed guidance as to the role of the coroner is set out in the ‘Guide 
to Coroners Services’ (MoJ, 2014a). 
Coroners are independent judicial appointees and are paid and funded by local authorities. Their 
governmental oversight lays with the Ministry of Justice and since July 2013, all newly appointed 
coroners must be legally qualified. This new requirement may be counterproductive as it may lead 
to unnecessary autopsies being ordered by legally qualified coroners, nervous about calling the 
cause of death because they are not knowledgeable about medical issues (Carpenter and Tait, 
2010, p. 207). Carpenter and Tait (2010) claim there is an over reliance on the medical reports 
from the pathologist rather than the scene report outlining the circumstances of the death, 
resulting is more focus on the science rather than the investigation. This is due to the perceived 
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superiority of the ‘scientific’ medical evidence verses what is seen as less scientific circumstantial 
and physical evidence from the police investigation at the scene (Carpenter and Tait, 2007, p. 209-
10).  
This over reliance on autopsy demonstrates a risk averse approach which is driven partly by a fear 
of missing homicides. If the coroner makes the call without the PM, and it is wrong, it is the 
coroners fault. If a post mortem is conducted and the outcome is wrong, it is the pathologists 
fault (Carpenter and Tail, 2010, p. 214). The existence of this risk averse attitude of coroners is 
supported by Luce, (2003, p. 70) and Smith (2004, p. 284). Over reliance on the medical cause of 
deaths can lead to less consideration as to why the death occurred, which the medical evidence 
cannot reveal (Carpenter and Tait, 2010, p. 216).  
The 2009 Coroners and Justice Act created the post of ‘Chief Coroner’ whose main responsibility is 
to provide support, leadership and guidance for coroners in England and Wales. The 2009 Act also 
introduced the concept of Medical Examiners. This was due to recommendations of Dame Janet 
Smith in the 2003 public enquiry which took place following the conviction of Dr Harrold Shipman 
for murdering what is estimated to be at least 215 of his patients dating back to the 1970’s 
(Smith, 2003). The necessity for Medical Examiners was reinforced by the Francis Inquiry into Mid 
Staffordshire Foundation Trust (Francis, 2010) and the Kirkup Inquiry into the Morecambe Bay 
disaster (Kirkup, 2015). It was recognised that the quality of the MCCD reports completed by 
doctors was flawed (Fernando and Nottingham, 2012; James and Bull, 1996; Roulson, Benbow 
and Hasleton, 2005; Slater, 1993 and Swift and West, 2002). The Medical Examiners system, 
unlike the system of the same name in other jurisdictions40, will not replace coroners, but acts as 
an oversight second opinion for all deaths except those which are deemed to be suspicious from 
the outset. It is still unclear how Medical Examiners when appointed will interact with coroners 
but speculation was made by the interim National Medical Examiner, Professor Peter Furness for 
which the title of his lecture to the Medico-legal Society in 2012 sums up the possibilities; 
‘Mutualism, Commensalism or Parasitism?’ (Furness, 2012). The system of Medical Examiners has 
been piloted in various parts of the country and a review of these pilot studies found that the 
quality of death certification by doctors improved, there was more consistency of reporting to 
coroners where a doctor could not issue a certificate and a better liaison with next of kin. In one 
pilot area, the medical examiner altered the MCCD in 83% of cases and in another site 33% 
required ‘major changes’ (Furness, Fletcher, Shepherd, Bell, Shale and Griffin, 2015, p. 11). Figure 
1.1 appears complex but in fact the medical examiners system will improve the quality of death 
                                                             
40 Medical examiners in the USA take on a dual role of pathologist and decision maker replacing the coroner. 
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investigation and assist to reduce the potential for missed homicide and will take place prior to 
registration of the death. 
Figure 1.1: Medical Examiners system. 
 
The reason that the coroner is an important figure in the potential for homicides to be missed, is 
because of their gate keeping and decision making role in death investigations which are not 
certified by an attending doctor. Because only the coroner can authorise a post mortem 
examination under Section 14.1 of the Coroners and Justice Act (2009), any erroneous decision 
leading to a missed homicide may be shared between the police and the coroner. However, the 
coroner does rely on the police report and opinion in making directions as part of their 
investigation. If the police investigation at the scene is inadequate, the decision making thereafter 
may be flawed (Carpenter and Tait, 2010, p. 206). There are political influences which can shape 
the decisions of professional death investigators, especially when suicide is suspected where 
there is great pressure to reclassify for the sake of grieving relatives (Timmermans, 2006, p. 75). 
Another area of external influence relates to terminally ill people where the euthanasia debate is 
often encountered. It can therefore be seen that there are outside influences to decision making 
other than the actual evidence from the scene and at autopsy. There are also social issues which 
can affect an investigation into a death such as a reluctance of some police officers to examine a 
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dead body or do not know what to look for (Timmermans, 2006 p. 41). There may be objections 
to the invasive post mortem process on ethical or religious grounds (Hutton, 2015). 
There have been a number of academic studies in relation to shortcomings in the current coronial 
system, none of which have been ‘fixed’ by the 2009 Coroners and Justice Act, which introduced 
largely cosmetic changes and has been viewed by many within the system as a missed 
opportunity (Cooper, Leigh, Lucas and Martin, 2007). The deaths caused by Dr Harold Shipman, 
the Marchioness disaster and the Alder Hay tissue scandal all highlight that the system is not 
water tight (Berry and Heaton-Armstrong, 2005). Although there have been several reviews 
dating back to 1920, there has been no significant change in a system which is embedded in 
history (Palmer, 2012, p. 64).  
Whatever the shortfalls of the coroner system, the main reason for the coronial investigation is to 
identify suspicious deaths where third party involvement is suspected, in other words ‘homicide’. 
If the coroner’s inquest cannot identify a cause of death, the jury will normally return what is 
termed and ‘open verdict’ – this means that the cause of death cannot be established and doubt 
remains as to how the deceased came to their death. There were over 1700 open verdicts in 
England and Wales (MoJ, 2016, p. 23) and although the majority tend to be possible but unproven 
suicides, this is the arena where unidentified homicides are most likely to be found.
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016.  167 
Appendix 2: Murder Investigation Process (ACPO, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW 
Objective is to constructively evaluate to 
ensure it conforms to national standards, 
is thorough, has been conducted with 
integrity and objectivity, to ensure no 
investigative opportunity has been 
overlooked and to identify good practice. 
ACPO Crime recommend the below 
format for Reviews 
1)  Initial action 
2)  Intelligence 
3)  SIO Policy file 
4)  Planned method of investigation 
5)  MIR 
CHARGE  (+ Post Investigation) 
CPS liason 
OIC 
Remand file 
Bail applications 
Case file 
Witness issues 
Graphic presentation of evidence 
 
PLANNING Action upon 
arrest (Suspect and HA) 
Soc/scientist (this is the 
other half of the scene) 
Three tier search of address  
(forensic, CID, Polsa) 
House to house 
FSS urgent submissions 
  
 
 
RECEPTION 
Photograph suspect 
Inspect for injury by Dr 
Always check prisoners’ 
property-look closely at 
watches, rings, and 
shoes for blood 
evidence 
Feedback to SIO 
INTERVIEW 
PEACE model 
Offence 
Defence 
Adviser 
Special warning 
Disclosure 
Monitoring 
PACE 
Time clock 
Reviews 
Supt review 
Extensions to custody 
Administration of 
applications 
IDENTIFICATION 
(prepare early) 
Witnesses 
ID Officer 
ID parade/Promat 
Video 
Street 
Confrontation 
FORENSIC 
 
Intimate sample 
Non-intimate samples 
Authority 
DNA premiums 
Fingerprint search 
Medical examination 
IN CUSTODY (the issues below require early planning)  
DISCOVERY of 
CRIME 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF 
INFORMATION 
Either obvious Major Crime 
OR 
Declared Major Crime by Senior 
Detective  
INSTIGATE MAJOR 
ENQUIRY 
Decide paper or HOLMES 
Location of room 
Initial resources 
EITHER 
1) Full HOLMES 
2) Mini Squad 
 SIO & D/SIO 
 DS inside 
 DS outside 
 DC 
 CSM/CSC 
 Disclosure/exhibits 
 Explain MIRSAP 
Compliance 
PERMISSION/AUTHORITY 
D Supt 
Coroner’s Officer 
HO Pathologist 
Location PM 
Resources PM 
Information from PM 
Photograph clothes FAST TRACK ACTIONS 
1) How is control of scene 
established? 
2) What is initial evidence? 
3) Who needs immediate 
interview? 
4) Lateral evidence grab - CCTV   
mobile data etc 
5) Family contact 
6) Search arranged 
 
7)   Flash House to house 
 
8)   Intel systems checks 
 
SCENE MANAGEMENT (see 
SOC Policy)  
1) Initial callout 
2) Control of scene 
3) Assessment 
4) Arrangements 
5) Removal of body 
6) Post Mortem 
7) Dealing with suspects 
8) Recovery of Forensic 
evidence 
9) Preparation for arrest 
10) General considerations 
11) Three tier search 
12) Leaving scene 
13) Development of evidence 
UPDATE CORONER 
Sudden death report 
Update regularly 
Second PM /release 
of body 
Retention of tissue – 
PACE or Coroner? 
SCENE ASSESSMENT 
1) Location - why? 
2) Victim - appearance 
3) Weapon used/left 
4) Blood pattern and 
distribution  
5) Force and locus of wound 
6) Sexual activity 
7) Ancillary activity 
8) Evidence of 
violence/struggle 
INITIAL DECISIONS  
Commencement of Investigation plan 
Establish Policy in Policy book in 
respect of: 
1) What is being 
investigated 
 
2) Why paper or 
HOLMES 
3) Location of room 
4) Structure of Squad and 
staffing 
5) Initial lines of enquiry 
6) Define scene area 
7) Scene security briefing 
8) Family liaison 
9) Witness support plan 
10) House to house 
11) Search Parameters 
12) Action in event of  an 
unplanned arrest 
13) Arrest policy, officer 
safety.   
14) Tactical interview 
management 
15) Finance application 
16) TIE policy and level of 
approval 
17) Initial press position 
and media 
management 
18) Indexing policy , PDF, 
and Sequence of 
events 
19) Sensitive material 
policy 
20) Intelligence strategy 
21) Call handling from the 
public 
22) Forensic Strategy 
23) Briefing Strategy 
24) Intelligence Unit 
FAMILY LIAISON   
1) Keep informed and record 
contact 
2) Manage liaison officers and 
ensure they are fully briefed 
3) Use Victim Support 
4) Recorded strategies should 
include: 
 Objectives 
 Decision about released info 
 Requests by family not acceded 
to and complaints by family 
 Lay advisory and intermediaries’ 
policy/Exit strategies 
5) Deploy to suspects family? 
 
COMMUNICATION PROCESSES 
Squad briefings -minuted 
Internal - Senior CID/ACPO 
Media Crimewatch/reconstruction’s 
Forensic fully involved 
Circulations internally 
Road checks-heightens local 
awareness with public 
Patrol Officers’ updates 
Internet 
Expert Conferences 
LINES OF ENQUIRY 
(Specify in Policy Book) 
VICTIM   
1) History/background/habits/photo 
2) Sequence of events victim 
3) Witnesses/video of movements 
SUSPECT  
1) Description 
2) Behaviour/MO/databases 
4) Method of elimination 
5) Informants/surveillance -RIPA 
6) Witnesses 
SCENE(S)   
1) Identify, secure, protect 
2)   Sequence of events scene 
3) Significant witnesses 
4) Physical evidence recovery 
CHECK 
PIRENNIAL 
ACTIONS 
ADMIN 
1) C/Complaint 
2) Internal 
 briefing 
3) Crimsec 7A 
NPIA 
Accredited specialists 
Behaviour 
Research analysis 
Profiler 
Scene assessment 
Advice re available databases 
 
FORENSIC Directed via Forensic 
management team (SIO, CSM, FA) 
1) Identify Urgent submissions 
2) Second stage submissions 
3) Office manager/Exhibits officer 
and exhibits review policy  
 
a) Define what doesn’t 
fit 
b) Investigate 
coincidences 
c) Test the logic of 
inferences 
 
d)   Hypotheses  
SCENE COMPLETION 
1) SIO approve 
Forensic completion 
2) CID search for 
relevant non- 
forensic evidence 
3) Polsa search for 
hidden evidence  
IMPORTANT CHECKS BY SIO 
Is the Paper flow within the 
Process/HOLMES system compliant with 
MIRSAP-?  
Double check messages  
Statements -  read statements - do they 
self-audit? 
Are statement read documents held up 
in  trays awaiting actions to be raised. 
Is the Holmes full prioritisation of actions 
(1,2,3,) required?   
Actions outstanding - is the team doing 
the important actions? 
Is analysis leading to conclusions? 
 
Completed actions - do they answer the 
question? 
Actioning of initial messages - double 
check them 
Effective analysis - is more than charts 
on walls? 
 
Confirm actioning process of H to H 
forms 
Examinations completed by Forensic 
provider - clear minuted conferences 
prevent misunderstanding 
Outstanding fingerprints/DNA-
understand the matrix of checking and 
what databases have been checked 
DNA on database 
No value marks - all have a value to the 
investigation 
Development of Forensic evidence- 
Is the Policy working between Office 
Manager, Exhibits Officer and SOC? 
Review Photographs/video of scene 
 Examine all exhibits and how actions are 
raised to progress them. 
Timely review of exhibits  
SCENE DISPOSAL 
Preferably retain and 
alarm, then clean and 
release 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
(Commence within 4 hours) 
1) Acknowledge impact 
2) Assess impact generally in 
collaboration with external 
agencies 
3) Manage impact on 
community and/or minority 
groups 
4)   Concerns of family should     
be adequately and 
sensitively addressed  
5) Liaise with Community 
6)   Community 
meetings/leaflet drop etc 
7) Communication Strategy 
 
CURRENT SITUATION REPORT 
1) Scenes  
2) The victim 
3) The investigation 
4) Suspects 
5) General 
 (ACPO crime 1998+ MIM Ch 12) 
HMP 
Within 28 days of 
sentence for a homicide 
offence the SIO will 
send a full detailed 
report to HMP Lifer Unit 
ACPO Protocol (Aug 
1999) 
INQUEST 
Police report 
for Coroner 
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Appendix 3: History and Development of Forensic Pathology in England and Wales 
 
History and Development of Forensic Pathology 
in England and Wales 
Background and definition 
Forensic Pathology is perhaps the most significant profession within the generic title of forensic 
medicine. All forensic pathologists in England and Wales must be medically qualified and 
registered with the General Medical Council. Forensic pathologists have a background in science 
as well as medicine and their discipline brings together the three areas of medicine, science and 
the law. Forensic physicians (‘police surgeons’) as well as other medical professionals such as 
histopathologists who deal with the microscopic examination of tissue, neuropathologists 
(disorders of the brain) and paediatric pathologists (disorders of infants and children) may also 
work within the criminal justice system.  
Pathology has origins in the ancient Greek word 'Pathos' which means 'suffering' and 'Ology' 
which translates to mean 'science or other knowledge'. 'Forensic' is defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as 'Relating to or denoting the application of scientific methods and techniques to the 
investigation of crime'. 
The British Association in Forensic Medicine which is the professional association for forensic 
pathologists in the United Kingdom and Ireland define forensic pathology thus; 
 Forensic pathology is that branch of medicine which provides the investigation and 
interpretation of disease and injury for courts of law — the use of primarily 
pathological knowledge in criminal investigations and other enquiries, particularly in 
establishing the cause of injuries or death.  BAFM from 
http://www.bafm.org/#!about/c240r 
Sir Sidney Smith the famous Professor of Forensic Medicine at the University of Edinburgh defined 
Forensic Medicine ‘...as consisting essentially of that body of medical and paramedical scientific 
knowledge which may be used for the purposes of administration of the law’ (Smith, 1951).  
Alfred Swaine Taylor defines medical jurisprudence as 'that science which teaches the application 
of every branch of medical knowledge to the purpose of the law' (Madea and Argo, 2014). 
However perhaps the most succinct definition is from Schmidtmann (1905) as 'forensic medicine is 
Appendices 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 169 
a cross sectional discipline of medicine and natural sciences dealing with all medical evidence that 
is relevant for law'. 
  
Origins of forensic medicine 
Forensic Pathology probably originated from the first time that civilianisation was reached with, 
on one hand a recognisable legal system, and the other an integrated body of medical knowledge 
and opinion (Madea and Argo, 2014). However, the earliest records of the two coming together 
probably date back some five thousand years, when early records began. 
The ancient Egyptians were probably the earliest known exponents of medicine as depicted in 
Papyri. From these it can be seen that there was a system of law and a body of medical 
knowledge as early as 2500 B.C. 
Possibly the first medico-legal 'expert' may have been Imhotep who was the Grand Vizier, Chief 
Justice and Physician to King Zozer. He was also the architect of the first Great Pyramid at Sakkara. 
There is evidence that bodies were medically examined to identify the cause of death, and an 
extensive knowledge of toxicology was apparent (Smith, 1951). Imhotep is argued by some 
historians to be the same person as the Bible describes to be Joseph, son of Abraham (Sweeney, 
2001).  
The ancient Greeks added significantly to the body of scientific medical knowledge largely due to 
Hippocrates (460-377 BC), and driven by such issues as would have been of concern to the courts 
of the time, such as the viability of children born before full term pregnancy and culpability in 
terminating life in both the born and unborn child. Hippocrates was an ancient Greek physician, 
and regarded as the ‘Father of Medicine.’  He is thought to have written a collection of treatises, 
which were organised into a single work called the Corpus Hippocraticum. This is believed to be 
the oldest surviving medical book.  It describes dissections of animals, the results of which 
permitted analogies to the human body to be drawn.  In his attempt to describe the human body, 
Hippocratic’s made use of external observation only as autopsies at this time were not permitted 
as the body of the deceased was regarded as sacred. 
A Greek physician, Herophilus of Chalcedon (335-280 BC) is regarded as the first physician to do 
autopsies on a regular basis, performing some of them in public, 
One early documented medico-legal opinion of death was the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 
B.C. when a physician gave a view that of the 23 wounds inflicted by the assassins, only one which 
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penetrated the chest was of a fatal nature. Another such case was that of Germanicus who died in 
the year A.D. 19 where medical opinion differed, one side claimed that he was poisoned whist the 
other contended that he had died of heart failure. 
The Byzantine post Roman era brought the Justinian enactments between A.D. 529 and A.D. 564. 
These were known as the 'Justinian Codes' and provided for inter alia the regulation of the 
practice of medicine; surgery; midwifery; proof and competence by way of medical examinations; 
classes of physicians that were to be recognised; limitations on the number allowed to practice in 
each town and penalties for medical malpractice. This was the first known time that the medical 
profession was regulated with recognised standards and competency. These laws created the 
principle still relevant in the UK today of ‘Medici non sunt proprie testes, sed majus est judicium 
quam testimonium’. This translates to mean that the medical expert is not affiliated to either side 
but there to assist the court by impartial interpretation and opinion. (Smith, 1951; Madea and 
Argo, 2014).  
In the thousand years following the demise of the Roman Empire, there appears to have been no 
real development in forensic medicine or any development in medicine generally or in scientific 
thought throughout the western world. Indeed, this period saw the religiously motivated legal 
resolution of ‘crimes’ by widespread use of torture and trial by ordeal. 
 
Later development-European and Eastern Asia 
In Italy during the 12th century, physicians were used to determine medical issues for the courts 
and in the case of murder, three experts were sent to examine the body to determine the cause 
of death and the type of instrument used to inflict the injuries; a physician, an apothecary and a 
surgeon (Madea and Argo, 2014).  
Town charters were issued for Italian Towns between the 11th and 13th century which 
determined that two experts, generally a physician and a surgeon were responsible for post 
mortem examinations.  
 In Bologna, the town charter directed that a medical expert must be at least 40 years of age and a 
citizen for at least 10 years. This seems to be the earliest formal process in the medical 
investigation of death (Madea and Argo, 2014). 
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In the first half of the 13th century, a volume was produced in China which documented the 
procedure to be followed in the investigation of death. This was called ‘Hsi Yuan Lu’ which meant 
the ‘washing away of wrongs’ and translated by Prof H A Giles (1905). This text has been updated 
several times over the ages but it is understood that it remains a comprehensive medico-legal set 
of instructions for the determination of the causes of death, including signs of violence. It is 
unclear as to whether the early manuscripts are a true reflection of modern interpretations, 
however it is clear that the ancient Chinese were far more advanced in the medical determination 
of death than other cultures. The translation by Giles quotes: 
'A forensic medical doctor must be serious, conscientious, and highly responsible, and 
must also personally examine each dead body or that of a wounded person.  The 
particulars of each case must be recorded in the doctor’s own handwriting.  No one 
else is allowed to write his autopsy report.  A coroner must not avoid performing an 
autopsy because he detests the stench of corpse.  A coroner must refrain from sitting 
comfortably behind a curtain of incense that mask the stench, let his subordinates do 
the autopsy unsupervised, or allow a petty official to write the autopsy report, leaving 
all the inaccuracies unchecked and uncorrected.”  In addition, he also wrote: “Should 
there be an inaccuracy in an autopsy report, injustice would remain with the 
deceased as well as the living.  A wrongful death sentence without justice may claim 
one or more additional lives, which would in turn result in feuds and revenges, 
prolonging the tragedy.  In order to avoid any miscarriage of justice, the coroner must 
immediately examine the case personally.'  
In Europe, the first state to introduce a systematic penal code was probably Germany. In 1507 the 
Bishop of Bamberg introduced the ‘Bamberger Code’ and pronounced that the code was to be 
followed within the early Germanic Empire. It directed that medical testimony must be obtained 
for the guidance of judges in cases of murder, wounding, poisoning, hanging, drowning, 
infanticide, abortion and all cases involving injury. (Smith, 1951. p 602).  
The first course at a University Centre in Forensic Medicine was taught at the University of Lepzig 
in 1642 but in the 17th and 18th centuries it was mainly within German Universities that 
development of forensic medicine took place, followed by France and Italy where forensic 
medicine developed along with the foundation of Universities with medical faculties. Bertrand 
Ludes (2008) claims that modern forensic medicine was born with the creation of three new 
Faculties of Medicine in Paris, Strasbourg and Montpellier after the French Revolution. 
Development of Forensic Pathology in Britain 
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In the United Kingdom, the development of forensic medicine lagged behind that of France and 
Germany. The reason for this may be because there was a reluctance to put technical evidence to 
a jury who it was thought might not understand it.  On the continent of Europe which generally 
operated a different legal system, judges were vested with the investigation under the 
inquisitorial system and were in a better position to make use of the expert opinion (Madea and 
Argo, 2014).  
By the end of the 18th century, Scotland lead the way in the UK by establishing professorships in 
forensic pathology at Edinburgh and Glasgow Universities and by 1837, no less than 37 British 
medical schools provided courses in forensic medicine. The subject was made obligatory for each 
medical school in 1836. The first known English language book on legal medicine was published in 
1787 by Samuel Farr. It was entitled 'Elements of Jurisprudence'.  In 1789, Professor Andrew 
Duncan of the University of Edinburgh gave the first lectures in an English-speaking University on 
legal medicine.  His son, Andrew Duncan jnr. was appointed to the first Regius (appointed by the 
Crown) chair in Forensic Medicine at the University of Edinburgh in 1807. In 1857, a chair of 
Medical Logic and Medical Jurisprudence was established at the University of Aberdeen in 
Scotland.  Francis Ogston, who had been lecturing on Medical Jurisprudence since 1839, was 
appointed to the chair.  He was the author of 'Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence' published in 
1878. 
The most prominent early name in forensic medicine was that of Alfred Swaine Taylor who was 
appointed as the first Professor of Medical Jurisprudence at Guy’s Hospital and St Thomas' 
Medical School in 1834.  He was the author of “Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence,” 
which was published in 1865.  This textbook was considered the standard of its time and 
remained so for years through continued revisions. 
The most famous forensic pathologist in the UK was Sir Bernard Spilsbury. Born in 1877, he 
received acclaim for many cases and the strong way in which he delivered his expert evidence to 
the courts. In October 1905, he was appointed resident assistant pathologist at St Mary's Hospital 
when the London County Council requested all general hospitals in its area to appoint two 
qualified pathologists to perform autopsies following sudden deaths. 
His first case which made him into a household name as the 'Great Pathologist' was the case of 
Hawley Harvey Crippen also known as Dr Crippen. He was accused of the murder of his wife Cora 
Crippen in January 1910. Crippen was convicted of the murder in October 1910 and later hanged 
largely on the evidence of Spilsbury who had testified to the court that a piece of abdominal skin 
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recovered from their home in Camden Road, London was that of Cora's, and identified due to a 
scar. Another of his many cases was the infamous Brides in the Bath case when three women had 
died mysteriously in their baths; in each case the death appeared to be an accident. George 
Joseph Smith was the suspect in all three murders and was brought to trial for the murder of one 
of them, Bessie Mundy and later hanged on conviction. Spilsbury testified that since Mundy's 
thigh showed evidence of goose skin, and since she was, in death, clutching a bar of soap, it was 
certain that she had died a violent death. This was the first time that the death of two other 
women in similar circumstances was used as 'similar fact' evidence in English law.  
Spilsbury was the pathologist in the Brighton trunk murder cases. Although the man accused of 
the second murder, Tony Mancini, was acquitted, he confessed to the killing just before his own 
death, many years later, and vindicating Spilsbury's evidence. Spilsbury also played a crucial role 
in the development of Operation Mincemeat, a deception operation involving the planted body in 
Spain of a servicemen with fictitious details of an allied invasion in Southern Europe, thereby 
deceiving the enemy during World War II which saved thousands of lives of allied service 
personnel (Macintyre, 2010) 
His cases were documented in the book 'Bernard Spilsbury, Famous Murder Cases of the Great 
Pathologist' (Browne and Tullett, 1982), although there are many other texts on Spilsbury and his 
cases. 
The Home Office historical register of forensic pathologists lists Spilsbury as the first Home Office 
Pathologist, although it believed that there were several before him but not documented on the 
register. Spilsbury gained much of his experience from three of his colleagues at St Mary's hospital 
and who are believed to be the founder members of modern forensic medicine; Dr A. P. Luff; Dr 
William Willcox and Dr A.J. Pepper.  
In order to properly investigate murders, the police required expert medical advice and to this 
end, Spilsbury was paid a retainer by the Home Office to assist with scene visits and conducting 
the autopsies in murder investigations not just in London, but also the rest of England and Wales. 
The fee varied from case to case but he received £100 per year retainer for upkeep of his 
laboratory. The coroner’s fee at that time was 2 guineas but Spilsbury averaged an annual salary 
of around £3000.  
In later years, Spilbury's dogmatic manner and his 'unbending belief in his own infallibility' 
(Goldsmith, 2007) gave rise to criticism. Concern was expressed about his invincibility and 
unwillingness to alter his opinion in court and it is now clear that his dogma lead to miscarriages 
Appendices 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 174 
of justice. Many of his cases were exposed in a book by Andrew Rose called 'Lethal Witness' 
(Rose, 2007). He found that Spilsbury would come to conclusions regarding a case and would 
resist a change of opinion, even in the face of contrary evidence. However, he was such a 
respected and charismatic character that few judges challenged him. Lord Goldsmith, the then 
Attorney General gave a speech to the Academy of Expert Witnesses on 25th January 2007 
entitled 'Expert Evidence - the Problem or the Solution?' when he referred to the Spilsbury cases; 
"One particular issue was whether we should accord to experts the deference that in the past we 
had. There is nothing new in this. Some will remember, at least by account, Sir Bernard Spilsbury, 
who acted in the case of Dr Crippen, the Brides in the Bath Murders and the Brighton Trunk 
murders, amongst many very famous cases. Juries were in awe of him and he was considered 
invincible in court. Yet, even in the later years of his life (he died in 1947) judges began to express 
concern about this. His dogmatic manner and unbending belief in his own infallibility gave rise to 
criticism and some research has indicated that his inflexibility led to miscarriages of justice." 
(Goldsmith, 2007). 
Burney and Pemberton (2010) commented how Spilsbury's performances in the mortuary and the 
courtroom 'threatened to undermine the foundations of forensic pathology as a modern and 
objective specialism'. Their criticism centres around his insistence on working alone, his refusal to 
train students, and an unwillingness to engage in academic research or peer review. These 
features today are recognised to be detrimental in medical practice. This they claim, 'lent him an 
aura of infallibility that for many raised concerns that it was his celebrity rather than his science 
that persuaded juries to credit his evidence over all others'. Spilsbury held himself in such high 
esteem that he is reputed to have once said 'I have never claimed to be God—but merely his 
locum on his weekends off' (Dalrymple, 2010).  
Dr David Foran and a team of researchers at the Michigan State University re-examined 
Spilsbury's slides taken from the remains found beneath the cellar floor in Crippen's home and 
concluded that they were not those of Cora Crippen. Writing in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, 
he quotes; 
 
'In this study, genealogical research was used to locate maternal relatives of Cora 
Crippen, and their mitochondrial haplotypes were determined. Next, one of the 
pathology slides of the scar was obtained, DNA was isolated, and the haplotype was 
determined. That process was then repeated. Finally, both DNA isolates were assayed 
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for repetitive elements on autosomes and repetitive elements specific to the Y 
chromosome. Based on the genealogical and mitochondrial DNA research, the tissue 
on the pathology slide used to convict Dr. Crippen was not that of Cora Crippen. 
Moreover, that tissue was male in origin'. (Foren et al, 2011). 
Sir Sydney Smith, another great contemporary and forensic pathologist of the time described 
Spilsbury as 'very brilliant, and very famous but fallible and very obstinate'. He later also 
commented 'One might almost hope that there will never be another Spilsbury'. 
Spilsbury committed suicide in at his laboratory 1947 having been for some time in a depressed 
state as well as in poor health.    
 
Development of training and structure 
A significant development in the training of doctors occurred in 1933 when forensic training 
became obligatory in the medical curriculum. This ensured that there was a degree of knowledge 
amongst all doctors and provided a sound base on which qualified doctors could consider a career 
in forensic medicine if they decided to specialise.  
The term 'Home Office List' (of Forensic Pathologists) was first introduced in 1944 and included 
only those who practiced for police forces outside of London. They were given a choice of either a 
retaining fee or a case fee payable by the respective police force (Home Office, 1989). Each 
pathologist was attached to a laboratory of the Forensic Science Service (FSS).   
More famous pathologists succeeded Spilsbury in the post war years. Professor Keith Simpson of 
Guy's Hospital and Professor Francis Camps of the London University hospital, both holding the 
position of 'Home Office Pathologists'. 
Simpson in 1950, along with Francis Camps and Donald Teare, also a Home Office pathologist 
formed the Association of Forensic Medicine which was later to become the British Association in 
Forensic Medicine (BAFM). Professor Sydney Smith of Aberdeen University, was asked to be the 
first president of the Association. 
Simpson authored his biography in 1978 'Forty Years of Murder' (Simpson, 1978) in which he 
documents some of the many famous cases in which he was involved. These include the 1949 
Acid Bath Murders committed by John George Haigh and the murder of gangster George Cornell, 
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who was shot dead by Ronnie Kray in 1966. A plaque to his memory was erected outside his 
Simpson's London home in 2012 by the Royal college of Pathologists. 
Francis Camps of the same era also dealt with many famous cases including the 1953 exhumation 
of Beryl Evans after John Christie confessed to her murder and when many other bodies were 
identified at 10 Rillington Place. He reported on numerous deaths from carbon monoxide 
poisoning, which had accounted for nearly half of all suicides in Britain in the 1950s when coal gas 
was widely available in many homes until in the 1960s when it was progressively replaced by the 
less toxic natural gas: the suicide rate in Britain fell by almost a third and has not risen since. 
Camps also had a biography written about his cases and in it he claims to have conducted over 
eighty-eight thousand post mortems (Jackson, 1975)41.  
One pathologist who served in London with Camps time in the late 50's and early 60's describes 
him 'with fag in his mouth, did 40 PMs a day. He never saw many of the bodies he conducted PMs 
on. The mortuary staff eviscerated the body and he just examined the organs!' This pathologist 
describes that he did not get paid anything for PM's at that time, 'the police called you out and the 
University got the coroner’s fee'. He describes much professional jealousy existing between the 
pathologists at the time, especially between Camps and Simpson and 'it was fairly well known in 
fact that they hated each other'. 
A retired pathologist also working in London recalls what remains the worse train disaster in 
British history, the Harrow and Wealdstone Railway crash in 1952. In all, 122 passengers and crew 
perished when a London-bound express train from Perth ploughed into the back of the 0731 
Tring-Euston commuter train as it was about to leave Harrow and Wealdstone station on the 
London Midland region line. Seconds later, a third train coming from Euston crashed into the 
wreckage. He recalls how he was having dinner with Camps at the time when Francis Camps was 
summonsed to attend the mortuary. The bodies were piled up outside. Camps had his secretary 
‘Stella’ take notes whilst Camps performed a perfunctory PM on each one. He had completed all 
the PM’s by the following morning. He was insistent that he did not require any assistance and 
claimed afterwards that his fee would pay off his tax bill. 
However, by the time of the Lewisham Train Disaster in 1957, the authorities had learnt from 
their mistakes in dealing with large scale fatalities and one of the pathologists serving at the time 
describes the way in which the victims were managed and the mortuary run due to the efforts of 
the police and the coroner. Another retired pathologist who worked with Camps described that 
                                                             
41 It is interesting to note that the claim of 88000 post mortems assuming a career of 40 years equates 
to mean average of 6 post mortems per day working every day in that 40 years without a day off. 
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he never took notes and would stay awake by using amphetamine. However, this appears to have 
been commonplace at the time amongst the pathologists as well as many other professionals. It 
was not a controlled drug in those days. He recalls that Camps always use to say "crime does not 
pay. At least it does not pay the pathologist!" 
Another retired trainee of Camps describes leaving the police force as a medical practitioner and 
wanted to be a forensic pathologist. He did so without any specialist qualification and was 
employed by Camps on the spot. He indicated that the courts tended to accept the evidence a 
pathologist 'pretty much without question unlike these days'. Describing what it was like serving as 
a forensic pathologist in London in the early 60's he recalled that it was extremely busy. To his 
knowledge, no less than seven forensic pathologists had committed suicide during his career, 
including Spilsbury. 
 
Home Office Register 
In the 1950’s, forensic pathology services were delivered by 10 specialists in London together with 
about 30 other pathologists who covered the rest of England and Wales. Those outside London 
were all associated with a branch of the then Forensic Science Service which had been set up in 
1935/6. They were not employed by the FSS but the Director of each FSS establishment would 
nominate local pathologists to go onto the Home Office list. Collectively they examined an 
average of 1400 dead bodies thought to have died in circumstances which were ‘suspicious’. 
Roughly half of the forensic pathologists in England and Wales were drawn from University 
departments and half from the Health service and appeared on a ‘list’ held by the Home Office 
and known as ‘Home Office Pathologists’. For this they were paid a retainer of about £1000 per 
year (Knight, 1985). This figure had risen to £1685 by the mid-eighties. There was reluctance from 
the London based pathologists to go on such a list, preferring to be paid on a fee per case basis. In 
that way, there was at that time a two-tier system, however the list was necessary for England 
and Wales outside London to document and identify those pathologists with sufficient knowledge 
and training to assist in police cases. Speaking to other retired pathologists from the 60's, notable 
comments were "We were called Home office pathologists but I don't think there was a register as 
such, the Home Office register was an invention of the media I think'. 
Speaking of the quality of the police investigation and in particular the quality of the post mortem 
process; 'There were probably many missed homicides, because the standard of coroner’s 
autopsies was very poor. Not much better now I think'. 
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Another famous pathologist of the period from the 60's to the early 90's was 'Taffy' Cameron. 
Cameron was another protégé of Camps and was involved in many high-profile investigations 
including the death of Rudolph Hess in Spandau Prison in his capacity as Senior Honorary 
Consultant in Forensic Medicine to the Armed Forces; the Turin Shroud and Maria Caldwell, which 
was one of the most significant early cases highlighting the plight of abused children. He was 
pathologist for several the East End gangland murders of the time involving infamous gangs such 
as the Kray's and the Richardson's. One controversial investigation in which he was involved was 
the so called 'Dingo Baby' case in which Lindy and Michael Chamberlain claimed their baby had 
been killed by a dingo near Ayres Rock, Australia in 1982. Lindy was eventually convicted in 
connection with the death but her conviction was eventually overturned when Cameron's 
evidence was brought into question. Cameron too has a biography written about his cases 
(Tullett, 1986). 
Until the abolition in 196942, judicial hanging for murder was mandatory in accordance with 
Section 1 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.43 It was practice for the forensic 
pathologist to attend the prison immediately after a hanging to perform the post mortem on the 
deceased. Contrary to what was believed to have been a ‘clean and instantaneous death’ there 
was evidence at the post mortem that this was often not the case. Dr Ryk James of Cardiff 
University conducted research which was published in 1992 where he examined the remains of 34 
‘victims’ of judicial hanging between 1882 and 1945 when bodies of those hanged were exhumed 
from three prisons where re-development was to take place. The findings were compared with 
the PM reports made at the time and those reports were found to be ‘grossly inaccurate’, 
particularly regarding the fractures of the spine (James and Nasmyth-Jones, 1992). 
 
Training and education 
At the time of the 50’s Knight (1985) wrote of the turmoil the profession faced due to no formal 
structure in the delivery mechanism and feared that the ageing profile of the practitioners was 
such that it faced extinction unless action was taken. This problem was compounded by the start 
in the decline of UK Universities teaching forensic medicine. According to Madea, by 1944 the 
amount of instruction given in forensic medicine was excessive. Therefore, Universities made 
claim that the provision of forensic medicine as a speciality in its own right was neither necessary 
                                                             
42 Hanging was suspended in 1965. The last hanging took place in 1964 and finally abolished by parliament in 1969.  
43 Murder was abolished by the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 
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nor important. Since 1953, forensic training was no longer obligatory in the trainee doctor's 
curriculum and thus the delivery of forensic medicine as a subject in UK Universities declined 
significantly. Curriculum allocations diminished, formal examinations were not compulsory and 
the subject became mainly of interest to postgraduates. This was highlighted in the 1980's when 
the European Commission were looking to standardise autopsy practice throughout member 
states and set up the 'Sevilla Working Party on the Harmonisation and Standardisation of Forensic 
Medicine' to make recommendations. At that time in the European Community, the teaching of 
forensic medicine was a very important part of the medical curriculum and the members of the 
Sevilla Committee considered that the standards of proficiency in the UK fell far below that of the 
other member states (Home Office, 1989).  
The Council of Europe - Recommendation 1159 (1991) ‘On the harmonisation of autopsy rules' 
made the following recommendations: 
 
i. Promote the adoption of harmonised and internationally recognised rules on the 
way autopsies are carried out and the adoption of a standardised model for 
autopsies:  
ii. Support the proposals that states world-wide formally accept and implement the 
obligation to carry out autopsies in all cases of suspicious deaths;  
iii. Invite the member states to apply the Interpol guidelines on disaster victim  
Identification;  
iv. Invite those Council of Europe Member states which have not yet done so to ratify 
the Council of Europe Agreement on the Transfer of Corpses;  
v. Invite the five Council of Europe member states which have not yet done so to ratify 
the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
 
The Royal College of Pathologists was founded in 1962 and received its Royal Charter in 1970. Its 
Patron is Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. The College is a professional membership organisation 
and all forensic pathologists must be a member in order to be entered onto the Home Office list. 
The College is committed to setting and maintaining professional standards and to promoting 
excellence in the practice of pathology. It is a registered charity and is not a trades union. Its 
members work in hospital laboratories, universities and industry worldwide. It is responsible for 
maintaining standards through training, assessments, examinations and professional 
development and sets the curriculum for all pathology disciplines including forensic pathology. 
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However, the formation of the College was not a cure for the issues facing the profession as the 
main delivery of training was via Universities, the College being more concerned with oversight 
and standards.   
One of the most respected pathologists of the 80's and 90's was Dr Iain West. West was involved 
in many famous cases. In 1984 West helped to establish that the shot that killed WPC Yvonne 
Fletcher was from the Libyan embassy in London. He helped recover and identify bodies from 
several terrorist bombings, including the Hyde Park (1982) and Harrods (1983) incidents in 
London, and the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel, Brighton during the Conservative Party 
conference. West was involved in the 1988 Clapham rail disaster and also the Paddington rail 
disaster in 1999 and it was his work which suggested improvements in carriage design and other 
safety aspects (Anscombe, 2001). In 1978 he took up a post in the forensic medicine department 
at Guy's hospital where he remained for the rest of his career. He was deeply concerned about 
the future provision of forensic pathology services in England and Wales and proposed that the 
future provision of the forensic pathology service in England and Wales should be regionally 
based. Again, a book was written about some of West's cases (Stern, 1996). Unfortunately, he 
died aged just 57 in 2001.  
 
Reviews into the Forensic Pathology Service 
Broderick Report-1971. The first of several reports into the future of forensic pathology was 
produced in 1971. The Broderick report made recommendations on the coronial system as it 
existed at the time but it also commented on the state of forensic pathology. One of its 
recommendations was that there should be direct financial support for University Departments of 
Forensic Medicine to ensure their survival and indeed expansion. However, this recommendation 
was never implemented. Fearing the imminent demise of the profession, the Home Office funded 
three trainee posts at Leeds, Sheffield and Cardiff. These were intended to give senior registrars a 
year’s forensic experience in order that they became potential entrants onto the Home Office list. 
This became the starting point for the current practice of the Home Office funding universities 
and the NHS to train forensic pathologists. There are now normally six to eight trainee positions in 
England and Wales. Other recommendations of the Broderick report were that all police forces 
should have access to forensic pathologists to help in the investigation of murder and other 
serious crimes against the person. It quotes at section 22.18; 
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'This person should be a pathologist with sound training in morbid anatomy who has added to his 
general knowledge some additional skills, most notable the ability to detect and give authoritative 
testimony about unusual features of the dead body and the surrounding circumstances which may 
be of evidential value. He should be able to command the facilities of a well-equipped pathological 
laboratory, be readily available on call to police and courts and be prepared to travel at short 
notice anywhere in the area which he serves'. (Broderick Report, 1971) 
The report endorsed the Home Office practice of maintaining a 'Home Office List' due to the 
dearth of universities training in forensic pathology outside of London. At the time the Broderick 
report was written, there were 25 pathologists on the list outside of London and about 15 within 
the London area. The small number of just 40 pathologists serving England and Wales was 
recognised as being '...particularly vulnerable to death, illness, retirement or withdrawal of any 
one of the men on the current Home Office list'.  
It will be noted that the reference in the Broderick report is to 'men' as at that time there were no 
female forensic pathologists. In fact, the first female forensic pathologist on the Home Office 
register was in 1987. In all there have been 16 female members of the register there being eight 
on the current register. 
The report went on to acknowledge that the profession was declining and considered the 
arguments at the time as to whether forensic pathology should be its own speciality or whether it 
should be a sub speciality of histopathology. On the one hand, some within the medical 
profession considered that it was too generalist in nature and that the issues identified during the 
course of a post mortem examination could be adequately dealt with by a specialist within that 
particular field. The contrary view was that forensic pathology was a service which needed 
specialists in suspicious death investigation to give an overall opinion in this field and that it was 
unrealistic to harvest opinion from diverse experts without the advice of a guiding medical expert 
with an overview of all disciplines. In any event, it was recognised that the service was in decline 
partly due to anomalies of remuneration, imperfectly organised training, the absence of a 
standard professional qualification, lack of career structure, but most of all was the controversy 
regarding whether there should be a specialist branch of forensic pathology.  
The report recommended that the service should be part of the National Health Service, based in 
major hospitals and that forensic pathology is made a sub speciality to the 'main division of 
pathology' (histopathology). The additional cost of the service borne by the Health Service was to 
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be sourced by the Home Office. It recommended that 40 pathologists were required to serve the 
needs of England and Wales. At section 24.11, the report states; 
'We also expect that cases would occasionally occur where evidence of a suspicious nature was 
found during a routine pathological investigation of what appeared to be an innocent death. In 
such circumstances, the right course would be for the pathologist to inform the nearest forensic 
pathologist and give him the opportunity to take part in the examination...' 
The Merrison Report 1975 recommended that postgraduate medical education and training 
needed a regulatory framework. This included pathology training. The 1977 EEC Recognition 
Order provided for the GMC to issue Certificates of Specialist Training (CSTs) to doctors who 
completed the minimum period of training specified in the Medical Directive. Holders of CSTs 
could have their name included on the GMC’s Specialist List. Forensic pathology was designated 
as a sub-speciality to Histopathology. 
An eminent Home Office forensic pathologist on the register (list) from 1979 to 1999 described 
that the forensic pathology profession in the first half of the 20th century was healthy, because 
the subject was on the curriculum for all pathologists, not just forensic pathologists. However, it 
declined throughout the 70's because the universities were in decline as far as forensic pathology 
was concerned. He described that most forensic pathologists on the Home Office list were 
employed either by a University or the NHS. Both institutions increasingly discouraged 
pathologists working for the police as this activity was clearly a distraction from the main work of 
their employer. It was in the 80's that some pathologists started to leave their employment and 
start up as private individuals. The first to do so was a forensic pathologist from the West 
Midlands who had the support of the then coroner for Birmingham. Private arrangements were 
put in place to pay for services from local police forces. Others followed. 
The income from supporting police cases was insufficient to pay the university and Health Service 
employers costs and so the system was in danger of collapsing in the mid-term. The situation was 
even worse in the London area where unlike in the provinces, no fee was payable by the police to 
pathologists or their employers. Pathologists had to subsidise their income by doing routine 
coronial work which at that time attracted a tiny fee. It is interesting to note that the fee today is 
only £96.80 for a routine case and £276.90 for a post mortem examination requiring 'additional 
skills'. The definition of additional skills is set by the British Medical Association as per figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Definition of ‘additional skills’ 
These are usually cases involving suspected homicide, road or other accidents 
likely to lead to serious charges, deaths during anaesthesia and deaths involving 
allegations against the medical profession or another third party. Criteria that 
distinguish this type of examination from those in 'routine' cases are: 
 Added responsibility carried by the pathologist e.g. in relation to possible criminal 
proceedings arising from his or her findings. 
 Frequent need for the pathologist to travel long distances at any time of the day 
or night at short notice, to make preliminary examination of the body, and to wait 
while photographs are taken before the body can be removed to the mortuary for 
the autopsy. 
 Need for special tests involving liaison with, for example, bacteriologists. As a 
consequence of the protraction of the investigation the pathologist may suffer a 
loss of other work. 
But the decision as to whether a particular case is potentially one requiring a 
post-mortem examination involving additional skills, must be a matter for the 
coroner's discretion. 
British Medical Association  
 
In July 1984, the then Home Secretary Leon Brittan informed Parliament that there would be a 
review of forensic pathology services headed by a senior Civil Servant Mr Gordon Wasserman 
(now Lord Wasserman) who held Home Office responsibility for police science and technology. 
The Committee included representation from all key stakeholders including the police, coroners 
and the representative organisation of forensic pathologists the British Association in Forensic 
Medicine (BAFM). The terms of reference were to ‘review the arrangements for providing a 
forensic pathology service in England and Wales’. The group was to consider the whole gamut of 
provision including organisation, funding, the appointment of practitioners and their training. 
Importantly, the group was also to consider standards. Leon Brittan announced the review in an 
answer to a Parliamentary Question on 17th April 1984: 
“To review the arrangements for providing a forensic pathology service in England and Wales with 
particular reference to: 
i. Organisation and funding; 
ii. Appointment and conditions of service; 
iii. Training and quality assurance; and 
iv)                 To make recommendations.” 
(Hansard, 1984). 
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The Working Party publicly invited representations by individuals or organisations and received 
written evidence from 37 persons and 19 organisations and The Working Party published its 
report on the 25th July 1989.  
On the 19th July 1990, the Home Secretary David Waddington in a written response to the House 
of Commons stated: 
“I have now carefully considered the report of the working party which had been 
examining the provision of forensic pathology services to police forces and coroners in 
England and Wales together with the comments which I have received on it from 23 
interested individuals and representative bodies. Without exception, those consulted 
have endorsed the report's principal findings and recommendations, particularly in 
relation to funding, accreditation, training and research, and have urged me to 
implement these urgently in order to reverse the recent decline of the service and 
ensure an adequate supply of forensic specialists in the future. The main proposal of 
the report is that the supply of forensic pathology services should be regulated 
through the market--that is, the main users of these services, police forces, should 
contract with the suppliers, the pathologists, for the services they need at prices and 
on conditions to be agreed between them. The role of the Home Office would be to 
maintain the high quality of the service through new arrangements for accreditation, 
training and research. I have decided to accept the working party's proposals and to 
introduce the new arrangements straight away, including the establishment of a 
policy advisory board to oversee the development of this vital part of our criminal 
justice system.” 
Wasserman recommended the creation of a Home Office Register which would form the basis of 
formal accreditation as a practitioner. Possession of appropriate qualifications would be required 
for appointment to this Register and the standard of those on the list would be regularly 
monitored. A new body was to be set up by the Home Office to oversee the profession – 
effectively this was to be a regulatory body for forensic pathology. The Policy Advisory Board for 
Forensic Pathology (PABFP) first met in 1991, its composition being similar to that of the Working 
Party. Initially Gordon Wasserman was the chair of the PABFP. 
The PABFP enjoyed some limited success. It standardised entry qualifications and ensured that 
appointees to the Register possessed adequate experience. It secured Home Office funding for 
senior lecturer posts in the three remaining academic departments of forensic pathology, 
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Sheffield, Cardiff and Guys Hospital. Perhaps the most important initiative was the formation of 
the Scientific Standards Committee, which produced the first code of practice for the 
performance of post mortem examinations. This group also introduced regular audit of 
pathologists’ reports.  
The Wasserman Report did not address the issues around the employment status of Home Office 
Pathologists and it is reported that most of the Working Party members, would have liked to have 
seen the Home Office introduce an ‘employed’ service; essentially a parallel service to the 
Forensic Science Service as it then existed. 
The report recommended that police forces pay a fee for each post mortem examination, to be 
negotiated in individual service level agreements. At the time of institution of the PABFP the 
employment status of forensic pathologists was mixed. Some were hospital pathologists 
employed by the NHS; others were University employees. A growing number of practitioners 
moved from employed status into the private sector because employers were reluctant to allow 
their practice in assisting police cases to continue, and also because there were financial 
attractions to working as a private company or contractor. Over time more than 80% of Home 
Office pathologists elected for the private option. At the time the Wasserman Report was 
published in 1989, there was believed to have been about 45 Home office pathologists. There is 
no certainty in that figure as there was no actual centrally published 'list' as such. The 'Register' as 
it exists today was only produced as a result of the Wasserman recommendations. 
In spite of the problems identified with Forensic pathology as a service, the Wasserman Report 
acknowledged at 1.13 that 'it was amongst the best in the world'. A number of recommendations 
were never implemented. One was that new appointees to the register should be for an initial 
period of one year allowing the PABFP to assess performance (a six-month assessment period has 
now been implemented in 2012). It also recommended that registration should be for five years 
at a time and that it should cease at 65. This again was never implemented and members of the 
register are appointed until they resign, retire or are removed for some other reason. 
Recommendation 12 of the Wasserman Report states that 'The Home Office should issue a 
circular strongly advising coroners to use only accredited pathologists (i.e. those that are on the 
Home Office List) in cases of suspicious death. In due course the Coroners Rules should be 
amended to that effect'. The Coroners Rules were never so amended and the 2009 Coroners and 
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Justice Act similarly did not include this provision although there is a requirement on coroners to 
‘consult'44 with the chief officer of police.  
It has long been talked about as to whether there should exist an 'Institute of Forensic Pathology'. 
This was first proposed by Lord Trenchard in 1936 who was at the time the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan police who saw the need 'to put the whole subject of Jurisprudence in this country 
on a higher plane.' The proposal was that it should exist as a school within the University of the 
London Faculty of Medicine. However, the proposal was rejected by the then Home Secretary Sir 
Samuel Hoare on the grounds of cost (Home Office, 1989). This idea was again considered as part 
of the Wasserman enquiry but was not pursued due to objection from the BAFM and the Royal 
College of Pathologists on the grounds that a single research Institute might stagnate and that too 
much power would be in the hands of a few, but proposing that there be three Institutes. Instead 
the Wasserman recommendation was that the Home Office should devote at least £50k per year 
towards Research and Development. Although the Home Office has recently supported research 
by way of grants no money was ever dedicated for this purpose.  
Some of the London pathologists, proposed the creation of a London institute of forensic 
pathology. In broad terms the operation would have resembled the organisation of barristers’ 
chambers, with practitioners self-employed but acting together as a cohesive group. The institute 
would negotiate service level agreements with police forces and be responsible for managing the 
service. It would provide a base within which practitioners could liaise regularly with colleagues, 
and offer structured training for new recruits. It would set up stable regular contracts for 
laboratory services and other specialist work. Suffice to say that this did not happen, again on cost 
grounds. 
In 2000, the structure of forensic pathology provision was that of eight loosely structured group 
practices of pathologists as follows; 
 
Table 1: Deployment of forensic pathologists in 2000 in England and Wales 
Area No: of 
Pathologists 
Description 
North East 3 One trainee in place. Fee arrangements were a 
mixture of a retainer plus a case fee as well as a call 
out fee payable by the police. A problem of 
timeliness of reports was identified caused by 
reporting time of toxicology results. Pathologists do 
coroners work as well as forensic cases. 
                                                             
44 Part 3 Section 12 of the The Coroners Investigations Regulations 2013 
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Humberside and Yorkshire 4 Pathologists were based at the Sheffield Medico-
Legal Centre which was part of the University. In 
addition, a pathologist based in Leeds did some 
forensic work although not on the register. The 
police paid an annual fee plus a fee per case on top if 
the cases exceeded 340. 
West Midlands 4 Police paid an annual retainer plus a case fee. A 
problem existed with timeliness of toxicology results 
which took between 3 to 12 months. 
East Midlands 3 Pathologists were paid an annual retainer plus a case 
fee. Toxicology results were obtained within two or 
three weeks. Most homicide scenes were visited by 
the pathologists unlike other areas. 
Greater London and Western 
South East 
7 The service had been provided by a recently formed 
partnership called Forensic Pathology Services (FPS). 
This arrangement replaced the previous service 
which was supplied from Teaching Hospitals. There 
was a mixed payment regime depending on the 
force. Reports that the major limiting factor was 
timeliness of toxicology which can take at best 3 
months. The other issue was the standard of the 
mortuaries.  
Greater London and Eastern South 
East 
3 Two pathologists acted as a partnership and one was 
employed and provided a service for part of London 
and counties of Kent Norfolk and Suffolk. A retired 
pathologist not on the Register was used in Kent at 
the insistence of the coroner. Kent insisted on all 
scene visits whereas the Met police have almost 
none. There are no official records of this group 
practice. 
Mid-South Wales and 
Gloucestershire 
3 All three pathologists were employed as senior 
lecturers in Cardiff. There was an annual retainer plus 
a case fee. 50% of the fee was retained by the 
University and 50% is paid to the pathologist. 
West and South West 2 The two pathologists covered as far as Hampshire 
and Devon and Cornwall when the local pathologist 
there is unavailable. There was a mixed model of 
annual retainer plus a case fee. Toxicology could take 
between 3 weeks but up to 9 months. 
Devon and Cornwall Police 1 One pathologist was employed under a full-time 
contract 
 
There were reported to be 36 pathologists on the Register in 2000, but only 30 are accounted on 
the above table. In all probability, the other 6 were effectively unused or semi-retired but on the 
list without having been removed. In 2002, pathologists on the Register performed between 66 
and 1,240 post mortem examinations each (not all forensic cases). The most forensic cases 
conducted by Home Office Pathologists was 135. The national average payment by case fee was 
£1500. 
In 2000 the BAFM set up a working party which produced a report to inform the debate regarding 
the future of forensic pathology services in England and Wales. The working party was chaired by 
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Iain West and included well known pathologists of the time William Lawler, Alan Anscombe and 
Professor Helen Whitwell. The opening of their report entitled 'Towards a Unified Forensic 
Pathology Service for England and Wales' painted a depressing picture of the then current state of 
forensic pathology; 
'In 1990 the recommendations of the Wasserman Committee of the Home Office were 
implemented in England and Wales. Details of contracts and the manner in which the 
users paid for the service varied from region to region. The sense of optimism that 
accompanied the Wasserman recommendations and their acceptance by the then 
Government led us to believe that the profession and its clients would gain by the 
establishment of a uniform, well-funded service with proper career opportunities and 
training. In reality, the opposite has occurred.  
 The number of university departments has diminished and those departments that remain 
are finding it difficult to survive. The attitude of most Universities to forensic medicine has 
changed. The number of forensic pathologists has decreased partly due to early retirement 
and to resignation. There is a dearth of trainees and fewer trainers than there were 10 years 
ago. The rising demand for forensic pathology services is already creating difficulties of 
supply and there are signs that the efficiency of police investigations may be affected.  he 
workload has doubled from 1990 to 2000. The standard of forensic pathology service is 
fragmented and there is considerable variation in organisation and in standards’ (West et 
al, 2000). 
The recommendations of the report were that forensic pathology should be an employed service, 
regionally based in either University or NHS sites but independent from University or NHS 
management. The report suggested a 'hub and spoke' model where pathologists who worked 
remotely from the regional centre but were associated to it (West et al, 2000).  
There remained considerable concern about forensic pathology, in particular recruitment, and a 
further review reported in 2003. This review known as the Leishman Enquiry (Home Office, 
2003)45 indicated that one solution to the professions problems might be to create an employed 
status within the Forensic Science Service. One of the drivers for this review was that the Home 
Office register had gone from 52 members since Wasserman down to 35 in 2001. 
At that time, the average work load per pathologist was as follows; 
 
                                                             
45 Ralph Leishman of 4-Consulting (a private company) 
Appendices 
Fatal Call: Getting Away with Murder? Dean Jones, 2016. 189 
Table 2: Numbers of Homicides and Forensic Autopsies in England and Wales (Home Office (2003) 
Homicides v forensic 
cases 
1998 1999 2000 
Recorded homicides 
England and Wales 
750 765 850 
Average number of 
cases per pathologist 
64 68 73 
 
As can be seen, the number of homicides was increasing along with the average number of cases 
per pathologist while the overall number of pathologists on the Register was reducing. The 
Leishman review proposed that accreditation be achieved through the Council for the Registration 
of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) which was at the time being developed to register and regulate 
forensic scientists and others providing a service to the Criminal Justice System. This was never 
implemented and was also unpopular. The accreditation by the CRFP would obviate the need for 
a Home Office register and thereby remove the prestigious title of 'Home Office Pathologist' 
which has been vested in medico-legal history since the time of Spilsbury.  
In the event the CRFP itself failed and no longer exists. The Leishman Enquiry also made the 
following recommendations: 
1. There should be executive management of the service overseen by the Home Office. 
2. Home Office pathologists should be employed and managed as part of an 'arm’s length’ 
Executive Agency'46 of the Home Office and proposed the FSS as the most appropriate 
existing such organisation. This would provide a career structure and would be more likely 
to attract new entrants into the profession. 
3. Regional delivery centres across England and Wales. 
4. The provision of funding to establish specialist regional delivery centres where mortuaries 
were based and where pathologists could work from - in other words 'Centres of 
Excellence'. 
5. Increased support for existing training centres (Cardiff, Leicester, Liverpool, Newcastle and 
Sheffield). 
6. The setting up of a new Executive body in 'debating, clarifying and agreeing identified 
professional issues requiring the application of informed judgement' (Home Office, 2003 
p3). 
7. Consider encompassing paediatric and other pathology disciplines within the ambit of the 
new agency (FSS). 
                                                             
46  An Executive Agency is also known as Non-Departmental Public Body and defined by the Cabinet Office as 'Bodies 
which have a role in the process of National Government but which are not Government Departments (or part of 
one) and which operate to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from Ministers. 
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8. Engage with the police and other forensic professionals to ensure better definition of the 
forensic pathologists role. 
9. Standardised national case fee. 
10. Consideration should be given to video recording forensic post mortems 
 
The FSS was set up in 1935/6 and operated by the Home Office and provided scientific services to 
all 43 police forces in England and Wales. The FSS could have provided management and 
administration, and created a proper career structure. The proposal, put forward by Leishman 
however was very unpopular amongst the profession and so the recommendations were 
considered by a steering group set up by the Policy Advisory Board for Forensic Pathology. 
Although the steering group appeared from their report to accept what Leishman had said, it then 
put forward alternative recommendations on the basis that it had 'undertaken further work' since 
the draft Leishman report had been written. 
The group therefore rejected the main Leishman recommendations of forensic pathology being 
subsumed into an arm’s length body. This was largely due to the objections raised by pathologists 
themselves in part because pathologists felt more affinity to the medical profession than forensic 
science. They rejected the possibility that forensic pathology should be its own 'quango' but there 
was pressure by government to reduce the numbers of such organisations. One other 
consideration was to set up a company limited by guarantee or a private company but the set-up 
costs and objections from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) meant that this option 
was not viable. 
Consideration of employing pathologists as civil servants in the Home Office was made but again 
the pathologists did not want to be seen as government employees. Therefore, the re-formed 
Policy Advisory Board was the chosen option and agreed by Ministers. The main recommendation 
of the steering group was that rather than forensic pathology becoming part of an Executive 
Agency such as the Forensic Science Service, that there should be an altered Policy Advisory Board 
with Executive powers. The recommendations were put to a meeting of the BAFM on 30th June 
2002 and following this finally decided on the altered PAB model. They proposed that the 
functions of the national body would be to: 
o Maintain the Register and establish procedures for regular monitoring and revalidation 
o Establish regional service delivery centres 
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o Promote relationships with users of forensic pathology services to ensure that their 
requirements are addressed and that practitioners play an appropriate part in the 
investigative process 
o Negotiate fee structures and contractual arrangements 
o Establish and maintaining national standards of practice and performance including the 
promotion of national and local quality management initiative 
o Develop career structures including a recruitment and retention strategy 
o In conjunction with the Royal College of Pathologists, develop a comprehensive national 
training strategy and programme, including continual professional development for 
practicing forensic pathologists 
o That the Policy Advisory Board should endorse the planning and of a national body, based 
upon the Board being reconstituted and given executive powers. 
o That the Board should set up a programme team to report to the Board its detailed 
proposals for the policy, functions and procedures of the new executive body. 
o The programme team should report to the board within 3 months of its appointment and 
to Home Office Ministers as soon as possible thereafter. A full report should be produced 
within 6 months, whereupon the Board should reconstitute itself and embark upon an 
implementation programme. 
There was clearly a difference of view from the Leishman recommendations and the final 
recommendations of the Steering Group. This was put down not to disagreement but to a 'result 
of the passage of time since the Leishman research was conducted and the time the Steering 
group considered it'.  
The main recommendations to the Leishman report; that of an employed service under a public 
body, in particular the Forensic Science Service was considered to be too controversial amongst 
Home Office pathologists, and politically difficult to achieve to have a realistic prospect of success. 
In March 2003, John Denham, the then Minister for Policing, Crime Reduction and Community, 
stated as follows in an address to the House of Commons; 
"I commissioned an independent review into the provision of forensic pathology 
services and have accepted the key recommendations of that independent review. 
There is clearly a need to establish a unified forensic pathology service to deliver the 
needs of the police service, coroners and the wider criminal justice system. The 
Government intend to: enable a standard high quality service to be offered across 
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England and Wales; ensure availability of service by providing the framework of a 
career structure to retain existing practitioners and to attract new entrants to the 
field; facilitate the provision of specialist regional service delivery centres; introduce 
improved management and budgetary controls for the provision of forensic pathology 
services. I have instructed my officials to implement the key recommendations of the 
review as quickly as possible, with the intention that by autumn 2003 we will: move to 
new accreditation and disciplinary procedures based on model competencies; and 
have two centres prepared to deliver a training programme against the improved 
standards. By summer 2004, we will aim to have more newly trained, and operational 
forensic pathologists; an agreed career structure for the future national forensic 
pathology service; and developed contracts of employment. I will continue to take a 
close interest in progress and will receive regular reports on progress from the 
Programme Delivery Board established to take this work forward. The delivery board 
will include representatives of both users and providers of forensic pathology services. 
Hansard: 17 Mar 2003: Column 35WS  
These changes lead to a formalisation of the Pathology Delivery Board (PDB) as a replacement to 
the Policy Advisor Board.47 The PDB had no formal constitution but was formed under the 
principle of 'Royal Prerogative'48. The PDB was made up of ex-officio members from the Home 
Office, Crown Prosecution Service, Royal College of Pathologists; Ministry of Justice49; Coroners’ 
Society and ACPO as well as representation from the group practices. 
The PDB was given executive power to add, remove or suspend a pathologist from the Register on 
behalf of the Home Secretary. The constitution of the Board was not formalised until a formal 
constitution was drafted and agreed by the then Home Secretary Alan Johnson in 2010. It was 
further amended in 2012 (see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/constitution-of-the-
pathology-delivery-board). 
The implementation team introduced a protocol as a condition of membership of the Register 
which set out the expectations of membership and administered the spending of £15 million on 
the upgrading of mortuary facilities. 
                                                             
47 Issues of quality were not allocated to the PDB as these were the responsibility of the Forensic Science Regulator 
48 Prerogative powers or the royal prerogative are defined by Dicey as being “…the remaining portion of the Crown's 
original   authority, and it is therefore… the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the 
hands of the Crown, whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers”. Dicey, A. V. 
(1959) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edition. Palgrave Macmillan: London.  
49 Was called the Department for Constitutional Affairs at that time 
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Each group practice was formalised with clear regional boundaries and a condition was set that 
each had to be constituted of at least three pathologists; have a contract with at least one police 
force; have a 'rota coordinator', committed to undertake at least 180 forensic cases per year; 
meet storage requirements agreed by the Board; ensure that preliminary reports were produced 
to the coroner and police within 14 days; ensure that all reports were subject to checking by a 
colleague; all members were adequately security cleared and disclose to the Board annually its 
strategy for workforce planning. 
 
Current Model of Delivery 
Little is known about how the Forensic Pathology Service was administered centrally by the Home 
Office throughout the early part of the last century. However, since the 70's there has been a 
dedicated unit responsible on behalf of the Home Secretary for the oversight and management of 
the Home Office register. This function changed post Leishman when the Home Office unit 
doubled in size to eight civil servants. Half were responsible for the general administration of the 
service and half for implementing the Steering Group recommendations.  
In 2007, responsibility for the central administration of the forensic pathology service was 
transferred to a new agency of the Home Office; the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(NPIA). Government thought it appropriate to devolve the responsibility for forensic pathology to 
this 'arm’s length' body. It was felt appropriate to distance a number of functions from central 
government for administrative and political reasons and this included a whole range of functions 
including forensic pathology. The current administrative unit within the Home Office is known as 
the 'Forensic Pathology Unit' (FPU). 
One seminal event occurred in April 2009. Ian Tomlinson a newspaper vendor who collapsed and 
died in the City of London on his way home from work after being struck by a police officer during 
the G-20 summit protests. An inquest jury found in May 2011 that he had been unlawfully killed. 
A police officer was subsequently acquitted of the murder but the issue throughout the case was 
the original cause of death had been that of natural causes from the Home Office pathologist Dr 
Freddie Patel. Subsequent post mortem examinations and reviews of Dr Patel's original post 
mortem revealed that it had been inadequate and that the true cause of death was connected to 
the original striking with a baton by the police officer. 
Dr Patel was suspended from the Home Office register and subsequently removed. However, he 
was not removed because of the quality of his post mortem examination on Ian Tomlinson. He 
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was in fact removed because on examination, Dr Patel had not complied with the conditions of 
membership of a group practice. In fact, he had not complied with several conditions of 
membership of the register. 
Other pathologists were then removed for similar reasons and the 'protocol' reviewed to ensure 
future compliance. Changes included the limiting to the number of forensic cases to between a 
lower limit of 20 and an upper limit of 95 per rolling year to ensure standards of practice. Further 
reviews of processes were also undertaken and strict case numbers and outcomes are now 
monitored together with statistical data as to how many forensic cases transpire to be homicide 
for each pathologist and each of the police forces in England and Wales. 
The discipline rules were also re drafted into 'Suitability Rules' to ensure that complaints were 
dealt with in a less adversarial manner. A six-month period of assessment upon entry onto the 
register was introduced (as proposed in the Wasserman Report) akin to a 'probationary' period in 
order that pathologists who failed to reach the high standard of professional knowledge, training 
and practice could more easily be either mentored or removed. 
The NPIA was responsible for general administration, dealing with complaints, and funding 
trainees. However, in 2009, the Forensic Pathology Unit started to take on projects akin to the 
recommendations in the original Leishman report.  
There was the dearth of specialists in the fields of paediatric pathology neuropathology bone 
pathology, and ocular pathology as well other specialist pathology disciplines willing to support 
police cases. These are required in some cases to provide the forensic pathologist with expert 
opinion in areas outside of the forensic pathologists field. They are particularly necessary in 
complex cases such as child death, head injuries and cases where other medical causations may 
need to be disproven. In 2012, a conference was arranged and a number of paediatric and neuro 
pathologists were invited to discuss the reasons why there was a reluctance to engage in police 
cases. One of the many reasons put forward was that there was a lack of training in expectations 
of the Criminal Justice System and giving evidence in court.  
Of course, the other main reason for reluctance to engage in police cases was the issues faced by 
specialists especially in child death cases such as those which lead to the disciplinary actions 
against Professor Sir Roy Meadow. Meadow's whose reputation was severely damaged after he 
appeared as an expert witness for the prosecution in several trials. The General Medical Council 
(GMC) struck him from the Medical Register after he was found to have offered 'erroneous' and 
'misleading' evidence in the case of Sally Clark who was convicted of killing her two sons largely 
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on the evidence of Meadow. Her conviction was quashed in 2003 after she had spent three years 
in prison for the alleged murders. In another case of Angela Cannings, a mother convicted on 
Meadow's evidence was freed on appeal. Her conviction of murdering two of her three babies, 
both of whom had died in their first few weeks of life, was deemed to have been unsafe by the 
Court of Appeal. Meadow was struck off the GMC medial register after a tribunal found him guilty 
of misconduct. He appealed to the High Court50 and the GMC finding was overturned, however 
the case effectively finished his career.  
This case and others will have no doubt dissuaded other medical experts from engaging in police 
cases, as well as certain pressure groups which have campaigned against doctors especially in so 
called 'shaken baby syndrome' where there is differing medical opinion as to the mechanism of 
death. This lead the CPS policy directorate in the framing of the current CPS prosecution policy 
which has received general acceptance across the various opinions on this very divisive issue.  
In 2013, revalidation was finally introduced by the GMC for all doctors on the medical register 
with a requirement for annual appraisal and a revalidation process on a five-year cycle following 
recommendations from the Shipman Enquiry chaired by Dame Janet Smith. However, the original 
regulations did not consider many groups of doctors outside of NHS, university or in employed 
status and therefore they were changed such that the PDB is now the 'Designated Organisation' 
for the purpose of appraisal and revalidation under the Medical Profession (Responsible Officers) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013. This is the only reference to the PDB in statutory regulations. The 
first and to date only Responsible Officer under the Act appointed by the PDB was Professor Jack 
Crane CBE, State Pathologist for Northern Ireland. 
In 2012 also on application from a group of forensic pathologists and the PDB, the Department of 
Health agreed to grant forensic pathology ‘Speciality Status’ in its own right. Hitherto it had been 
a sub speciality of Histopathology. The benefit to the profession was that due to changing GMC 
rules, it avoided the necessity for a doctor to qualify in histopathology first and then train for a 
further three or four years as a forensic pathologist. If it had not become its own speciality, the 
fear was that few recruits would be attracted by the addition of four extra years training before 
becoming a consultant. 
Recently there are on average about 34 to 38 members on the Register at any one time. The PDB 
try to ensure that there are about eight trainees in the system. This is on the basis that the 
profession will need one new consultant per year on average considering that there is a 50% fall 
                                                             
50 Meadow v GMC [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) 
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out of trainees due to withdrawal from training; resignation and more significantly successful 
completion of training and obtaining alternative employment abroad. In October 2012, following 
the demise of the NPIA, forensic pathology was returned to the Home Office where it currently 
sits. 
The latest review of forensic pathology services in England and Wales was conducted by Professor 
Peter Hutton who was appointed by the Home Secretary in 2014 to conduct a fundamental and 
independent review. Amongst the numerous recommendations was a call for there to be a 
national autopsy service in England and Wales. Surprisingly, although starting as a review of 
forensic pathology alone, it soon became apparent that forensic pathology was comparatively 
healthy compared with non-forensic autopsy practice. Coroners are finding it increasingly difficult 
to secure the services of non-forensic pathologists and also the quality of some non-forensic 
autopsies is variable (Hutton, 2015). Non-forensic pathologists deal with coroners’ non-suspicious 
cases on an occasional basis and do not generally receive training in the interpretation of scene 
and body examination and the recovery of trace evidence. The practice of non-forensic post 
mortem pathologists is particularly concerning in the light of a report by the National Confidential 
Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and Death (NCEPOD), (Furness, 2006), which found that many non-
forensic post mortem (PM) examinations were inadequate. Concerns were first highlighted by the 
Broderick Report in 1971 (Broderick, 1971) when discrepancies were found between clinical and 
PM diagnoses.  
Although the NCEPOD research is over 10 years old, the report was recently referred to the Royal 
College of Pathologists to establish whether its findings are still current. The unanimous view was 
that, if anything, the situation had worsened since 2006 (Hutton, 2015). One of the reasons given 
was the fact that the autopsy element of histopathology training was no longer compulsory 
leading to a reduced number of non-forensic pathologists willing or able to conduct coronial work. 
The NCEPOD auditors reviewed 1,877 autopsy reports and supporting documentation conducted 
in a one week period of 2005 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The report concluded that 
there was no improvement in the discrepancies identified since the 1960s (Harvard, 1960), that 
half of the cases produced findings which were unsuspected before death, and that at least one 
third of death certificates were likely to be incorrect. In 16 cases where the body was found in a 
decomposed state, the bodies were not examined and evaluated properly. A common 
denominator in these cases was that the deceased were either known alcoholics or drug users or 
found hanging from the neck. The following factors were also identified: 
 One in four autopsy reports were judged to be poor or unacceptable; 
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 In one third of mortuaries, the mortuary technician opened the body and removed organs 
before the pathologist actually inspected the body contrary to guidance (Leadbeatter, Lucas 
and Lowe, 2014); 
 In one in seven cases the brain was not examined; 
 Histology was not taken when it was judged that it should have been in many cases; 
 In a fifth of cases, the cause of death was adjudged to have been questionable; 
 There was generally a poor quality of examination of the body and organs, and 
 Communication between coroners and pathologists was poor and there was insufficient 
information passed to the pathologist by the coroner. 
The report quotes; 
‘If one quarter of all surgical procedures undertaken on the living were deemed, by peers, to be 
poorly or unacceptably badly done, there would be a public outcry. The fact that there is no public 
outcry is a manifestation of the fact that families are unaware of the variable quality of the 
autopsy procedure’ (Furness, 2006). 
When questioned about this, a common response from pathologists and coroners was “what do 
you expect for £87.70?”51 (Furness, 2006, p. 117). 
The NCEPOD report however did not review the actual post mortem examinations, but was a 
review of the paperwork, and so reliance on this report as empirical evidence of the poor quality 
of non-forensic post mortem examinations should perhaps be treated with some caution. 
Undoubtedly many histopathologists conduct PM’s to a high standard, nevertheless reliance on a 
non-forensic PM is risky and potentially unlikely to identify a complex murder (Jones, 2014). This 
issue is further highlighted by a recent BBC news feature52 explaining the role of a London based 
non-forensic histopathologist who claimed to do 50 autopsies a week on top of her full time ‘day 
job’, including complex baby deaths. In contrast, forensic pathologist on the Home Office register 
are restricted to doing 95 cases in a year. This demonstrates the difference in detail and expertise 
a forensic examination requires compared with a non-forensic procedure. Non-forensic PM’s 
should be subject to the same audit regime as forensic post mortems as the outcomes are 
important and critical to grieving families who deserve to know the true cause of death (Rutty, 
2006). Rutty points to the poor quality of non-forensic post mortem from his considerable 
experience as a forensic pathologist in various parts of England. 
                                                             
51 The fee then payable for a non-forensic ‘routine’ autopsy which is now £96.80. An enhanced fee of 276.90 is payable 
by the coroner for a post mortem requiring ‘additional skills’. http://www.bma.org.uk/support-at-work/pay-fees-
allowances/fees/fee-finder/fee-finder-coroners. 
52 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31536753 
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Another study (Johnson, 1969) attempted to estimate the frequency of unnatural deaths 
discovered at autopsy by reviewing over 5000 death cases not considered as suspicious over a 
five-year period between 1963 and 1967. Of these cases, 263 were found to be suspicious in that 
174 were cases of poisoning; 34 were head injury cases; 14 had other injuries to the body; 11 
asphyxia cases; 1 hanging; 1 cut throat; 1 electrocution; 18 definite homicides and 9 criminal 
abortions. This represented over 5% of all the identified unnatural deaths from the original total 
number of cases. Johnson commented that although there was information which would bring 
these cases into the unnatural category they were missed as potential homicides, even though in 
some cases there were visible injuries. He identified that the main reasons were that the body 
had not been properly examined at the scene either by the attending doctor or the police officer, 
or because in some cases no examination had taken place at all. In other cases, no investigation 
appeared to have taken place at the scene of the death. There were also examples of deliberate 
deception and concealment of information by relatives in the deaths identified as being criminal. 
In many cases assumptions had been made that because the deceased was either old or had been 
ill that death was due to natural causes. This again highlights the importance of the initial scene 
investigation by the police. At the time of the study, there was no formal training for police 
officers in death investigation (Johnson, 1969). 
Cases without an adequate medico-legal investigation of the person who has died a violent or 
sudden death of unexplained cause are fraught with danger (Harvard, 1960; Jones, 2014). Even 
the most competent physician if he or she attempts to certify the cause of such deaths on the 
basis of the available clinical history and external examination of the body is likely to be proven 
wrong by a medico-legal post mortem in one out of every three cases (Harvard, 1960). This 
highlights the importance of a forensic post mortem in suspicious death cases. In 1942, the 
advisor to the Home Office on toxicology, Dr Roche Lynch reported that of eight exhumations he 
had examined, seven were homicide that had been missed due to inadequate investigation 
(Roche, 1942).  
Failing to use the services of a HORFP is of concern, as there are specific examples of police 
placing undue reliance on the findings of non-forensic or ‘routine’ PM examinations, believing 
that a non-forensic PM will reveal foul play. Reliance on a non-forensic post mortem could lead at 
best to forensic evidence being lost during the PM by unqualified practitioners and at worst to 
missed homicides (Jones, 2014). In every case where homicide is a possibility, the police must 
request that the coroner appoint a HORFP.  
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It can clearly be seen that any police and coronial practice of engaging a non-forensic pathologist 
to conduct a post mortem procedure is therefore dangerous in terms of missing or failing to 
identify the case as homicide or losing vital forensic evidence. Thus, the decision as to whether to 
treat a death as suspicious and ensure that there is an appropriate medical determination of 
death by a HORFP is critical to the investigation. This again opens the question as to how many 
homicides may be missed by non-forensic pathologists conducting coronial PM’s. 
Hutton (2015) considered that if both coronial and forensic pathology were joined together into 
one service, it would raise standards of non-forensic autopsy practice and ensure a structured 
career path for forensic pathologists. The outcome of the Hutton recommendations is awaited but 
being the third major review recommending employed status for forensic pathologists, it is 
doubtful in the current economic landscape the recommendation of a national autopsy service 
will come to fruition. Things may change when there is public outcry that the lack of pathologists 
willing to do the important work of coroner’s autopsies will result in deaths not being properly 
investigated. 
Since the time of Bernard Spilsbury, the first 'Home Office Pathologist' there has been in total 142 
known53 forensic pathologists who have members of this very exclusive and famous Register or 
'List'.  
The current Register can be viewed online at the following link: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/303730/Registe
rForensicPathologists.pdf 
  
                                                             
53 This figure represents only known members of the Register from Home Office records. There may have been 
others where documentation no longer exists 
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Appendix 4: Biasing Effects 
 
Forensic Science Regulator’s description of bias. (FSR, 2015). 
Bias Definition 
Anchoring or 
focalism 
The tendency to rely too heavily on one piece of 
information when making decisions. 
Blinding Shielding the forensic examiner from 
information about the case that is not required 
in order to conduct the examination. 
Cognitive bias A pattern of deviation in judgement whereby 
inferences about other people and situations 
may be drawn in an illogical fashion. 
Confirmation 
bias 
The tendency to test hypotheses by looking for 
confirming evidence rather than potentially 
conflicting evidence. 
Contextual bias The tendency for a consideration to be 
influenced by background information. 
Debias The reduction or elimination of the impact of 
bias in decision making and problem solving. 
Expectation bias Also known as experimenter bias, where the 
expectation of what will be found affects what 
is actually found. 
Photogrammetry The practice of obtaining reliable information 
about physical objects through the processes of 
recording measuring and interpreting 
photographic images. 
Psychological 
contamination 
Exposure to other information that is irrelevant 
to the assessment but that introduces 
subconscious bias into the findings. 
Reconstructive 
effects 
The tendency when people rely on memory to 
fill in gaps on recall with what they believe 
should have happened. 
Role effects The tendency for individuals to identify themselves as 
part of a team with common goals, which may 
introduce subconscious bias. 
 
 
There is much literature which aims to understand what causes investigations, particularly 
homicides to go wrong and miscarriages of justice. One of these is if the first stage of the 
investigation fails to reveal that a crime has been committed (Jones, 2014). The academic 
literature describing the role of bias in failed investigations is summarized by DeJong (2015): 
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Terms and Concepts Associated with Confirmation Bias. (DeJonge, 2015). 
 
 
Type of 
Confirmation 
Bias 
 
Explanation 
Anchoring 
Effect 
 
 
Refers to people within a group tending to agree with 
others’ beliefs creating an ‘anchor’ of an original set of 
hypotheses that refuses to be challenged Rossmo, 
2006; Findley, 2009. 
Asymmetrical 
Scepticism 
A preference for information that confirms, rather than 
disconfirms, an already existing belief. (Rossmo, 2006; 
Ask and Granhag, 2007; Ask, Rebelius and Granhag, 
2008). 
Belief 
Perseverance 
Maintaining one’s belief (e.g. that the suspect is guilty) 
even when strong evidence (including DNA) is 
presented. (Findley and Scott, 2006; Savage and Milne, 
2007) 
Case Closure A case may close due to lack of evidence or perceived 
lack of evidence; may also refer to finding a fast end to 
a case by believing (wrongly) in the guilt of a suspect. 
(Lean and Lynn, 2012; Fahsing and Ask, 2013) aka 
premature closure (Savage and Milne, 2007) 
Case Denial Refusing or failing to accept there is a case to 
investigate (e.g. due to prejudice towards the victim) 
(Savage and Milne, 2007; Lea and Lynn, 2012) 
Cognitive Bias Predetermined set of psychological characteristics that 
sets a person up to be biased in investigations (e.g. 
belief in racial characteristics or ones based on gender 
etc.). Rossmo, 2014. 
Cognitive 
Closure 
Desire for a clear-cut conclusion – to reach closure as 
quickly as possible (Ask and Granhag, 2005) 
Fundamental 
Attribution 
Error 
Explaining the behavior of others (e.g. a suspect) by 
reference to their character or characteristics (with or 
without looking at other evidence) (Richardson, 2012) 
Freeze Maintaining a steadfast position even when evidence 
to the contrary comes to light (Ask and Granhag, 2007) 
Hindsight Bias A ‘we-knew-it-all-along’ belief in the guilty party; aka 
outcome bias (Findlay, 2006; Salet and Terpstra, 2014) 
Hypotheses 
Bias 
 
 
A set of hypotheses stating possible explanations for 
an event by ignoring or failing to consider others to the 
contrary (“closed mindedness”) (Findley and Scott, 
2006; Rassin, Erland and Kuijpers, 2010; O’Brien, 2009; 
Wastell, Weeks, Wearing and Duncan, 2012) 
Implicit Bias Judgments made based on a person’s ambiguous 
behavior often interpreting people of different 
ethnicities (who exhibit the same behavior as others) 
in a more negative light (e.g. racial bias) (Richardson, 
2012) 
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Institutional 
Incompetence 
Pressures from an institution to find a suspect even if 
insufficient evidence is gathered or other possibilities 
exist (Grieve, Crego and Griffiths 2007; Jones, 2011) 
Tunnel Vision 
 
Refers to holding onto one’s belief even when faced 
with evidence to the contrary; confirmation bias may 
be a symptom of tunnel vision or vice versa or 
regarded as equivalent. Aka investigator bias 
(Findley, 2006; Rossmo, 2006; Salet and Terpstra, 
2014; Price and Dahl, 2014) 
Verification 
Bias 
Any instance of creating a narrative based on 
'perception' rather than, or prior to, 'open evidence' 
which considers all viewpoints; often regarded as 
synonymous to confirmation bias (ACPO, 2005b; 
Rossmo, 2006; Vrij, 2000; Jones, 2011) 
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Appendix 5: Ethical approval letter 
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Appendix 6: Key Features of Investigative Interviewing 
 
Investigative interviewing 
The term ‘Investigative Interviewing’ separates the particular skills of generic interviewing to that 
whereby evidence or intelligence is gathered as part of a criminal investigation. There are many 
reasons to ‘interview’ another person prospective employees are interviewed for occupational 
vacancies, doctor’s interview patients in order to conclude a diagnosis, and a bank manager may 
interview a hopeful loan applicant. Interviewing is in fact a part of everyday life. One could argue 
that everyday conversation between two or more individuals constitutes ‘interviewing’. It is the 
interaction between two or more individuals with an aim of gaining comments or information. 
Milne defines investigative interviewing as: 
 ‘In the context of policing, the purpose is the gathering of information, to feed into the 
investigative process and to later be considered as evidence’ (Milne, 2005, p. 3). 
The main difference between normal human interaction and interviewing within the context of a 
criminal investigation, is that the process of investigative interviewing must be capable of 
withstanding the rigours of a judicial process. Within this context there are clear legal 
requirements. This is similar in many ways to expectations of fairness and objectivity in the 
interviewing of participants in academic research. However, there are also clear ‘rules’ dictated by 
psychological research which have perhaps been even more impactive upon how witnesses and 
suspects should be interviewed to secure reliable and ethical interviewing, (Milne and Bull, 1999). 
It is argued that the same principles of Investigative Interviewing should be applied in relation to 
the obtaining of information from any person, including academic research. 
Table 2.5 – The PEACE Model 
 Explanation Commentary 
P Planning and 
Preparation 
The planning and preparation is when the researcher will organise 
and plan for the interview and make mutually agreeable 
arrangements with participants in relation to the interview. This will 
also require a semi-structured interview questionnaire to guide the 
researcher into various generic issues which are required to be 
covered. 
E Engage and Explain Engage and explain is the phase of the interview where rapport is 
built. This is often overlooked but is a very important part of the 
process as this could determine the relationship with the 
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participant and therefore builds trust and eventually the amount of 
information and data obtained. 
A Account The account phase is the actual interview itself. It is essential that 
open questions (TED questions, Griffiths and Milne 2006) are used 
to elicit the maximum information. Questioning style is very 
important to the researcher as the over use of questioning styles 
can skew the answers given. Leading questions which inherently 
contain a degree of the questioner’s own bias can be particularly 
dangerous and research has shown that police officers, when 
interviewing adult witnesses, who use such questions risk obtaining 
erroneous information. (Clarke & Milne, 2001). It is equally 
important to allow the interviewee plenty of time to answer the 
question and for the interviewer to use silence to their advantage. 
Research in the United States in the early 90’s revealed that police 
officers on average allow an interviewee just 6 seconds to answer a 
question and in this way, the interviewee becomes accustomed to 
answering with short factual responses and not then elaborate the 
wealth of other information which a researcher seeks (Fisher and 
Geiselman, 1992). 
 
C Closure Closure of the interview describes the ending of the process and 
informing the interviewee what will happen next, thanking them for 
their participation and arranging any follow up processes. 
E Evaluation Evaluation is twofold. Firstly, it is to reflect on the process of the 
interview itself – what went well, what went not so well and what 
can I learn from it for the next interview? Secondly is the actual 
process of evaluation of the collected data and deciding on issues 
such as transcription, content analysis and deriving meaning from 
the assembled material. 
 
There are alternative models: Whiting (2008) describes an alternative model for the research 
interview starting with rapport building and engaging in general conversation prior to the main 
focus of the interview commencing. This then develops into the exploration phase in which more 
in depth discussion of the issues takes place. Once comfort levels are reached, the interview 
enters the co-operation phase where there is free discussion and the interviewee should show 
signs of enjoying the process. The penultimate level is the participation phase where the 
interviewee is fully engaged and actively ‘guiding and teaching’ the interviewer and the final stage 
is concluding the interview.  
There are precedents for the use of semi structured interviews in criminal justice enquiries. 
Savage and Milne (2007) used semi-structured interviews with a range of individuals associated 
with miscarriages of justice. Interviewees included representatives from campaigning 
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organisations, lawyers, journalists, victims and relatives of victims of miscarriages of justice. The 
research aimed to determine both the ‘critical failure points’ across a range of past cases of 
miscarriages of justice. One of the principles of Investigative interviewing is the type of questions 
used when speaking to the focus groups. Historically the use of ‘open questions’ were those 
preceded with what are sometimes referred to as ‘Kipling’s wise men’ which prefix any question 
with what, when, where, why, who and how. This is sometimes referred to as ‘5WH’ (Kipling, 
1902) see figure 11 (Kipling, 1902). 
 
 
 
Kipling (1992) 
Although these types of questions are preferable to closed questions which tend to elicit a one 
word answer, open questions are now considered to be those which prefix with ‘Tell me..., 
Explain to me... and Describe to me...’. These are referred to as TED questions (Griffiths and Milne 
2006; Oxburgh, Myklebust and Grant 2010). The use of open questions will elicit the maximum 
information from an interviewee as it does not encourage a yes or no answer and allows the 
respondent to explain their answer thus gaining more information on which to base further 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
I Keep six honest serving-men: (They taught me all I know) 
Their names are What and Where and When and How and 
Why and Who. 
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Appendix 7: SPSS output for Multi-dimensional Scaling 
 
PROXIMITIES  S G NS H PH DA EM EF MAM MAF YA CYP I M Med DV V 
  /PRINT NONE 
  /MATRIX OUT('C:\Users\Dean\AppData\Local\Temp\spss357180\spssalsc.tmp') 
  /MEASURE=EUCLID 
  /STANDARDIZE=NONE 
  /VIEW=VARIABLE. 
Notes 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
Workspace Bytes 
Files Saved Matrix File 
 
Notes 
Output Created 25-MAR-2016 09:32:03 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\Dean\Desktop\Draft THESIS\SPSS Output\SSA 
Chart.1.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 17 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax PROXIMITIES  S G NS H PH DA EM EF MAM MAF YA CYP 
I M Med DV V 
  /PRINT NONE 
  /MATRIX 
OUT('C:\Users\Dean\AppData\Local\Temp\spss357180\spssa
lsc.tmp') 
  /MEASURE=EUCLID 
  /STANDARDIZE=NONE 
  /VIEW=VARIABLE. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
Workspace Bytes 1432 
Files Saved Matrix File C:\Users\Dean\AppData\Local\Temp\spss357180\spssalsc.tm
p 
 
 
Case Processing Summarya 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
17 100.0% 0 0.0% 17 100.0% 
 
a.  Euclidean Distance used 
 
Proximities 
ALSCAL 
  /MATRIX=IN('C:\Users\Dean\AppData\Local\Temp\spss357180\spssalsc.tmp') 
  /LEVEL=ORDINAL 
  /CONDITION=MATRIX 
  /MODEL=EUCLID 
  /CRITERIA=CONVERGE(0.001) STRESSMIN(0.005) ITER(30) CUTOFF(0) DIMENS(2,2) 
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  /PLOT=DEFAULT ALL 
  /PRINT=DATA HEADER. 
Alscal 
Notes 
Output Created 25-MAR-2016 09:32:03 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\Dean\Desktop\Draft THESIS\SPSS Output\SSA 
Chart.1.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 17 
Syntax ALSCAL 
  
/MATRIX=IN('C:\Users\Dean\AppData\Local\Temp\spss357180\
spssalsc.tmp') 
  /LEVEL=ORDINAL 
  /CONDITION=MATRIX 
  /MODEL=EUCLID 
  /CRITERIA=CONVERGE(0.001) STRESSMIN(0.005) 
ITER(30) CUTOFF(0) DIMENS(2,2) 
  /PLOT=DEFAULT ALL 
  /PRINT=DATA HEADER. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.50 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.50 
 
Alscal Procedure Options 
 
Data Options- 
Number of Rows (Observations/Matrix).   17 
Number of Columns (Variables) .  .  .  .  .  .   17 
Number of Matrices   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1 
Measurement Level .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Ordinal 
Data Matrix Shape .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . Symmetric 
Type  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Dissimilarity 
Approach to Ties  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Leave Tied 
Conditionality .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Matrix 
Data Cutoff at .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   .000000 
 
Model Options- 
Model .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . Euclid 
Maximum Dimensionality  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2 
Minimum Dimensionality  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 
Negative Weights  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Not Permitted 
 
Output Options- 
Job Option Header .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Printed 
Data Matrices  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . Printed 
Configurations and Transformations  .  .  .  Plotted 
Output Dataset .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Not Created 
Initial Stimulus Coordinates  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   Computed 
 
Algorithmic Options- 
Maximum Iterations   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  30 
Convergence Criterion   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     .00100 
Minimum S-stress  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .    .00500 
Missing Data Estimated by  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  Ulbounds 
Tiestore .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 136 
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Raw (unscaled) Data for Subject 1 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 .000                 
2 2.291 .000                
3 2.694 2.055 .000               
4 1.353 2.146 2.056 .000              
5 1.954 1.568 1.770 2.040 .000             
6 2.091 1.852 1.623 1.653 1.605 .000            
7 1.782 1.586 1.995 1.506 1.896 2.080 .000           
8 2.016 1.562 1.923 1.678 1.815 2.168 1.760 .000          
9 2.026 1.813 1.825 1.985 1.496 1.501 1.974 2.167 .000         
10 2.056 1.517 1.791 2.027 1.415 1.596 1.828 1.895 1.865 .000        
11 1.945 2.144 1.608 1.485 1.753 1.234 1.954 2.066 2.107 1.875 .000       
12 1.491 1.824 2.064 1.738 1.669 1.876 1.697 1.800 1.904 1.727 1.756 .000      
13 1.543 1.726 1.981 1.771 1.647 1.875 1.616 1.755 1.724 1.703 1.832 1.573 .000     
14 1.799 1.825 1.889 1.402 1.914 1.669 1.583 1.544 2.261 1.782 1.390 1.360 1.848 .000    
15 1.677 1.924 1.937 1.373 1.934 1.934 1.523 1.312 2.223 1.550 1.661 1.797 1.799 1.244 .000   
16 1.367 2.135 2.211 1.495 1.554 1.672 1.983 1.975 2.191 1.709 1.319 1.166 1.804 1.344 1.734 .000  
17 1.469 1.695 2.280 1.382 1.661 1.619 1.600 1.616 2.000 2.115 1.577 1.569 1.605 1.370 1.748 1.497 .000 
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Iteration history for the 2 dimensional solution (in squared distances) 
 
                  Young's S-stress formula 1 is used. 
 
                Iteration     S-stress      Improvement 
                    1           .34179 
                    2           .29967         .04212 
                    3           .29306         .00661 
                    4           .29140         .00167 
                    5           .29079         .00061 
 
                         Iterations stopped because 
                 S-stress improvement is less than   .001000 
 
                                         Stress and squared correlation (RSQ) in distances 
 
                             RSQ values are the proportion of variance of the scaled data (disparities) 
                                        in the partition (row, matrix, or entire data) which 
                                         is accounted for by their corresponding distances. 
                                           Stress values are Kruskal's stress formula 1. 
 
                For  matrix 
    Stress  =   .21727      RSQ =  .71372 
 
           Configuration derived in 2 dimensions 
 
                   Stimulus Coordinates 
 
                        Dimension 
 
Stimulus   Stimulus     1        2 
 Number      Name 
 
    1      S          1.8926    .1970 
    2      G          -.9816   1.3893 
    3      NS        -1.8273  -1.1330 
    4      H          1.3225   -.3984 
    5      PH        -1.2141   -.1190 
    6      DA         -.6426  -1.3101 
    7      EM          .4731   1.4302 
    8      EF         -.0007   1.5129 
    9      MAM       -1.8792    .1866 
   10      MAF       -1.2348   -.1417 
   11      YA          .1244  -1.4711 
   12      CYP         .5369    .2264 
   13      I          -.0464    .8255 
   14      M           .6727   -.4336 
   15      Med        1.0163    .1938 
   16      DV          .7815  -1.0584 
   17      V          1.0067    .1035 
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Optimally scaled data (disparities) for subject   1 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 .000                 
2 3.112 .000                
3 3.951 2.884 .000               
4 .947 2.884 2.884 .000              
5 2.776 1.612 1.612 2.884 .000             
6 2.884 2.083 1.612 1.612 1.612 .000            
7 1.612 1.612 2.884 1.612 2.269 2.884 .000           
8 2.884 1.612 2.542 1.612 1.790 2.884 1.612 .000          
9 2.884 1.790 1.790 2.884 1.191 1.612 2.776 2.884 .000         
10 2.884 1.612 1.612 2.884 .947 1.612 2.083 2.269 2.083 .000        
11 2.776 2.884 1.612 1.191 1.612 .947 2.776 2.884 2.884 2.083 .000       
12 1.191 1.790 2.884 1.612 1.612 2.083 1.612 1.612 2.269 1.612 1.612 .000      
13 1.612 1.612 2.776 1.612 1.612 2.083 1.612 1.612 1.612 1.612 2.083 1.612 .000     
14 1.612 2.083 2.269 .947 2.269 1.612 1.612 1.612 2.884 1.612 .947 .947 2.083 .000    
15 1.612 2.542 2.776 .947 2.542 2.542 1.612 .947 2.884 1.612 1.612 1.612 1.612 .947 .000   
16 .947 2.884 2.884 1.191 1.612 1.612 2.776 2.776 2.884 1.612 .947 .947 1.790 .947 1.612 .000  
17 .947 1.612 3.092 .947 1.612 1.612 1.612 1.612 2.884 2.884 1.612 1.612 1.612 .947 1.612 1.191 .000 
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Appendix 8: SPSS output for Multi-dimensional Unfolding 
 
PREFSCAL VARIABLES=S G NS H PH DA EM EF MAM MAF YA CYP I M Med DV V 
/INITIAL=CLASSICAL(TRIANGLE) 
/CONDITION=ROW 
/TRANSFORMATION=ORDINAL(KEEPTIES) 
/PROXIMITIES=SIMILARITIES 
/CRITERIA=DIMENSIONS(2,2) DIFFSTRESS(.000001) MINSTRESS(.0001) MAXITER(5000) 
/PENALTY=LAMBDA(0.5) OMEGA(1.0) 
/PRINT=MEASURES COMMON 
/PLOT=COMMON. 
Prefscal 
Notes 
Output Created 11-APR-2016 11:14:54 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\Dean\Desktop\Draft THESIS\SPSS Output\SSA 
Chart.1.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 17 
Syntax PREFSCAL VARIABLES=S G NS H PH DA EM EF MAM MAF 
YA CYP I M Med DV V 
/INITIAL=CLASSICAL(TRIANGLE) 
/CONDITION=ROW 
/TRANSFORMATION=ORDINAL(KEEPTIES) 
/PROXIMITIES=SIMILARITIES 
/CRITERIA=DIMENSIONS(2,2) DIFFSTRESS(.000001) 
MINSTRESS(.0001) MAXITER(5000) 
/PENALTY=LAMBDA(0.5) OMEGA(1.0) 
/PRINT=MEASURES COMMON 
/PLOT=COMMON. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.91 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.94 
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Warnings 
Negative proximities found. 
Credit 
Prefscal 
Version 1.0 
by 
Data Theory Scaling System Group (DTSS) 
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Leiden University, The Netherlands 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 17 
Sources 1 
Row Objects 17 
Column Objects 17 
Analysis Diagnostics 
History of Iterations 
Iteration Penalized Stress Difference Stress Penalty 
0 .9391690  .5415626 1.6286916 
5000a .2488918 .0000006 .0161926 3.8256498 
 
a. Maximum number of iterations (MAXITER) exceeded. 
Measures 
Iterations 5000 
Final Function Value .2488918 
Function Value Parts Stress Part .0161926 
Penalty Part 3.8256498 
Badness of Fit Normalized Stress .0002622 
Kruskal's Stress-I .0161925 
Kruskal's Stress-II .2290840 
Young's S-Stress-I .0315057 
Young's S-Stress-II .1724638 
Goodness of Fit Dispersion Accounted For .9997378 
Variance Accounted For .9664407 
Recovered Preference Orders .7154587 
Spearman's Rho .8369317 
Kendall's Tau-b .7563974 
Variation Coefficients Variation Proximities .3913715 
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Variation Transformed Proximities .3028881 
Variation Distances 1.0788147 
Degeneracy Indices Sum-of-Squares of DeSarbo's Intermixedness 
Indices 
1.4495751 
Shepard's Rough Nondegeneracy Index .4584775 
Common Space 
Final Row Coordinates 
 
Dimension 
1 2 
1 2.343 1.401 
2 -.157 .654 
3 -21.185 -6.151 
4 17.961 -4.065 
5 1.199 1.085 
6 -5.581 -.807 
7 -2.820 -.116 
8 .220 .795 
9 .469 -1.135 
10 -.142 2.000 
11 -5.553 -.936 
12 1.172 -.218 
13 1.230 -.117 
14 16.535 -5.948 
15 .783 .961 
16 .665 -.654 
17 -1.550 2.905 
Final Column Coordinates 
 
Dimension 
1 2 
S .652 2.027 
G 1.199 -.029 
NS -12.375 -1.498 
H .614 2.019 
PH 2.237 1.504 
DA -2.162 .643 
EM -2.043 -1.057 
EF .522 2.006 
MAM 1.201 -.034 
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MAF .532 2.006 
YA -1.967 -1.133 
CYP 1.192 -.035 
I 1.204 -.040 
M .597 2.018 
Med 1.201 -.029 
DV 1.195 -.036 
V .612 2.016 
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Appendix 9: Police Practice Advice 
DRAFT 
Prepared by Dean Jones as part of suggested practice advice to police for the investigation of 
sudden and unexplained death. This is part of a far larger document considering all aspects of 
the scene management and pathology considerations in a ‘suspicious death investigation.  
 
PRACTICE ADVICE FOR DEALING WITH UNEXPLAINED DEATH AND THE MEDICAL INVESTIGATION 
Section 1: INTRODUCTION 
This document provides advice on dealing with the initial stages of a sudden and unexplained 
death; for those cases where a decision is made that medical assistance is required; and on the 
role and provision of forensic pathology assistance in police death investigations. Dealing with the 
death of a human being is one of the most fundamental of police roles, and one that over the 
years has brought much criticism to the police service in England and Wales.  
A report published by the Forensic Science Regulator in November 2015;  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484298/Report
_into_the_2012_FSR_FP_Audit_Publication_copy_pdf.pdf 
highlights the potential to ‘miss’ a homicide.  In order to reduce the likelihood of such an 
eventuality, it is essential that the police service deal with death in a systematic and professional 
manner. 
Forensic pathology is an essential element in most suspicious death and homicide investigations.  
Senior investigating officers (SIOs) require a clear knowledge of how pathology can assist the 
investigation, and of the varied issues that are associated with the discipline.   
Home Office Registered Forensic Pathologists are appointed in each suspicious death case by the 
Senior Coroner for the relevant district, in consultation with the local Chief Officer of Police 
(although in practice this will be the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). In such cases, the 
pathologist receives a small fee from the coroner, but the main case fee is paid by the police. 
Forensic pathology in England and Wales is overseen by the Home Office Pathology Delivery 
Board (PDB), which is responsible for the maintenance of the Home Office Register of forensic 
pathologists, and issues connected with the medical investigation of death in police cases.  
 
ACTIONS AT THE SCENES OF SUDDEN AND UNEXPLAINED DEATH 
Police involvement in a sudden and unexplained death will usually commence with a call into the 
command and Control centre. This may lead to the deployment of an officer to the scene of 
where the body lies. This is an important phase of the investigation and it is essential that the call 
handler ensures that the following actions are completed: 
Caller details are obtained 
Location of the body is ascertained 
Establish if an ambulance has been deployed 
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Establish who is present with the body 
Ensure intelligence checks are made in respect of the deceased and the address at which the body 
is located 
Risk assessment is undertaken prior to deployment of resources 
Deployment of resources is made in accordance with force procedures 
Language use when deploying officers is non-judgemental and unbiased in order that the 
attending officer does not pre-judge whether the death is suspicious or not. 
 
The overriding priority for the attending officer is firstly their own health and safety, and secondly 
to preserve life. The person may not in fact be dead so the question as to whether life is extinct 
will need to be established. The officer should consider first aid and other life saving measures as 
a priority. They should also confirm with the control room whether an ambulance has been 
deployed. If there is any doubt whether the person is alive or dead, an ambulance should be 
deployed (a FME/Nurse/police surgeon should not normally be called as they are not trained to 
deal with potential crime scenes). 
If the case appears to be non-suspicious, the General Practitioner who has treated the deceased 
within 14 days of death may attend and issue a Medical Certificate of the Cause of Death form 
(MCCD). Once this has been issued, there may be no further need for police involvement other 
than security of any property. 
 
If a MCCD cannot be issued, the case will have to be referred to the coroner for investigation, who 
should be informed as soon as possible after the discovery of the body. If the cause of death 
cannot immediately be ascertained from the available medical evidence, the case should be 
considered a ‘suspicious’ death and the attending police officer will need to conduct the following 
enquiries; 
 
 Note what you see and what you do (consider Body Worn Video/notes sketch etc.) 
 Assess body – injuries/trauma? 
 Sign of break in/disturbance/alcohol/drugs (including paraphernalia). 
 Search scene for other bodies/offender present or hiding? 
 Establish if the deceased was vulnerable 
 Intelligence checks on deceased and on property 
 Identify witnesses 
 Consider the death as suspicious until identified otherwise – keep an open mind 
 If third party insolvent is suspected, protect the scene, set up a cordon and scene log. Call for 
assistance and maintain a scene log.  
 ABC – Assume nothing; Believe nobody; Challenge everything! 
 Ensure a supervisor is informed 
 Call the on-duty CSI 
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Appendix 10: Form UPR 16 
 
FORM UPR16 
 
 
 
Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 
Student ID: 
 
15040 
 
PGRS Name: 
 
 
Dean Jones 
 
Department: 
 
 
ICJS 
 
First Supervisor: 
 
Prof Becky Milne 
 
Start Date:  
(or progression date for Prof Doc students) 
 
 
Sept 2014 
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Study Mode and Route: 
 
Part-time
 
Full-time 
  

 
 
 
 
MPhil  
 
PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MD 
 
Professional Doctorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title of Thesis: 
 
 
Fatal Call: Getting away with murder? 
 
 
 
Thesis Word Count:  
(excluding ancillary data) 
 
 
49532 
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If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee 
for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, 
academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical 
conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
 
 
UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online 
version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/) 
 
 
a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and 
within a reasonable time frame? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
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c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication 
and authorship? 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it 
remain so for the required duration?  
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
   
      
 
Candidate Statement: 
 
 
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully 
obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
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Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from 
NRES/SCREC): 
 
 
14 15:19 
 
If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or more of 
questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so: 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Signed (PGRS): 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 22/8/2016 
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